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ABSTRACT
This thesis concerns two issues of current interest in the foundations
of cognitive science. The two issues are treated in three independent
essays.
The first two essays concern a recent attack on the Representational
Theory of Mind (RTM). According to RTM, propositional attitude states,
states such as believing that p, desiring that q, etc. are to be analyzed
as relations to mental symbols. Like the sentences of a language, these
mental symbols are held to have semantic properties as well as formal, or
syntactic, properties. Stephen Stich has argued that, while cognitive
scientists should continue to posit mental symbols, there is no need to
regard the symbols as having any semantic or representational properties.
He thus proposes to replace RTM with the Syntactic Theory of Mind (STM).
In the first essay, I consider the question of whether, in fact,
theories in cognitive science must appeal to the semantic properties of
mental symbols. I argue that if homuncular functionalism, a popular
account of the structure of explanations in cognitive science, is correct,
then explanations of cognitive capacities will appeal in an essential way
to the representational properties of mental symbols. Modifying such
explanations to eliminate this appeal results, I argue, in a loss of
generality and a loss of simplicity.
The second essay considers STM itself. I note that one of the
potentially attractive features of STM is that it seems to avoid what
Hilary Putnam has called the collateral information problem (the CI
problem), the problem of having to distinguish the acquisition of beliefs
that change the content of a mental symbol from the acquisition of mere
facts, or collateral information. I argue that the principle of STM which
Stich uses to escape the CI problem is itself untenable. In particular,
the principle has the consequence that STM-based theories are unable to
distinguish between pairs of beliefs that have the same logical form. I
conclude that STM must abandon the principle which has this consequence,
leaving it vulnerable to the CI problem. The attractiveness of STM is
thereby diminished.
The final essay in the thesis concerns the use of connectionist
networks in cognitive science. These networks are composed of large
numbers of densely connected simple processing units that operate in
parallel. Connectionist models are often portrayed as radical alternatives
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to models based on conventional, symbol-processing computer architectures.
It has been suggested in response that connectionist models are most
plausible as low-level accounts, or implementations, of symbol-processing
models. I argue for this latter view. In particular, I show that some who
have urged the more radical understanding of connectionist models have
based their views on very particular kinds of connectionist networks, which
turn out to be overly simple. More adequate networks, I argue, are more
likely to turn out to be implementations of conventional, symbol-processing
models.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Ned Block
Title: Professor of Philosophy
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Homuncular Functionalism and Syntactic Theories of Mind
Since the publication of The Language of Thought in 1975, Jerry Fodor
and like-minded philosophers of psychology have been developing a view of
the mind based on the oft-drawn analogy between thought and language. For
Fodor and other proponents of the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM),
the central element of the analogy is the claim that having a belief or a
thought is like having a sentence inscribed in one's brain.1 In fact,
having a belief or a thought is, on this view, having a sentence inscribed
somewhere in one's head. Its just that the sentence is a sentence in a
special language--the language of thought (LOT)--and, the sentence is not
inscribed in ink or lead, but in some yet to be understood manner. If this
analogy between language and thought is a good one, then we should expect
sentences in the language of thought to have both a syntactic form and a
meaning. Proponents of the Representational Theory of Mind believe that
they do. The meaning of language of thought sentences plays an important
role according to RTM in determining the nature of a person's beliefs.
Specifically, when you have a belief, and, therefore, a sentence of LOT
inscribed in your head, it is the meaning or content of the sentence that
determines which belief you have. To have the belief that it's raining,
for example, is to have a sentence of LOT inscribed in one's head whose
content is that it's raining.
1. Although Fodor doesn't label it the "Representational Theory of Mind"
until Fodor, 1980, the locus classicus for the view is probably Fodor,
1978.
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One of the challenges facing RTM is to say what it is to have an LOT
sentence of a given syntactic form inscribed or encoded somehow in your
head. The proponent of RTM receives some comfort here from the analogy,
which she embraces, between minds and computers. For, it is reasonably
clear that we can invent formal languages--programming languages, e.g.--and
store sentences of such languages in a computer's memory. Another
challenge facing RTM is to say what determines the meaning or content of an
LOT sentence with a particular syntactic form. This challenge is widely
thought to be considerably more vexing.
In a recent book, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case
Against Belief, Stephen Stich goes so far as to argue that the challenge of
saying what determines the meaning or content of a particular sentence in
the language of thought presents insurmountable obstacles. As a result, he
urges a more limited analogy between language and thought. Stich agrees
that the psychological states corresponding to what we call beliefs are
like sentences written in the head. And, like sentences in a natural
language, sentences in the head have a syntactic form. But, unlike
sentences in a natural language, they do not, on Stich's view, have a
particular meaning or semantic content. And, the same goes for beliefs and
other psychological states which, according to RTM, inherit their content
from the content of sentences in the language of thought. The
psychological states of interest to cognitive scientists, Stich argues,
should be ascribed syntactic, or formal, properties, but the question of
what the states mean, or what their semantic content is, should be
discarded. Stich urges that the Representational Theory of Mind be
replaced by the Syntactic Theory of Mind (STM).
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If questions about the meaning or semantic content of psychological
states can simply be discarded, then the semantic content of these states
must not, or at least need not, play any important role in cognitive
science. Hence, the plausibility of STM, and any other view which urges
cognitive science to dispense with the notion of the meaning or content of
psychological states, depends crucially on a claim about explanations in
cognitive science. Specifically Stich must endorse the following thesis2:
(T) Appeal to what a psychological state means, represents, is about, or
refers to plays no essential role in explanations in cognitive
science.3
(By "essential" I mean a role that could not equally well be filled by
appeal to the syntactic form of the psychological state.) The thesis above
is the subject of this essay. I shall call it the thesis of the
dispensability of meaning (in cognitive science), and the opposing thesis,
the one I shall defend, the thesis of the indispensability of meaning (in
cognitive science). In arguing for the indispensability of meaning my aim
is to undermine the Syntactic Theory of Mind and any other view which urges
that cognitive science "go syntactic."
2. Well, not quite. Stich might want to limit his claim to those states
which are analogous to beliefs, admitting that appeal might be made to
the meaning or content of other psychological states. One would think,
however, that if claims about meaning were to be essential for any
cognitive states at all, they would be essential for belief-like states.
For this reason, I won't worry about distinguishing between belief-like
states (or other propositional-attitude-like states) and other cognitive
states in arguing for the indispensability of meaning.
3. My talk of "what a psychological state means" is really just shorthand
for what the mental representation or symbol whose tokening the state
consists of means.
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Arguments for the indispensability of meaning have usually emphasized
the importance of generalizations that quantify over mental contents.4 It
is claimed, for example, that there are certain true important
generalizations relating cognitive states and behavior, which could not be
stated except by appeal to the content of those states. Hence, the
argument goes, a theory which failed to ascribe content to these states,
would miss true important generalizations. 5 In this essay, I give a rather
different argument for the indispensability of meaning. The argument
begins by assuming a widely accepted view of explanation in cognitive
science, one which Bill Lycan has dubbed homuncular functionalism
(homunctionalism for short).6 Versions of the view can be found in Fodor,
1968; Dennett, 1978; Haugeland, 1978; Lycan, 1981; and Cummins, 1975 and
1983. Homunctionalism specifies a certain form for explanations in
cognitive science. I will argue that psychological explanations which have
that form commonly depend on the ascription of meaning or content to
psychological states referred to in the explanation. Hence, the
homunctionalist conception of explanation in cognitive science is
incompatible with the thesis of the dispensability of meaning.
4. And, these are the only arguments Stich responds to in defending the
thesis of the dispensability of meaning. See, in particular, Stich,
1983, pp. 170-83.
5. This argument is given in detail in Pylyshyn, 1981 (p. 161). See also
Pylyshyn 1984, pp. 31-32, Fodor, 1986, p. 3, and Fodor, 1987, pp. 4-8 in
regard to the emphasis on -generalizations that quantify over mental
contents.
6. Cummins also suggests that the importance of appeals to meaning is a
consequence of the homunctionalist framework (Cummins, 1983, p. 42).
But, his remarks fail to give the dispensabilist position serious
consideration.
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1. Homunctionalism and the Dispensability of Meaning.
1.1
The metaphor which underlies homunctionalism was suggested in a
passage in Fodor (1968) in which he discusses the question of how we tie
our shoes:
We might thus consider expanding the population in one's head
to include subordinate little men who superintend the execution
of the "elementary" behaviors involved in complex sequences
like grasping a shoelace. When the little man reads 'take the
left free end of the shoelace in the left hand', we imagine him
ringing up the shop foreman in charge of grasping shoelaces.
The shop foreman goes about supervising that activity in a way
that is, in essence, a microcosm of supervising tying one's
shoe. Indeed the shop foreman might be imagined to superintend
a detail of wage slaves, whose functions include: searching
inputs for traces of shoelace, flexing and contracting fingers
on the left hand, etc. (Fodor, 1968, p. 628.)
The homunctionalist view which this metaphor engenders is well known,
so I won't bother presenting all the details. The basic idea is this. The
aim of a theory in cognitive science is often to explain how it is that an
organism or a system has a certain capacity--the capacity to tie its
shoelaces, the capacity to understand language, the capacity to remember
things, the capacity to recognize visually presented objects, the capacity
to construct and subsequently execute plans, etc. In order to explain the
organism's having the target capacity, the psychologist begins by dividing
the capacity into a number of component subcapacities, and describes the
manner in which they must interact in order to produce the target capacity
(in Fodor's metaphor, each of the subcapacities would be assigned to a
little man, or to a team of little men). This reduces the cognitive
scientist's job to that of explaining the organism's possessing the
component subcapacities and explaining how the execution of the
subcapacities interact in the appropriate way. To do this the psychologist
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simply repeats the process: she divides the subcapacities into their
components, etc. The process is repeated until she reaches capacities
which the organism or system has as a direct consequence of the
physiological or physical characteristics of its parts--those parts
presumably being something like neurons or groups of neurons in the case of
organisms, and flip-flops or registers in the case of computers.
When this picture is spelled out in full detail, the story becomes
rather complicated. For my purposes, however, the critical features of
homunctionalism are captured by three claims. First, in attempting to
explain the fact that an organism (0) has a capacity (C), cognitive
scientists often divide the capacity into component subcapacities S1 , ... ,
Sn and specify the manner in which the subcapacities must interact to
produce C. Second, this process can be iterated many times; and,
oftentimes, if it is iterated enough, one reaches subcapacities the
organism's possession of which can be explained by direct appeal to its
physical constitution. Third, when the process can thus be completed, the
following becomes a partial explanation of O's'having capacity C1:
S: Ci) 0 has subcapacities S1, ... ,0Sn-
(ii) Subcapacities S1, . Sn interact in 0 in the
following way:
(iii) For the following reasons, any system that has capacities
S * .., Sn, and in which these capacities interact in
the manner specified in (ii) will have the capacity C:
S can be extended to include the decomposition of subcapacities Sg ..
Sn. In that case, the schema is repeated n times, one for each of the
7. Compare Haugeland, 1978, pp. 246-49 and Cummins, 1983, chapter 2.
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subcapacities. And, of course, one can extend the explanation still
further to include decompositions of the second-level subcapacities; etc.
One of the central claims of homunctionalism is that the schema above
(interpreted in accordance with the discussion below) gives the form of
typical explanations in cognitive science of an organism or system's having
a particular cognitive capacity. I'll call explanations of this form
homunctional explanations.
Three aspects of schema S require further comment. First, I want to
say something about why I am focusing on partial rather than complete
homunctional explanations. Second, I want to comment on the gaps in the
schema that appear in steps (ii) and (iii). Finally, I want to discuss
cases in which there is a discrepancy between a target capacity and what
the system actually achieves.
A complete homunctional explanation would culminate, as noted earlier,
with a level of subcapacities which the system or organism has as a direct
consequence of the physical or physiological features of itS physical or
physiological components. There are three reasons for considering partial
homunctional explanations to be the norm in cognitive science and complete
homunctional explanations to be the exception. First of all, in a very
complex system, such as the brain, a complete homunctional account may
simply not be available. Still, partial homunctional explanations can be
proposed and tested. Secondly, complete homunctional explanations may
present an overwhelming amount of detail, not all of which is of interest.
Finally, the closer a particular account is to a complete homunctional
explanation, the less general it will be. Consider, for example, an
explanation of how an automobile works. A partial homunctional account
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which discusses the various systems involved--the electrical system, the
braking system, etc.--and their major components may be almost completely
general, applying to all or almost all automobiles. As the details of the
explanation are filled out, the explanation will inevitably apply to fewer
and fewer kinds of automobiles, though perhaps still to several models. A
complete homunctional explanation, finally, would involve a detailed
discussion of the actual physical components being used, and would, most
likely, apply to only a single model. Obviously, other things being equal,
the more general an explanation, the better. One of the great virtues of
homunctionalism is that it allows one to add incremental levels of detail
until the depth of understanding that is gained thereby is outweighed by
the accompanying loss of generality and decrease in ease of comprehension.
Two gaps occur in schema S, one in (ii) and one in (iii). The gap in
(ii) is to be filled by some description of how the subcapacities interact
in 0. Typically, the description will be in the form of a computer flow
chart. The gap in (iii) is completed with whatever support is needed for
the claim with which (iii) begins. Sometimes one can see just from
inspecting the description in (ii) of how the subcapacities are to
interact, that any system which has those subcapacities interacting in that
way, will have the target capacity. In that case, the gap in (iii) need
not be filled. Suppose, for example that we are explaining how an assembly
line assembles a jar of Heinz catsup. There are just three subcapacities:
the capacity to pour approximately 22 oz. of Heinz catsup into a jar, the
capacity to move the jar, and, the capacity to take a cap and screw it
onto the top of a jar. The manner of interaction is simply that the first
capacity is executed first, the second capacity second and the third
capacity third. It is apparent that any system which has these three
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subcapacities, and in which the subcapacities interact in that manner will
have the capacity to assemble a jar of Heinz catsup given an empty jar and
a cap.
In other cases the gap in (iii) will be filled by a rather extensive
discussion. Consider, for example, an account of how a car has the
capacity to travel at high speeds on a flat surface, Much of the burden of
the explanation may fall on step (iii). Suppose that the following
subcapacities are described in step (i): the capacity of a certain
component of the system periodically to deliver a spark to a certain
chamber; the capacity of another component periodically to deliver a
certain amount of air/fuel mixture to the same chamber; and the capacity of
a third component to transform explosions in that chamber into a certain
sort of energy. The discussion in (iii) will have to indicate why the
sparks in the chamber will cause explosions given the periodic delivery of
the air/fuel mixture. If the account is to convince someone ignorant of
such matters, a fair amount of the theory of combustion will have to be
discussed. Because the gap in (iii) may be filled by a rather extensive
discussion and because it is rather open ended, I will refer to this part
of the explanation as the story. If we say that the specification of the
subcapacities of 0 and the manner in which they interact ((i) and (ii))
tell us how 0 is organized, then we can summarize by saying that, according
to homunctionalism, an explanation of 0's having capacity C will be a
description of how 0 is organized together with a story about why system's
organized in that way have capacity C.
I want to make one last point before going on to discuss the relevance
of homunctionalism to the thesis of the dispensability of meaning. Suppose
that the target capacity of a particular homunctional explanation is the
- 14 -
capacity to compute some function r. And, suppose that the system in
question does not really compute r. That is, for one or more stimuli s,
the system's response to s is something other than r(s). Suppose that r'
is the function that the system actually computes. So, for some s, r'(s) 4
r(s). If the function r in question maps retinal stimuli to descriptions
of the shapes of objects in the visual field, then the stimuli for which
r(s) 4 r'(s) are optical illusions.
Now, we could change our target capacity to be the capacity to compute
the function r'. But, sometimes it will be more useful to leave the target
capacity as it is. We then proceed to analyze the capacity, aiming to
explain how it is achieved (to the extent that it is) by the system. At
some point in the analysis, we will analyze some capacity C into
subcapacities S1, ... , Sn interacting in some manner, such that a system
with those subcapacities interacting in that way will not really have the
capacity C, but something a little short of C instead. (If we don't
encounter this situation, then we must not be analyzing the target capacity
into subcapacities that the system really has.) Such steps in the
decomposition, where there is some "slack" between what the system is
supposed to achieve and what it actually achieves, allow us to pinpoint the
source of the difference between the function that the system is trying to
compute--r---and the function it actually computes--r'. For such
decompositional steps, we will have to modify step (iii) of the schema
above slightly. The story will have to show us not why any system with the
posited subcapacities organized in the right way has the capacity in
question, but (a) why any system with the posited subcapacities organized
in the right way has something close to the capacity in question, and (b)
for which stimulus conditions such a system fails. If we later want to
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account for the stimuli s for which the system does not generate the
response r(s), we simply go through the homunctional account and look for
all the places where there is slack between a capacity and the
subcapacities it is analyzed into and note the stimulus conditions for
which the system fails to achieve that capacity. Note that we wouldn't be
able to pinpoint the source of the system's errors in this way if we had
reformulated the target capacity and regarded the system as attempting to
compute r'.
1.2
Frequently the subcapacities alluded to in an homunctional explanation
of a cognitive capacity involve the manipulation of some sort of structured
mental entity. The structured entity may be a mental image, a prototype
for a concept, a sentence in some sort of language of thought, an entry in
a mental lexicon, a parsing tree, a frame, a 2-1/2 D sketch, or any of the
other kinds of structured mental entities that cognitive scientists posit.
The generic term for these entities is "mental representation," and that is
what I'll call them. 8
Let me pause for a moment here to get clear about the way I am going
to talk about capacities. Suppose that Bob Hope's favorite function is the
one that takes x into x2. Then, if there is an ordinary way of counting
capacities, perhaps the capacity to determine the square of a given number
8. I use the term 'mental representation' with some trepidation since it
suggests that I have begged the central question of this essay--whether
these entities must be regarded as having representational properties.
I use it because the term is ubiquitous in cognitive science, and the
alternatives (such as 'structured mental entity') strike me as.
exceedingly awkward. It will be apparent, I hope, that my use of the
term (if not its connotations) never presupposes that these objects must
be regarded as representing the world in some particular way.
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would ordinarily be considered to be identical to the capacity to determine
the result of applying Bob Hope's favorite function to a given real number.
In other words, it may be that ordinarily we count capacities
"extensionally." When, however, capacities are adverted to in
explanations, counting capacities extensionally won't do. We can explain a
machine's capacity to compute the area of a circle given the length of its
radius, in terms of its capacity to compute the square of a given number,
its capacity to multiply a given number by pi, etc., when the capacities
are described in the explanation in just those words. We cannot, on the
other hand, explain the machine's capacity to compute the area of a circle
in terms of its capacity to compute the result of applying Bob Hope's
favorite function to a given number, its capacity to multiply a given
number by pi, etc., when the capacities are described in the explanation in
just those words. In other words, it is really capacities under a
description, and not capacities themselves, that figure in homunctional
explanations. Of course, it is cumbersome always to speak of the capacity
to X under thet description. So, I will normally just refer to "the
capacity to X" even though it is the capacity under that description that I
will usually have in mind.
Now suppose that a given capacity in an homunctional explanation
involves the manipulation in some manner of a particular mental
representation. And suppose that the description of the capacity adverts
to what the mental representation means or is about. Suppose, for example,
that everyone maintains in a particular place in memory a list of the names
of their close friends, relatives, colleagues, etc. Call this the P-list.
We might speak of the capacity to discriminate those items on the P-list
that refer to men from those items that refer to women. This description
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of the capacity obviously presupposes that the mental representations--the
items on the P-list--have a particular reference. Unless the items on the
P-list refer to people, the description of the capacity doesn't make any
sense, and, therefore, couldn't figure in a good explanation of any
cognitive ability. Now let's suppose that each item consists not just of a
name, but of a name together with another symbol--a letter, if you will.
The letter is an 'N' if the item contains the name of a man and a 'W' if it





The capacity to discriminate those items of the P-list that refer to men
from those items that refer to women amounts to nothing but the capacity to
discriminate those items ending in an 'M' from those items ending in a 'W.'
And, this latter description of the capacity presupposes nothing about what
the items on the list refer to.
We see, then, that a capacity under one description--e.g., "the
capacity to discriminate items on the P-list referring to men from those
that refer to women"--may presuppose something about the meaning of a
mental representation even though the capacity under another description--
e.g., "the capacity to discriminate items on the P-list ending with an 'M
from those ending with a 'W'--presupposes nothing about the meaning of the
mental representation.
When a capacity (under a description) presupposes something about the
meaning of a certain mental representation, I will say that the capacity
(under that description) is dependent on the meaning of the mental
representation, or, more simply, that the capacity (under that description)
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is meaning dependent. Oftentimes, when a meaning dependent capacity occurs
in an explanation, it is possible to redescribe the capacity so that the
capacity (under the new description) is no longer meaning dependent. When
this is done, I will say that the capacity has been syntacticized. When a
capacity is syntacticized, the redescription of the capacity may render the
explanation impotent, but sometimes it won't. When a meaning dependent
capacity occurs in an explanation and it is possible to syntacticize the
capacity (and redescribe some of the surrounding capacities if necessary)
so that the effectiveness of the explanation is not substantially impaired,
I will say that the capacity (under the original description), as it
figures in the explanation, is inessentially meaning dependent. When, on
the other hand, a meaning dependent capacity occurs in an explanation and
it is not possible to syntacticize the capacity without impairing the
effectiveness of the explanation (even when some of the related capacities
are also redescribed if this is necessary), I will say that the capacity as
it figures in the explanation is essentially meaning dependent.
1.3
Recall the thesis of the dispensability of meaning in cognitive
science:
(T) Appeal to what a psychological state means, represents, is about, or
refers to plays no essential role in explanations in cognitive science.
When an homunctional explanation in cognitive science involves an
essentially meaning dependent capacity, the explanation appeals, at least
implicitly, to the meaning of a psychological state in ascribing the
capacity to the system in question. And, such appeal is, of course,
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essential. Since essential appeal to the meaning of psychological states
is ruled out by (T), the following is an immediate corollary of (T):
(T') Homunctional explanations in cognitive science do not involve
essentially meaning dependent capacities.
My aim in this essay is to argue against the thesis of the
dispensability of meaning in cognitive science by arguing against this
corollary of the thesis. In particular, I claim that homunctional
explanations in cognitive science commonly involve essentially meaning
dependent capacities.
As we shall see, it is usually, perhaps always, possible to
syntacticize a meaning dependent capacity. But, I will argue, doing so
will often substantially reduce the effectiveness of the explanation. In
particular, the explanation will sometimes suffer a substantial loss of
generality and will sometimes suffer an even greater loss of simplicity.
In the next section I discuss an example of how syntacticizing a meaning
dependent capacity can result in a less general explanation. In sections
3, 4 and 5, I turn to a more detailed example to show how syntacticizing a
meaning dependent capacity can result in a dramatic reduction in
simplicity. In section 6 I suggest that these syntacticizing explanations
is also likely to produce a loss of insight. Finally, in section 7, the
last before the conclusion, I argue that the examples discussed in sections
2 through 5 are by no means unique, thus completing the argument that
homunctional explanations in cognitive science involving essentially
meaning dependent capacities are common.
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2. Meaning Dependence and Considerations of Generality
2.1
Consider an explanation of how we add pairs of whole numbers.9 The
way we do it, of course, is to write one of the numbers underneath the
other, aligning the last digits of each number. We then proceed from right
to left, focusing on one column at a time. We compute the sum of the two
digits in the column and the carry, if there is one. Etc. Now, in order
to make the processes involved in this example purely psychological,
imagine that we typically perform such operations in our head, and not on
paper.
One of the capacities involved in an homunctional explanation of our
ability to add pairs of numbers in this way will be the capacity to
determine the sum of three digits (the first two of which will be less than
10 and the third of which will be a 1 or a 0). Consider the question of
whether this capacity is meaning dependent. It is helpful to think
ourselves as receiving three expressions, say '4' and '3,' and '0,' as
input, and having to produce a third expression, '7' in this case, as
output. Now, given the characterization of the capacity as the capacity to
produce a sum, it is clearly meaning dependent. A numeral can not be
thought of as the sum of two other numerals unless the numerals are
understood to represent numbers. Hence, given the current characterization
of the capacity, the output (as well as the inputs) will have to be taken
to represent a number.
9. The example was suggested to me by James Higginbotham.
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But, it is easy enough for the dispensabilist to syntacticize the
capacity. It can be recast as the capacity to produce the expression '2'
if the first two inputs are the expression '1,' and the third the
expression '0'; to produce the expression '3' if one of the first two
inputs is the expression '2,' the other the expression '1,' and the third
the expression '0'; etc. This move is somewhat problematic in a number of
ways that will not be of immediate concern. First, the complete
characterization of the capacity in question will be rather lengthy, and
would, therefore, make the homunctional explanation more cumbersome and
less easily understood. Second, the question arises whether the
syntacticized capacity can play the same role in the homunctional
explanation as the original explanation did. It is easy enough to see how
the capacity to produce the sum of three digits fits into the capacity to
add any pair of numbers; it is not nearly so obvious that one can see how
(without noting that it is equivalent to the original capacity) the
syntacticized capacity fits into the capacity to sum any pair of numbers.
These two concerns will come up again later. But, for now I want to set
them aside.
Instead, I want to raise another difficulty with the syntactic
characterization. To get at the problem, I want to begin with an argument
against the syntactic characterization that won't quite work. Let us
grant, the argument begins, that the characterization produces a perfectly
good homunctional explanation of our ability to add any pair of numbers.
Still, the explanation only works for those of us who use Arabic numerals.
The explanation will simply not apply to people or systems who use a
different set of numerals--'a,' 'b,' ... , 'j,' for example, instead of '0,'
'1,' ... , '9'--even if the system they use is functionally equivalent to
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the Arabic numeral system. Such persons or systems may not even have, for
example, the syntactic capacity described above: given the expressicns
'1,' '1,' and '0,' they may have no idea of what to do, even if they know
they are supposed to be adding. The same is not true of the original
capacity--the capacity to compute the sum of any three digits. Since it
does not refer to specific numerals at all, it can be ascribed to any
person or system using the familiar algorithm. The explanation containing
the original capacity, therefore, is more general than the dispensabilist's
explanation; it applies equally well to me and to a person unfamiliar with
Arabic numerals who adds, using an equivalent numeral system, in the same
way I do. And, this is as it should be, since, by hypothesis, we add in
the same way.
The argument based on differences between Arabic numerals and other
possible numerals rests on a crucial assumption. Specifically, it is
assumed that the identity of the syntactic expressions being used must be
derived from their physical manifestations. We needn't make this
assumption. Stich, for example, proposes to individuate syntactic items
functionally. 10 And, since the alternate numeral system and Arabic numeral
systems are, by hypothesis, isomorphic, there is reason to think that the
mental counterparts in me and the person using the alternate system will
have equivalent functional roles. In that case, the relevant syntactic
items would be identical, and the same syntactic characterization of the
capacity to compute the sum of three digits could be applied to each of us.
Consider, however, a case involving me and someone who computes in
base-12. Base-12 has, of course, 12 numerals. The syntactically
10. See Stich, 1983, pp. 150-53.
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characterized capacity, referring as it does to only 10 numerals, could not
possibly apply to addition in base-12. A syntactic characterization of the
capacity to compute the sum of three digits in base-12 would have to refer
to 12 distinct syntactic items. Hence, an homunctional explanation with
purely syntactic characterizations of the sort anticipated could apply to
addition base-10 or to addition in base-12, but not to both. Distinct
explanations would be required. Still, as many children learn in
elementary school, it is perfectly possible to use the familiar algorithm
to add in base-12. But, the sense in which the algorithm is the same is
only captured if the steps in the algorithm are expressed in a way that
refers to what the numerals being manipulated mean. Only if, for example,
one of the steps is computing the sum of the two digits in a column, plus
the carry if there is one. Indeed, our original homunctional explanation
of adding pairs of numbers can easily be stated so as to apply to addition
in any base.11
We see, then, that if the homunctional explanation of adding pairs of
numbers is to be as general as possible, we cannot replace the capacity to
compute the sum of three digits with a syntacticization. Any such
recharacterization has the result of narrowing the explanation's range of
application. We are relying here on a very important feature of
homunctional explanations. As has already been noted, homunctional
explanations have a tree-like structure. One starts with a target
capacity, analyzes it into a number of subcapacities, analyzes the
subcapacities in turn, etc. The tree ends when one reaches capacities
11. The most substantial modification would involve places where the
explanation refers to a sum being greater than 10. "10" would have to
be replaced by "the number of the base-system being used." The
explanation remains essentially the same.
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which are explained directly by the physical constitution of the system.
But, to give an explanation of the system's having the target capacity, it
isn't necessary to present the entire tree. Describing the tree to any
particular depth gives some sort of explanation of the system's ability:
the greater the depth the more complete the explanation.
In the case just described, we have two systems, me and the person
computing in base-12, that have the same ability. The complete
homunctional explanations of the abilities are distinct. But, the
differences only show up at a certain depth in the associated trees.
Hence, if the homunctional explanations are cut off above that depth, the
same explanation applies to both systems. Thus, we are able to see the
sense in which the two systems achieve the target capacity in the same way,
and also see the sense in which the target capacities are achieved in
distinct ways. If the dispensabilist is forced to give entirely different
explanations for two such systems, she will fail to be able to fully
account for the similarities between the two systems. She will thereby
fail to take advantage of a powerful aspect of homunctionalism.
2.2
The reader may have noticed a difficulty with the discussion above.
The problem concerns the question of whether very simple machines have
intentionality. One can imagine a very simple machine wired up to
implement the addition algorithm. The machine need not be this complex,
but let's suppose that it is a standard digital computer. Since the
computer implements the addition algorithm, it ought to come under the
purview of the homunctional explanation referred to in the previous
discussion. And, I have argued, some states of such systems must be
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regarded as having a semantic value. In particular some states of such
systems must be regarded as representing numbers. And, this is, of course,
to impute intentionality to the states of this very simple computer. Do I
really want to say that the states of this very simple computer have
meaning? No, I don't. 12
What, then, do I want to say about the simple machine? To begin,
notice that if we were literally to regard the machine as adding, we would
have to assign meaning to its states. Syntactic objects can be added only
when they represent numbers. The obvious move is to say not that the
machine adds, but that it is interpretable as adding.13 By saying that it
is interpretable as adding, I mean that if we associate the inputs and
outputs to the machine with numbers in the obvious way, and regard the
machine as computing a function of its inputs, the function it computes is
the addition function. It may be interpretable as doing other things as
well, but that's fine. Rigorizing this notion of interpretability so that
it applies to more complex examples would be a substantial task. But, at
least in simple cases such as the one at hand, everyone understands
intuitively what it means to claim that a machine is interpretable as
performing some task.
12. Perhaps they have some sort of indirect meaning or intentionality if
someone has programmed the machine to add. Then, for that person the
inputs to the machine really do represent numbers. To avoid this side
issue, the person issuing the challenge in question could suppose that
the machine appears spontaneously as the miraculous result of the
random motion of the particles that come to compose it.
13. The move here is essentially the one that Cummins makes in chapter 3 of
Cummnins, 1983. The ensuing discussion, including the use of "a-
notatation" follows that discussion.
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Let us say that a system *Xs just in case it performs operations that
are interpretable as Xing. So, our machine doesn't add, but it does *add.
And, what we want to explain is not its ability to add, but its ability to
*add. We can transform the homunctional explanation of how we add into an
explanation of the machine's ability to 'add by putting asterisks in front
of all the subcapacities that are meaning dependent. So, part of the
explanation of the machine's ability to *add is its having the capacity to
*(compute the sum of three digits). Of course, the two homunctional
explanations are virtually identical. And, we could have the machine's
ability and my ability come under the very same explanation by adding *'s
and having *Xing mean either Xing or doing something interpretable as Xing.
Similar remarks apply to all systems that use the adding algorithm. They
will either add or *add, and their ability to do so will be accounted for
by the original homunctional explanation or the *explanation, which, again
could be turned into the same explanation. Thus, the homunctional
explanation allows us to see what is common to all systems that use the
algorithm.
I have now shown how we can bring the capacities of the simple
computer under the purview of the original homunctional explanation without
attributing intentionality to it. But, in doing so, it might be argued
that I have played right into the dispensabilist's hand. After all, why
can't the dispensabilist apply the analysis of the machine's ability given
above to us. In other words, why can't the dispensabilist say that we
don't really add, we *ad And, our capacity to do this doesn't involve
computing the sum of three digits, but *(computing the sum of three
digits). And, instead of regarding a certain psychological state as a
token of a symbol that represents a number, we can simply regard the symbol
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as being interpretable as a number. Thus, the dispensabilist could say,
the homunctional explanation doesn't really require that we regard any of
our psychological states as being tokens of interpreted expressions, only
that we regard them as being interpretable in a certain way.14
The dispensabilist can indeed use this tack to avoid actually
ascribing semantic properties to psychological states without abandoning
homunctional explanations of cognitive capacities. But, such a move does
not really save the thesis of the dispensability of meaning in cognitive
science. The point of dispensabilism is not to allow the cognitive
scientist to associate meanings with cognitive states without saying that
the states are themselves meaningful. Rather, the point is to set the
stage for getting rid of meaning from cognitive science altogether. My
claim here can be stated in terms of the role of the word "essential" in
the thesis of the dispensability of meaning. The thesis says that appeal
to what a psychological stat'e means "plays no essential role in
explanations in cognitive science." The word "essential" could be
interpreted so that the role couldn't be played by appeal to a meaning that
is merely associated with the psychological state. But, this
interpretAtion must be rejected, since the thesis would not then support
the elimination of semantic notions from cognitive science altogether.
In light of the above remarks, we should refine the notion of meaning
dependence. Before we said that a capacity (under a description) is
meaning dependent if it presupposes something about the interpretation of a
14. Of course, since we want to explain our ability to add and not our
ability to do something interpretable as adding, something we do--
verbalizing the answer, for example--will have to be interpreted. But,
of course, that is a social, not a psychological, act.
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certain mental representation. Instead, we could say that a capacity
(under a description) is meaning dependent if it presupposes something
about the interpretation or interpretabili of a certain mental
representation. We could again say that when a meaning dependent capacity
occurs in an explanation, and it is not possible to redescribe the capacity
so that it is no longer meaning dependent and the explanation remains
effective, the capacity is essentially meaning dependent. Given the above
interpretation of the thesis of the dispensability of meaning, the thesis
would still imply that meaning dependent capacities do not appear in
homunctional explanations in .ognitive science. Although the refinement is
necessary to complete our solution to the problem at hand, I will simply
observe that it can be so refined, and proceed to use the original version
for the sake of simplicity.
The worry that the discussion of the example of adding pairs of whole
numbers somehow commits me to saying that the states of something as simple
as a 99 cent calculator have intentionality has now been put to rest. The
conclusion of section 2.1--that syntacticizing the capacity to compute the
sum of three digits results in a dramatically less general explanation of
the capacity to add pairs of whole numbers--stands.
3. Newell and Simon on Problem Solving
In this section and the next two I want to present in detail another
example of an explanation containing an essentially meaning dependent
capacity. In this case, the example will hinge on considerations other
than those of generality.
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The example I will present is based on the work of Alan Newell and
Herbert Simon on problem solving. Their views are presented in a number of
places but most notably in their book Human Problem Solving (Newell and
Simon, 1972), and I will be drawing from the account of problem solving
presented there. I have chosen to draw from this work for two reasons.
First, among the virtues of Newell and Simon's account is that it is very
concrete and clearly laid out. This clarity and concreteness extends, I
believe, to the homunctional explanation I will construct, and to my
characterization of the representations whose semantic properties I claim
the explanation to be dependent on. This clarity prevents, as far as
possible, the judgment as to whether such semantic properties are being
appealed to from being clouded by vagueness and sketchiness in the
explanation or in the characterization of the representations. The second
reason for choosing Newell and Simon's treatment of problem solving as the
basis for my example lies in its centrality in the field of cognitive
science. The study of problem solving lies at or near the heart of the
study of cognition and Human Problem Solving is the classic treatment of
the subject. Because of this centrality, one would expect that if
explanations engendered by Newell and Simon's work are essentially meaning
dependent, many other cases of essentially meaning dependent explanations
in cognitive science could be found. And, if the dispensabilist wants to
suggest that the explanation I cite is exceptional in this regard, the
burden of proof falls on her. I want to emphasize that my reasons for
choosing Newell and Simon's account of problem solving as a basis for my
example have nothing at all to do with the question of whether their view
is correct. All I claim for now is that a plausible theory in cognitive
science, one which is quite characteristic of the field as a whole, yields
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an essentially meaning dependent explanation. This should be enough to
cast grave doubt on the dispensabilist thesis.
I turn now to the account of problem solving presented in Human
Problem Solving. The first thing to note is that Newell and Simon worked
with a rather constrained notion of a problem. Three classes of problems
were studied in detail: symbolic logic problems, chess problems and
cryptarithmetic problems. The authors are hesitant to say just how wide
the scope of the theory is, writing, "It is clearly broader than the three
tasks. On the other hand, the evidence at hand is ill-suited to define the
limits of its scope." (Newell and Simon 1972, p. 791.) I will assume that
these three sorts of problems typify a broader class of problems, and that
the theory aims to be a theory of how people solve problems of the broader
class. I'll use the term 'puzzle' to refer to problems falling into this
broader class. So, I will take Newell and Simon's theory to be an account
of the human capacity to solve puzzles.
The guiding notion of Newell and Simon's account of puzzle solving is
the notion of a problem space. In fact, I'll sometimes refer to their view
as the problem space account of puzzle solving. A problem space is
constructed from the following four elements:
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1. A set of knowledge states, K, each of which encodes a state of
knowledge about the problem being solved;
2. A set of operators, 0, each of which maps knowledge states into
knowledge states;
3. A subset, S, of K, each element of which constitutes a solution
to the problem;
4. An initial knowledge state, u0.
The easiest way to see what all of this means is to look at a sample
problem space, examining each of the four elements of the sample problem
space in turn. Consider the following cryptarithmetic puzzle: DONALD +
GERALD = ROBERT. A cryptarithmetic puzzle consists of a simple
arithmetical equation in which the digits have been systematically replaced
by letters so that the equation contains words or names instead of numbers.
The letters can always be replaced by digits so that: (a) the same letters
are replaced by the same digits (so, if the 0 in DONALD is replaced by a 2,
then the 0 in ROBERT is replaced by a 2 as well); (b) two letters (types)
are not replaced by the same digit; and, (c) the result of making these
substitutions is a correct equation, e.g., 526485 + 197485 723970. The
puzzle is solved when such a replacement scheme, an example of which is





Solution: D = 5; 0 = 2; N = 6; 526485
A = 4; L = 8; G 1; ---- > +197485
E=9; R=7; B= 3;
T= 0 723970
Figure 1
Let's see what a problem space for the puzzle, DONALD + GERALD
ROBERT might look like.
K, the set of knowledge states.
Knowledge states are quasi-linguistic entities. The set of all
possible knowledge states for a given problem space is called the knowledge
set. K', the knowledge set for the puzzle DONALD +.GERALD = ROBERT, will
include knowledge states like (E:9,c5=1,A=4,L>5,T even). This knowledge
state indicates that the letter E is to be replaced by the digit 9, the
carry in the fifth column from the right in the target sum is a 1, the
letter A is to be replaced by the digit 4, the letter L is to be replaced
by a digit greater than 5, and T is to be replaced by an even digit. The
knowledge set is specified in the same way that the elements of a formal
language are--by giving a recursive syntax for the language, or in this
case, the set of expressions. Newell and Simon use a notation often used
for the grammars of programming languages to describe the recursive syntax.










<digit-set> ::= <digit>|<digit> V <digit-set>
<knowledge-state> ::: O1<expression>'<expression>,<knowledge-state>
The only metasymbols in this notation are '::=', '', '<, '>', and
'0' (the symbol for the null string). '::=' indicates that the extension
of a class of expressions is being described. On the left of '::=' is the
name of the class of expressions whose extension is being described. These
names, whether they occur on the left or right of the '::=' sign, are
flanked by the signs 1< and '>.' '' is a sign of disjunction. So, the
first line indicates that a symbol is in the extension of the class of
expressions, <digit>, if it is '0' or if it is '1' or if it is '2', etc.
The disjuncts on the right of the '::=' sign may be individual expressions,
as in the first line, classes of expressions, or concatenations involving
individual expressions, classes of expressions, or both. These are to be
read in the obvious way. So, in the fifth line above, which assigns the
extension of the class <expression>, the last disjunct indicates that if an
expression in the class <variable> is concatenated with the expression '=
and then with an expression in the class <digit-set>, the result will be a
member of the class <expression>.
Note that K* will include some absurd knowledge states such as
(E:9,E;8). This is to be expected: there are many contradictions among
the grammatical sentences of English.
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0, the set of operators.
The idea of a problem space is that puzzle solving consists in moving
step by step from the initial knowledge state (often the null string) to a
knowledge state which constitutes a solution to the puzzle. The individual
steps from one knowledge state to another involve the application of
procedures which transform one knowledge state into another. These
procedures are called operators. The problem space in question contains
four operators. Among them are PC (process-column) and GN (generate-
numbers). PC has one parameter--the number of the column to be processed.
The purpose of PC is to take the information contained in the knowledge
state pertaining to the values of the three letters and two carries
associated with the relevant column, and deduce new information about the
three letters and two carries, if possible. So, to take a simple example,
consider the operator PC(4) applied to the knowledge state (N=6,B=3).15
15. I will use expressions such as 'PC(4)' to refer, e.g., to the specific
procedure gotten from the general procedure PC by setting the value of
the procedure's parameter at 4. I will, fbr the time being, engage in
a systematic ambiguity, using the term 'operator' sometimes to refer to
specific procedures, such as PC(4), and sometimes to general procedures
such as PC.
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PC(4) focuses on this c'lumn






As illustrated above in Figure 2, PC(4) applied to (N=6,B=3) yields
(N=6,B=3,R=7,c4=0,c5=1). Given the 6 and the 3 in the fourth column, R
must either be 6 (in which case the carry from the 3rd column would have to
be a 1) or 7. Since N has already been assigned 6, R can't be 6 as well.
So, R=7. The carry from the 3rd column must be 0 (0+6+7 modulo 10 3).
So, c4=0. And, since 0+6+7 is greater than 10, we have a carry of 1 in the
fifth column: c5=1.
Like PC, GN (generate numbers) has just one parameter--the letter for
which possible numbers are to be generated. It takes all current
information about the letter, any current assignments of digits to other
letters, and generates an explicit list of numbers that could be assigned
to that letter. So, for example GN(R) applied to (R odd,R>4,E=9) would
combine the information that R is odd, that R is greater than 4, and that E
has been assigned the digit 9, to determine that the numbers that could be
assigned to H are 5 and 7. In other words, GN(H) applied to
(H odd,R>4,E=9) yields (R=5v7,E=9).
Complete rigor would demand a complete specification of the functions
associated with these operators. Providing such a specification would be a
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formidable task, and in practice, an informal definition of the operators
of the sort given above is usually considered sufficient.
S, the set of solution states.
S is just the subset of K consisting of all knowledge states that
represent a solution to the puzzle being solved. Of course, in settling on
a solution set, one doesn't actually produce a list of solutions. If you
could do that, the puzzle would already be solved. Rather, one must have a
characterization of the solutions, so that given a candidate solution, you
can test it to see if it really is a solution or not. For the puzzle at
hand, producing a rigorous characterization would be a substantial task.
The idea, of course, is that if you use the solution to substitute into the
equation DONALD + GERALD ROBERT, the resulting numerical equation is
correct.
uL, the initial knowledge state.
The final component of a problem space is u0, the initial knowledge
state. Frequently, as with the puzzle at hand, the initial knowledge state
will be the null string. Sometimes, to make a cryptarithmetic puzzle
easier, Newell and Simon include one piece of information with the initial
characterization of the puzzle. For example, with DONALD + GERALD =
ROBERT, they specify that D is to be equal to 5. u0 for the puzzle DONALD
+.GERALD =ROBERT, D=5 is, of course, (D=5).
We have now looked at each of the component of the problem space for a
sample puzzle. Formally, the problem space itself is a graph. The nodes
of the graph are the elements of K. Nodes are connected directionally.
Node q is connected to node p (but not necessarily vice-versa) if there is
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an operator in 0 which maps p to q. A path through the problen space is
defined as a sequence of nodes, the first of which is u0, and the last of
which is a member of S, such that for any node q in the sequence, if p is
the node immediately preceding q in the sequence, then q is connected to p.
Newell and Simon's account of problem solving is frequently summed up by
saying that problem solving consists of search in a problem space.
Formally, this means that it consists of the application of a sequence of
operators in 0 to elements in K (the first of which is u0) so that the
sequence of knowledge states passed through is a path through the problem
space.
Below I present an example of a path through the problem space just
described. On the right of each knowledge state in the sequence I indicate















I leave it as an exercise for the reader to determine the nature of the
operators TD (test-a-digit) and AV (assign-value) , which are applied in
steps 10 and 11 respectively, but which are not described above.
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I have now sketched the notion of a problem space. For Newell and
Simon, this conception was just the first step toward a theory of problem
solving. They probably considered the theory of the implementation of
search in a problem space to be the core of the project. It was here that
they were led to the tremendously influential idea 'of a "production
system." For my purposes, however, that aspect of the theory which goes
beyond the conception of a problem space will not be important. What has
been presented so far will be sufficient to allow one to see how the first
few steps in an homunctional explanation of the capacity to solve puzzles
might go, and that is all I shall need.
4. A System that has the Capacity to Solve Puzzles
4.1
I now want to show how to decompose the capacity to solve puzzles into
seven subcapacities in accordance with the hypothesis that puzzle solving
consists of search in a problem space. The idea that puzzle solving is
search in a problem space immediately divides the process of puzzle solving
into two parts: picking a problem space to use to solve the puzzle, and
conducting a search in the space selected. Since a problem space has four
components, picking a problem space will involve four subcapacities, one
for each component. Let's call these subcapacities KSET, OPSET, SOLSET,
and ALPHA. KSET is the capacity to select intelligently a knowledge set
for the puzzle to be solved; OPSET is the capacity to select intelligently
a set of operators for the puzzle to be solved; SOLSET is the capacity to
produce a characterization of the solution set--those elements of the
knowledge set that are to count as solutions to the puzzle; and, ALPHA is
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the capacity to correctly pick out the initial knowledge state for the
puzzle. Clearly these capacities cannot be executed independently of each
other. Each of the latter three capacities depends on knowing what
knowledge set has been chosen. More will be said about this in discussing
the manner in which all seven subcapacities are to interact.
Now consider the subcapacities needed to conduct a search in the
problem space thus selected. Conducting such a search consists of
constructing a path through the problem space and then recognizing when the
path has led to a solution state. Taking the individual steps in the path
consists of selecting an operator to apply to the knowledge state
associated with the current node in the path, and then applying the
operator to produce the knowledge state associated with the next node. As
long as each operator is selected wisely, the individual steps thus chosen
will ultimately constitute a path through the problem space. Conducting
the search thus requires three subcapacities: the capacity to choose, at
any given step in the search, an appropriate operator to apply to the
current knowledge state; the capacity to apply an operator that has been
selected to the current knowledge state and thereby produce a new knowledge
state; and, the capacity to determine, at any step along the way, whether
the current knowledge state is a member of the solution set. Let's call
these capacities PICKOP, EXEC and TEST respectively.
The capacity to solve puzzles has now been decomposed into seven
suboapacities. If the problem space account of puzzle solving is correct,
then any system or organism that has these seven subcapacities, and in
which they interact in the requisite way, will have the capacity to solve
puzzles. And, its having that capacity will be susceptible to an
homunctional explanation based on this decomposition. If Newell and Simon
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are correct in claiming that people solve puzzles via search in a problem
space, then this decomposition could be used to construct an homunctional
explanation of the human capacity to solve puzzles. I could consider the
question of whether such an explanation would involve essentially meaning
dependent capacities. Instead of considering human puzzle solving
abilities, however, I want to consider the puzzle solving capacities of a
hypothetical cybernetic system. I do this because it will be possible to
describe the operations of this system of digital computers more vividly
than it would be possible to describe hypothetical human cognitive
processes. Talk of cognitive processes being applied to a mental
representation is vague and metaphorical in a way that talk of a computer
executing a sequence of instructions which modify the contents of a certain
register is not. And, the explanation of the puzzle solving capacities of
our system, Solver, will suit my polemical needs as well as an explanation
of human puzzle solving abilities would. Newell and Simon's work was
explicitly based on the supposition that digital computers, programmed
appropriately, could be endowed with the same puzzle solving abilities that
we have, and that the explanations of our abilities and their abilities in
this regard should be fundamentally identical. This assumption means that
any lessons we learn about the explanation of the puzzle solving abilities
of our cybernetic system should apply to humans as well.
So, consider a system--Solver--of seven digital computers together
with a keyboard and a CRT, which system has the capacity to solve puzzles
in virtue of having the seven subcapacities described above. There is one
computer in Solver for each of the seven subcapacities. I will use the
name of a given subcapacity to refer to the computer that has that
subcapacity, using boldface to refer to the machines and regular capital
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letters to refer to the subcapacity. So, Solver consists of a terminal, a
CRT and KSET, OPSET, SOLSET, ALPHA, PICKOP, EKEC, and TEST.
Each of the machines in Solver is connected by an output-input link to
one or more of the other machines in Solver. In other words, in virtue of
an electronic connection between the two, the output of any given machine
will serve as the input for some other machine. It is these output-input
links that guarantee that the seven subcapacities interact, in Solver, in
what I referred to above as "the requisite way." These output-input links
can best be described by tracing the activity of the system as it solves a
puzzle. First, a description of the puzzle to be solved is entered into
the terminal. This description becomes the input to KSET. KSET produces
a description of an appropriate knowledge set for the puzzle and delivers
this description, along with the description of the puzzle to OPSET,
SOLSET, and ALPHA. OPSET produces a description of the set of operators
to be applied to elements of the knowledge set. This description, together
with the description of the knowledge set, and the description of the
puzzle, are delivered to PICKOP. The description of the set of operators
and the description of the knowledge set are also delivered to EXEC.
Meanwhile, SOLSET produces a criterion that solutions to the puzzle must
meet and delivers it, along with the description of the knowledge set, to
TEST. And, ALPHA selects the initial knowledge state and delivers it to
PICKOP. [SET, OPSET, SOLSET, and ALPHA have now selected the problem
space. It is up to PICKOP, EXEC and TEST to conduct a search in the
problem space. The search consists in the execution of the following loop:
PICKOP selects an appropriate operator to apply to the current knowledge
state. The first time around, this is the knowledge state delivered by
ALPHA. On subsequent or tsions, the current knowledge state comes from
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TEST. PICKOP delivers the operator it has selected to EXEC, which then
applies that operator to the current knowledge state, thereby producing a
new knowledge state, which it passes on to TEST. TEST, having received a
characterization of the solution set from SOLSET, has constructed an
algorithm for determining whether a given knowledge state is a solution
state. TEST applies this algorithm to the new knowledge state. If the
algorithm determines that the new knowledge state is a solution state, the
loop is completed and the new knowledge state is displayed on the CRT. 16
Otherwise, TEST delivers the new knowledge state, which is now the current
knowledge state, to PICKOP, and the loop begins again. The loop is
repeated until a solution state is produced. At that point, the search is
completed and the result displayed. Solver is depicted below in Figure 3.
The thick arrows indicate connections involved in the loop:
16. One might want to translate the knowledge state into some other form
before it is displayed and thereby presented as the solution to the
puzzle. In fact, in a sense it partly begs the question against the
dispensabilist to treat the knowledge state as a solution to the puzzle
since the dispensabilist will generally regard knowledge states as
uninterpreted syntactic objects. And, an uninterpreted syntactic
object obviously cannot be regarded as a solution to a puzzle. To
accommodate this point, I could have added another component to Solver
that translates the solution state into English. But, such an added
component would have remained idle in the rest of the discussion, and I







an homunctional explanation of Solver's capacity to solve
Ci) Solver has the subcapacities KSET, OPSET, SOLSET, ALPHA,
PICKOP, EXEC, and TEST.
Cii) In Solver, the subcapacities KSET, OPSET, SOLSET, ALPHA,
PICKOP, EXEC, and TEST interact in the manner pictured
in Figure 3.
(iii) Any system that has the subcapacities KSET, OPSET, SOLSET,
ALPHA, PICKOP, EXEC, and TEST and in which those capacities
interact in the manner pictured in Figure 3 will have the
capacity to solve puzzles.
Step (iii) must be supplemented by what I called in section I "the
story." The story associated with a decomposition of a capacity is simply
whatever is needed to make it apparent why a system with the relevant
- 44 -
E:
subcapacities interacting in the relevant manner will have the target
capacity. In section 1, I discussed the example of the homunctional
explanation of a car's capacity to move at high speeds on a flat surface.
In that case, the story needed to include enough of the theory of
combustion to explain why, if a spark is delivered periodically to a
certain chamber and a certain air/fuel mixture is continually delivered to
the same chamber, there will periodically be an explosion producing a
certain amount of energy in that chamber. To see that a given system would
have the capacity to move at high speeds on a flat surface, one needed a
bit more than a characterization of its subcapacities and a description of
the manner in which they interact; one needed to know something about
combustion.
Something similar happens in E. Having read section 2, you know what
search in a problem space is. Furthermore, having seen the example
presented in that section, you see how search in a problem space can be
used to solve puzzles. Finally, it is a pretty straightforward matter to
see that the hypothetical system described in step (iii) will conduct a
search in a problem space. This will follow almost straightaway from the
definitions of the relevant capacities. Furthermore, the system will not
pick just any problem space, nor will it conduct just any search in the
space it has selected. We have required that the elements of the problem
space are appropriate for the puzzle being solved. And, we have required
that the operators applied at each step in the search also be appropriate
given the current knowledge state. In sum, we have guaranteed that the
system will conduct an intelligent search in an intelligently chosen space.
So, you see that the system in step (iii) will conduct an intelligent
search in an intelligently chosen problem space, and you see how an
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intelligently conducted search can be used to solve a puzzle. Do you then
see that the system in step (iii) has the capacity to solve puzzles? Well,
not quite. Roughly, you need to know that the example in section 2 is not
just a fluke. And, you need to know this in two ways. First, you need to
know that the system will be able to discover the path in the problem space
described in the example. Or, if not that path through that problem space,
then some other path through some other problem space. Secondly, you need
to know that this will be true not just of that one cryptarithmetic puzzle,
but of puzzles in general. The way to see all of this is to see a large
number of examples worked out. By looking at a number of puzzles, and for
each puzzle seeing that many problem spaces can be used and for each of
these problem spaces, that paths through the problem space are easily
discovered, one eventually becomes convinced that any system capable of
conducting an intelligent search through an intelligently conducted problem
space will have the ability to solve puzzles. So, the story associated
with E must consist in this sort of a presentation of a wide variety of
examples. (It is no coincidence that in their book, a central aim of which
was to make the problem space account of puzzle solving plausible, Newell
and Simon work through a wide variety of examples in great detail.) Once E
has been thus supplemented, it will constitute an homunctional explanation
of Solver's capacity to solve puzzles. In brief, E will show that Solver
is organized in such a manner that it intelligently conducts search in a
problem space, and that any system thus organized will have the capacity to
solve puzzles.
Of course, E, supplemented in the manner described above, does not
show that Solver can solve all puzzles. It only shows, roughly, that
Solver can solve an awful lot of' puzzles and many different kinds of
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puzzles. But, this is all I mean when I say that Solver has the ability to
solve puzzles, just as that is all I mean when I say that I have the
ability to solve puzzles.
5. Meaning Dependence and Considerations of Simplicity
5.1
I now want to argue that the capacity PICKOP in E is essentially
meaning dependent. PICKOP, attributed in E to PICKOP, is the capacity to
select an appropriate operator given the following input: a description of
the puzzle to be solved, the problem space to be used, and the current
knowledge state. In regarding PICKOP (or any other system) as having this
capacity, then, we picture it as receiving these three inputs, and having
the capacity to produce an output that is appropriate relative to these
inputs. To make the picture simpler, we can assume that PICKOP has
already received the description of the puzzle to be solved and the problem
space to be used. (This is an accurate description of PICKOP during the
actual search; during the actual search, it just needs to be given the
current knowledge state and it will then pick an operator to apply to it.)
Then, we can say that a system has the capacity PICKOP just in case when it
is given a knowledge state, it produces an appropriate operator to apply to









The capacity PICKOP will be meaning dependent just in case regarding an
organism or system as having the capacity depends on a semantic
characterization of some state or states of the system. Shortly, I will
argue that regarding a system as having this capacity depends on a semantic
characterization of both the input to and output of the system, and
conclude that the capacity PICKOP in E is meaning dependent. 17 In so
arguing, I am denying that someone could reasonably hold of a particular
system; (a) that it has the capacity described above; and (b) that its
inputs and outputs are syntactic objects which are never regarded as having
an interpretation.
Given the way I have been using the term 'operator,' my claim might
seem trivially true. For I have been using the term to refer to procedures
for transforming knowledge states. Clearly, a syntactic object is not a
procedure for transforming knowledge states (though it may designate or
17. Implicit here is the assumption, which I won't bother to defend, that
the input and output of the system on a particular occasion are states
of the system. More precisely, the assumption is that the input (or
output) to the system having a particular value is a state of the
systen.
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represent one). If operators are procedures, it is not possible to regard a
system whose sole output is an uninterpreted syntactic object18 as
selecting an operator at all, much less an appropriate one. But, we
needn't stick to this use of the term 'operator.' Associated with every
operator/procedure in a problem space--PC(4) or TD(G,3), e.g.--is a
syntactic item -.-'PC(4)' or 'TD(G,3),' e.g.--and it is perfectly natural to
use the term 'operator' to refer to these syntactic items. In order to be
as fair to the dispensabilist as possible, I will use the term 'operator'
in this way. And, when I want to talk about the procedure itself, I'll use
that term. One more terminological clarification is in order before we
return to the question of whether the capacity PICKOP is meaning
dependent. I have sometimes used the term 'operator' to refer to general
procedures for transforming knowledge states--PC or processing a column,
for example--and sometimes to refer to the specific procedures which result
when the parameter(s) for the general procedure has been fixed--PC(4) or
processing the fourth column, for example. From now on, I will usually be
talking about these specific procedures. Unless it is clear that I have
the general procedure in mind, the term 'procedure' will refer to these
specific procedures, and the term 'operator' will refer to the syntactic
items that designate them.
5.2
By an appropriate operator, as I have said before, I mean an operator
that given the current state of the puzzle, as encoded in the knowledge
state, could reasonably be expected to lead toward progress in the solution
18. When I use the term "uninterpreted syntactic object," I mean a
syntactic item that is not assigned an interpretation for any purpose.
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of the puzzle. Whether an operator is appropriate or not apparently
depends on the interpretation of both the operator and the knowledge state
which is the input to PICKOP (or whatever system is in question). To see
this, suppose that Solver is solving the puzzle DONALD + GERALD = ROBERT.
And, suppose that KSET and OPSET have selected a knowledge set and set of
operators/procedures respectively and delivered these to PICKOP. Finally,
suppose that PICKOP is given the input '(D=5,T=0,C1=1,E=9),' and produces
the string of characters 'PC(4)' as output. Has PICKOP selected an
appropriate operator? We simply don't know enough to say. To know whether
the operator is appropriate, we need to know what procedure the operator
'PC(4)' designates. And, we need to know what partial solution to the
puzzle '(D=5,T=0,C1=1,E=9)' represents. Only then can we determine whether
or not the operator that has been selected is appropriate.
Suppose that the knowledge state '(D=5,T=0,C1=1,E=9)' is to be
interpreted as before. That is, suppose that it encodes the following





Now look at the third column from the right. The E in ROBERT has
already been assigned the digit 9. Hence, there is only one letter in the
third column which hasn't been assigned a digit. In such a situation, it
shouldn't be hard to narrow down the digits which can be assigned to that
letter. (In this particular case it is easy to narrow it down to one
possibility; A must be assigned the digit 4.) In the problem space
described earlier, there was a procedure that would focus on a particular
column in the puzzle, and determine any new information which can be
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inferred just from what is already known about that column. This
procedure--focusing on a particular column and determining the consequences
of what is already known about that column--was called processing a
column. Given the fact that there is only one unknown letter in the third
column from the right, and nothing is known about it, the procedure of
processing the third column would be certain to generate new information.
Hence, in the present situation, an operator that designates the procedure
of processing the third column from the right would be an appropriate
operator. Now look at the fourth column from the right. Since it contains
three unknown letters, the procedure of processing the fourth column from
the right would be fruitless in the current situation. An operator that
designates the procedure of processing the fourth column from the right
would not be an appropriate operator. What does all of this tell us about
the operator 'PC(4)'? Well, that depends on what procedure the expression
designates. If 'PC' designates the procedure of processing a column, and
the '4' indicates that the fourth column from the right is to be processed,
then 'PC(4)' is not an appropriate operator. If, on the other hand, the
'4' indicates that the fourth column from the left is to be processed,
then, of course, this being the same as the third column from the right,
'PC(4)' will be an appropriate operator. Finally, if 'PC' designates some
other procedure, then until we know more about that procedure, we can't
make any determination about the appropriateness of 'PC(4).'
The appropriateness of the operator 'PC(4)' will vary with the
interpretation of the knowledge state as well. We could imagine that the
knowledge state '(D=5,T=0,C1=1,E=9)' is to be interpreted differently.
Perhaps the letter 'E' as it occurs ±n this knowledge state is not used to
encode what is known about the 'E' in the puzzle. Perhaps it is used to
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encode what is known about the 'G' in the puzzle. So, the knowledge state






In this situation, processing the fourth column from the left would be
fruitless, since we have three unknown variables (the two letters and the
carry). So, assuming that the operator 'PC(4)' designates the procedure of
processing the fourth column from the left, the operator will be
appropriate on the earlier interpretation of the knowledge state but not
on this interpretation.
Given a particular knowledge state and a particular operator, whether
the operator is appropriate or not depends on how the knowledge state and
the operator are to be interpreted. I do not mean by this that there is no
fact of the matter as to whether a given operator is appropriate relative
to a given knowledge state, a given puzzle, and a given problem space. A
complete characterization of a problem space must tell us how to interpret
knowledge states and operators. It was implicit in my discussion of the
problem space in section 2 that 'PC(4)' designates the fourth column from
the right and that knowledge states are to be interpreted in the standard
way. Hence, given that problem space, the operator 'PC(4)' is not
appropriate relative to the knowledge state '(D:5,T:O,C1=1,E:9).' The
point is not that such facts are not determinate. Rather, it is that they




Consideration of the examples adduced in the paragraphs above simply
dramatizes what we should have known already: given any operator and any
knowledge state, the appropriateness of the operator relative to the
knowledge state is determined not by the syntactic form of these items but
rather by the nature of the procedure designated by the operator and the
nature of the partial solution to the puzzle represented by the knowledge
state. The notion of appropriateness appealed to in section 4 applies
directly to a procedure for transforming partial solutions to a puzzle,
which procedure is to be applied to some particular partial solution. The
notion of appropriateness applies only indirectly to syntactic objects such
as operators and knowledge states, and only then when they designate
procedures and partial solutions respectively. The notion of
appropriateness does not apply to an operator at all if the operator and
associated knowledge state are regarded as syntactic objects that are never
assigned an interpretation. If we think of a system as receiving a
knowledge state as input and producing an operator as output, but insist on
regarding these as uninterpreted syntactic objects, we could never regard
the system as producing an operator that is appropriate relative to the
knowledge state it received as input. The capacity to select an
appropriate operator, then, is quite clearly meaning dependent.
5.3
Faced with the meaning dependence of PICKOP, the dispensabilist must
somehow syntacticize the capacity. She might attempt to follow the example
of the recharacterization of the capacity to compute the sum of three
digits (where the third is either 1 or 0), discussed in the previous
section. There the idea was essentially to list all the possibilities.
The capacity to add three digits became the capacity to produce the
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expression '2' if the first two inputs are the expression '1,' and the
third the expression '0'; to produce the expression '3' if one of the first
two inputs is the expression '2,' the other the expression '1,' and the
third the expression '0'; etc.
In principle, the dispensabilist can do something similar for the
capacity to select an appropriate operator. Let's continue to assume that
the puzzle being solved and the problem space being used to solve it are
fixed. The knowledge set described in the problem space (call it P)
contains only a finite number of knowledge states. Hence, only a finite
number of strings of characters are knowledge states in P. Similarly, the
set of operators/procedures in P determines only a finite number of strings
of characters to be operators. Now, consider the cartesian product of
these two sets of strings. That is, consider the set of all ordered pairs
of strings such that the first element in the pair is a knowledge state in
P and the second element is an operator in P. Call this set Sp. For any
given pair in this set, we can consider the question of whether the second
element would be an appropriate operator if the first were the current
knowledge state. Whether it is will obviously depend on what procedure the
operator designates and what partial solution to the puzzle the knowledge
state represents. But, of course, the problem space P determines all of
this. Hence, we may consider the subset of Sp consisting of all pairs such
that the second element of the pair is an appropriate operator relative to
the first pair. Call this set Ssp. Now suppose that there were some way
of characterizing this set without in any way appealing to the semantic
interpretation of the relevant strings of characters. Suppose, for
example, that the set could be characterized extensionally--by listing all
its members. Then, the dispensabilist could recharacterize the capacity
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PICKOP (at least as it applies to the particular puzzle and problem space
in question) as the capacity to select an operator 0, whenever it is given
a knowledge state K, such that the ordered pair (0,K) is an element of the
set S*p.
Of course, listing all the elements of S*P would be an4mmense task:
the number of elements is enormous. Consider, for example, the number of
knowledge states in the problem space we have been using. Even if we
employ certain restrictions--counting strings with the same elements in a
different order, like '(D=5,T=0)' and '(T=0,D=5)', as the same string, for
example--to keep the number down, the number of knowledge states must be
well over 1010.0
But, let us suppose that such a list could be produced and, therefore,
that a purely syntactic characterization of the capacity PICKOP given, that
is that it could be recharacterized as the capacity to select one of the
expressions I ', ' '1 , or ' ' if the current knowledge state is
; to select one of the expressions '_ , ' , or ' ' if the
current knowledge state is ' '; etc. Let us call this syntacticized
capacity PICKOP'. The enormous size of the list necessary to describe
PICKOP' will, I claim, destroy the effectiveness of the explanation.
The situation is analogous to the central example in Putnam's
"Reductionism and the Nature of Psychology." Putnam considers two possible
explanations of why a square peg whose sides measure slightly less than 1"
won't pass through a round hole of diameter 1" in a board, but will pass
through a square hole whose sides measure exactly 1" in the same board.
The first explanation "is that the peg is approximately rigid under
transportation and the board is approximately rigid. The peg goes through
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the hole that is large enough and not through the hole that is too small."
(Putnam, 1973, p. 131.) The second possible explanation considers the peg
and the board as clouds of (Newtonian) elementary particles. These
characterizations include the precise position and velocity of each
particle in the board and the peg at some particular time. It is then
supposed that some immense calculation is performed which shows that the
collection of particles that the peg comprises may pass through the
spatiotemporal region that the square hole comprises but will not pass
through the spatiotemporal region that the round hole comprises.
Putnam rejects the second proposal as an explanation on the grounds.
that "whatever the pragmatic constraints on explanation may or may not be,
one constraint is surely this: The relevant features of a situation should
be brought out by an explanation and not buried in a mass of irrelevant
information." (Putnam, 1973, p. 132.)
An explanation of Solver's ability to solve puzzles (or, more
precisely, DONALD + GERALD : ROBERT, since we have been holding the puzzle
fixed) that uses the capacity PICKOP' can be rejected on the same grounds.
The explanation fails to bring out the contribution that exercise of the
capacity PICKOP' makes in producing a solution to the puzzle. It hides
this contribution in a mass of irrelevant information. The mass of
irrelevant information makes the explanation literally incomprehensible.
Given the limits of human patience one could not really digest or
comprehend the entire explanation: it would be too long. Considerations
of comprehensibility are particularly relevant to homunctional
explanations. One of the great virtues of homunctional explanations is
that they can make very complex systems comprehensible by organizing them
into layers of interacting parts. Even though one can't understand the
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operation of the system all at once, at a low enough level, the operation
of the components can be comprehended directly, and comprehensibility then
filters back up.
We needn't even go so far as Putnam does and claim that the inclusion
of enormous amounts of irrelevant information prevents the account that
uses the capacity PICKOP' from being an explanation. We need only claim
that it severely weakens the explanation. Because it does, the
dispensabilist will have to find some other way of generating a syntactic
characterization of PICKOP, or concede that P!CKOP is meaning dependent.
5.4
Another tack the dispensabilist might take in recharacterizing PICKOP
would be to replace the notion of an appropriate operator with the notion
of a "syntactically effective" operator. Suppose that the notion of
progress in the search for a solution to the puzzle could be defined
sy.itactically. Then, the dispensabilist could say that appropriate
operators are simply strings of chrracters such that when they are used as
input, along with the current knowledge state, to EXEC, pregress in the
search for a solution to the puzzle is thereby produced.
How could the notion of progress bc defined syntactically? Well,
recall that one of the elements of a problem space is u0 , the set of those
knowledge states which count as a solution to the puzzle at hand. In SYS,
SOLSET is responsible for producing a characterization of this set. The
output of SOLSET is delivered to TEST, which then creates an algorithm
which sorts members of u0 from other knowledge states. The dispensabilist
can use TEST to get c syntactic characterization of the knowledge states
in u0 (solution states): a given string of characters is a solution state
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just in case it is a knowledge state and would elicit a positive response
if used as input to TEST. Some knowledge states (continuing to think of
these as strings of characters) will not be solution states, but will be
very close to solution states. For example, many knowledge states will
have the property of differing from a solution state by just one character.
It is not hard to imagine that such properties can be used to develop an
overall measure of the extent to which any given knowledge state differs
syntactically from a solution state. First we would develop a measure of
the extent to which any two knowledge states are syntactically different.
It could be as simple as the number of places in which the two strings have
the same character divided by the average length of the two strings. But,
it is possible to be more sophisticated--we could, for example, give a
bonus for having one entire syntactic component in common, or having the
same number of syntactic components. In any case, having defined a measure
of the ayntactic difference between any two knowledge states, the measure
of a knowledge state's closeness to a solution state would simply be the
smallest number m such that for some solution state the syntactic
difference between the knowledge state and that solution state is m. Using
this notion of syntactic closeness to a solution state, the dispensabilist
can now define the notion of syntactic effectiveness.
An operator is syntactioally effective (relative to a given knowledge
state, puzzle and problem space) just in case, when the operator is used
together with the knowledge state as input to EXEC, the output of EXEC is
a knowledge state that is syntactically closer to a solution state than the
current knowledge state. 19
19. There are other ways that one might define the notion of syntactic
effectiveness. For example, one might define the distance between
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Appropriate operators will often be syntactically effective, and vice-
versa. When the procedure designated by an appropriate operator is applied
to a knowledge state, the resulting knowledge state typically contains more
information about a solution to the puzzle. And, typically, if not always,
a knowledge state that contains more information about a solution is a
knowledge state that is syntactically closer to a solution state. Hence,
typically, when a knowledge state and an appropriate operator are used as
input to EXEC the result will be a knowledge state that is syntactically
closer to a solution state than the original. Therefore, an appropriate
operator will typically be a syntactically effective operator.
At first glance, then, it is plausible that PICKOP--the capacity to
select an appropriate operator given a knowledge state--can be
recharacterized as the capacity to select a syntactically effective
operator given a knowledge state. Clearly, however, the capacity to select
an appropriate operator is not precisely identical to the capacity to
select an effective operator. Some appropriate operators are not
effective, and some effective operators are not appropriate. Perhaps the
dispensabilist can argue that the discrepancy is so trivial that, for the
knowledge states on the basis of the minimum number of steps between
the two knowledge states. Two knowledge states are separated by a
single step if one can be gotten from the other by applying one of the
procedures in the problem space being used. This way of putting it
appeals to the procedures that the operators in the problem space
designate. But, the dispensabilist could instead say that knowledge
state A is a single step from knowledge state B if there is some
operator in the problem space such that when it and A are the inputs to
EXEC, B is the result. With this notion of distance, the
dispensabilist could once again say that an operator is syntactically
effective if it results in a knowledge state that is closer to a
solution state than the original knowledge state. The comments that
follow, particularly the remarks about "dead ends" apply as well to
this definition of syntactic effectiveness or any other variations on
the theme.
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purposes at hand, the capacity to select an appropriate operator and the
capacity to select a syntactically effective operator may, in fact, be
considered the same capacity (under different descriptions).
I don't, in fact, think that it can be argued that the difference
between the notion of an appropriate operator and a syntactically effective
operator are trivial. Often in solving problems we find ourselves pursuing
dead ends--following strategies which, though perfectly reasonable, end up
bringing us no closer to a solution to the problem at hand than we were
when we embarked on them. Newell and Simon's theory of puzzle solving is
designed to allow for the pursuit of dead ends. Most of the problem spaces
they consider are designed in such a way that a knowledge state can encode
within it a means of indicating where things stood before a certain
speculative strategy was begun. In this way, when a strategy does not pan
out, an operator can be selected which has the effect of canceling the
strategy out. 20 Newell and Simon describe the advantage of having these
operators as follows:
There are several reasons why a system will usually be more
efficient that retains some capability for returning to
previous knowledge states. A knowledge state may contain false
information--as a result of errors in processing or recall. A
knowledge state may also contain conditional information, where
assumptions are made deliberately in order to work out their
consequences (the conditional assignments of cryptarithmetic
and the alternative moves of chess are both examples of
conditional information). (Newell and Simon, 1972, p. 816.)
The important point about the pursuit of dead ends is that it will
generally involve the application of procedures that produce knowledge
states syntactically further from a solution state than the original
knowledge state. In other words, the pursuit of dead ends involves the
20. See Newell and Simon, 1972, p. 273 for an example.
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selection of operators that are not syntactically effective, although they
are appropriate. Suppose, as Newell and Simon do, that the pursuit of dead
ends is sometimes an important aspect of the way we solve puzzles, and
therefore an important aspect of the way Solver solves puzzles. Then
PICKOP's sometimes selecting an ineffective operator will be an inherent
in the way Solver solves puzzles, and it would be a major mistake to
attempt to explain Solver's ability to solve puzzles in terms of PICKOP's
capacity to select an effective operator, even if it generally does select
an effective operator. Given the importance that Newell and Simon place on
dead ends, then, the attempt to recharacterize PICKOP as the capacity to
select a syntactically effective operator will not work.
5.5
In 5.1 and 5.2 I argued that the capacity PICKOP is meaning dependent.
We cannot judge an operator to be appropriate or not without knowing the
procedure that is designated by the operator and knowing how to interpret
the knowledge state that the procedure will be applied to. In section 5.3
I considered the possibility of syntacticizing PICKOP by means of a
complete list of knowledge state-operator pairs, where the operator is
appropriate for the knowledge state it is paired with. This possibility
was rejected on the grounds of simplicity: it would obscure our
explanation with a huge amount of irrelevant information. Finally, in
section 5.4, I considered a syntacticization in which the notion of an
appropriate operator is replaced with the notion of a syntactically
effective operator. I argued that although most appropriate operators are
syntactically effective operators and vice-versa, the two notions differ in
important ways, and thus that the capacity to select a syntactically
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effective operator cannot be regarded as identical to the capacity to
select an appropriate operator.
I conclude that there is no apparent way to recharacterize the
capacity PICKOP, and that PICKOP, in E, is, therefore, essentially meaning
dependent. In section 2, we had an example of a meaning dependent capacity
which could be syntacticized, but at the price of narrowing the scope of
the accompanying explanation. Given the assumption that we want the
explanation to be as general as possible, we were able to say that the
explanation was weakened by the syntacticization and that the capacity was,
therefore, meaning dependent. Here we do not depend on the assumption that
the explanation should, if possible, be of broad scope. Instead, the
argument relies on the fact that the only syntacticization available
obscures the explanation with an enormous amount of irrelevant information.
Before proceeding to an example of another kind of reason for holding
a capacity to be meaning dependent, I want to consider the present example
just a bit longer. In particular, I want to consider an argument to t 'e
effect that there must be another way to provide a syntactic
recharacterization of the capacity PICKOP. The argument is based on the
"formality condition,."
The formality condition, originally proposed by Fodor, and very widely
accepted, places a constraint on theories of mental processes.2 It says
that mental processes must apply to mental representations in virtue of the
formal--i.e. syntactic, or non-semantic--properties of the mental
representation.
21. See Fodor , 1980, p. 64.
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Now, consider the processes involved when Solver selects an operator.
The formality condition ought to hold since we are assuming that Solver
solves puzzles just like people do. Also, Solver is composed of
conventional digital computers, and the formality condition holds almost by
definition for such machines. So, the process of selecting an operator
applies to the relevant representations in virtue of their formal
properties. In other words, PICKOP selects an appropriate operator on the
basis of the formal properties of its input. This suggests that the
relation which holds between the input to PICKOP and the operator it
selects can be defined formally. Couldn't, one might ask, this definition
be used in turn to provide a syntactic characterization of the notion of an
appropriate operator? More generally, if a process satisfies the formality
condition, then mustn't there be a way of characterizing the capacity
reflected by that process formally or syntactically?
There are a number of problems with deriving a syntactic
characterization in this way, but I'll focus on just a couple. Both derive
from the fact that capacities characterized in this manner will be much too
narrow. Suppose we use the formal algorithm or program used by PICKOP to
define the notion of an appropriate operator. Then, there will be one and
only one appropriate operator associated with any given set of inputs (a
puzzle description, a characterization of a problem space, and a knowledge
state). But, in fact, given any particular set of inputs, there may be a
number of appropriate operators, all but one of which will be excluded by
the proposed definition. Hence, the notion captured by the proposed
characterization is not the notion of an appropriate operator, but
something much narrower.
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An explanation which depended on such a narrower capacity would have
two sorts of defects. First of all, since it depends on the manner in
which Solver happens to select an appropriate operator, it could not be
applied to systems or organisms which select operators in a slightly
different way. In other words, the explanation would have the defect of
not applying to systems which employ different algorithms than those used
by Solver, but still, at a certain level of abstraction (in particular, the
level associated with the amount of detail present in the explanation E),
solve puzzles in the same way.
Another problem with the proposed explanation has to do with the
importance of accounting for the circumstances in which a system fails to
exhibit a target ability. As I noted earlier in the discussion of
homunctional explanations in section I, there may be some slack between a
particular capacity--be it the target capacity or one of the subcapacities
in the explanation--and what will actually be achieved by the subcapacities
posited to account for that capacity. Suppose, for example, that the
capacity C appears in an homunctional explanation, and subcapacities S1,
S2, '''0 5n, interacting in manner M are posited to account for the
system's having capacity C. It may be that there are certain stimuli such
that the execution of the subcapacities in the relevant manner will not be
sufficient for the system to achieve C. This situation is tolerable so
long as such cases can be shown to be exceptional and to correspond to
stimuli for which the system actually fails to exhibit the target ability.
If the system in question is the human visual system, then among such
stimuli will be those that produce optical illusions.
In the case of Solver and the capacity PICKOP, we want to acknowledge
that there may be circumstances in which Solver fails to select an
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appropriate operator. In fact, these failures may exhibit some sort of
systematicity. We would like a detailed homunctional explanation of
Solver's abilities to reveal the precise locus of the failures.22  The
failure might result, for example, from the fact that the initial set of
subcapacities posited to account for the capacity PICKOP are not always
sufficient for the selection of an appropriate operator. Or, the problem
might appear later, in the decomposition of one of these subcapacities.
Standard homunctional explanations will reveal the locus of difficulty
wherever it might be.
Suppose, however, that the syntactic recharacterization of PICKOP is
derived from the actual algorithm used by Solver. PICKOP then becomes the
capacity to select whatever operator Solver actually selects in a given
situation. All of Solver's selections are treated as successes. The
causes of Solver's failures to select an appropriate operator will be
obscured.
Using the algorithm actually used by Solver to select an appropriate
operator to derive a syntactic recharacterization of PICKOP evidently
produces a capacity that is too narrow. And, in general, the formality
condition does not guarantee that a given nominally meaning dependent
capacity of a system can adequately be given a syntactic
recharacterization.
22. By a detailed homunctional explanation I mean one that contains levels
of analysis beyond those included in E.
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6. Dispensabilist Explanations and Insight
In this section I will put the homunctional explanation of Solver's
ability to solve puzzles aside and focus instead on a particular episode of
puzzle solving. The accounts of that particular episode offered by the
dispensabilist and indispensabilist respectively will be compared. The
point here will largely be tangential to the main discussion, since it is
not essentially tied to the structure of homunctional explanations. My
claim, that the dispensabilist explanation gives less insight into how the
puzzle is solved, could be transferred to the general homunctional
explanation which has been at issue since section 3. I won't do this
because the argument is too lengthy to make it worth presenting here.
Still, it is important to see the kind of effect that dispensabilism can
have on the extent to which an explanation of a cognitive process gives us
insight into that process.
Suppose once again then that Solver is given the puzzle, DONALD +
GERALD ROBERT; D=5. And, suppose that Solver solves the puzzle in the
manner indicated in section 2. Now consider how Solver's activities will
be described by the indispensabilist and by the dispensabilist in turn.
The broad outlines of the descriptions will be the same. Solver begins by
selecting a problem space comprising a solution set, a knowledge set, a set
of operators and an initial knowledge state. Solver then produces a
sequence of knowledge states, with the step from one knowledge state to the
next being guided by the selection of an operator.23 The accounts will
23. Notice that the account will fit neatly with the general homunctional
account given earlier. In general, it is easy to transform a general
homunctional account of a system's capacity to X into an account of a
particular episode of Xing: the more complete the homunctional
account, the more detailed the account of the particular episode.
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differ in that the dispensabilist regards each of these structures as
uninterpreted syntactic objects, whereas the indispensabilist regards each
of them as an expression with a meaning or interpretation as well as a
syntactic form.
In presenting the sequence of knowledge states and operators, the
dispensabilist might produce something like the chart that appears at the















This chart, combined with the dispensabilist's description of the
problem space that Solver selected in solving the puzzle, produces a
succinct and cogent account of how Solver solved the puzzle. The
description of the knowledge set allows us to interpret each of the
knowledge states in the chart above, except for the last one, as a partial
solution to the puzzle. And, the description of the set of operators will
provide an explanation of what each of the procedures indicated in the
column on the right do. Hence, we are able to see each knowledge state as
a step toward the final solution of the puzzle, and we are able to see how
Solver gets from one step to another. Consider, for example, the step from
the tenth line on the chart to the eleventh line. The status of the puzzle





N= 2or 3 or 6 70B970
At this point Solver chooses the operator 'TD(N,2),' which designates the
procedure of testing the assignment of the digit 2 to the letter N for
plausibility. Of course, if you suppose that N=2, then the third column
from the left will sum to 9, and B will have to be assigned the digit 9.
But, we already have E=9. So, you can conclude that N does not equal 2.
Given that N is equal to 2 or 3 or 6, you can further conclude that N is
equal to 3 or 6. And, this is exactly the conclusion that Solver reacned
by testing the plausibility of N=2. This conclusion is reflected in the
knowledge state on the eleventh line above, which differs from the previous
knowledge state only in tnat 'N=3v6' occurs where 'N=2v3v6' occurred
before. By looking at the step from the tenth line to the eleventh line,
we see tnat Solver, "knowing" that N is equal to 2 or 3 or 6, tests the
plausibility of N being equal to 2; determines that N can't be 2; and,
"concludes" that N must be 3 or 6. Thus, we understand to a large degree
how Solver got from the ninth to the tenth step in the solution of the
puzzle. We can similarly understand each of the other steps in the chart
and thereby see how Solver, step by step, solves the puzzle.
So, putting the above chart together with a description of the problem
space used, we get a cogent account of how Solver solved DONALD + GERALD=
ROBERT; D=5. The explanation is, of course, incomplete--in just the same
way that our account, E, of Solver's ability to solve puzzles was
incomplete. We still don't know how Solver selected the problem space; and
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we don't know in full detail how Solver tested the plausibility of N being
equal to 2; etc. Still, it provides an acceptable answer to the question,
How did Solver solve the puzzle? It is just the sort of answer we would
want if a person had solved the puzzle and we had asked her to explain how
she solved it.
Now compare the above account with the one available to the
dispensabilist. The dispensabilist can also produce the chart above. But,
of course, for the dispensabilist, the symbols on the chart are
uninterpreted syntactic objects. Let's emphasize this fact by replacing
the set of symbols with ones that do not suggest a particular semantic
interpretation. The result is given below:
#"%d# ?#a#
#"%d$&%z$!a%a# ?#e#
#"%d$&%z$! a%a$)%i$! da$! e%a# ?#c#
#"5d$&%z$!a~a$)51$!.d~a$!e~a$,Ic~z$^5'f$lb~a# ?#d#
#"%d$&%z$!a%a$)%i$!d%a$!e%a$!c%z$^%f$!b%a$+me# ?#b#







#"5~d$&5z$l asa$)5i1 dsa$ esa$l c~z$^5f $I ba$+5g$}%n${5%a$;5%j$'5# =#*#
#"5~d$&%z$la~a$)%i$!d~a$le~a$lc~z$^5f$lb~a$+5g*}5h${5a$;5j$'5ec$*5b#
This chart, like the previous one, shows Solver solving the puzzle by
going through a sequence of knowledge states. Each step, the
dispensabilist may explain, is mediated by the operator listed on the
right. The operator triggers a procedure which transforms one knowledge
state into the next. And, the dispensabilist use her characterization of
u0, the set of solution states, to prove that the last knowledge state
above is, indeed, a solution state. Thus, the dispensabilist can show how
Solver, step by step, constructs a solution to the puzzle. But, of course,
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the explanation is very unsatisfying. We still don't have any insight into
how Solver was able to solve the puzzle.
The lack of insignt in tne indispensabilist's explanation should be
familiar to anyone who has watched a Rubik's cube expert at work without
being privy herself to the special techniques used to realign the cube.24
You can watch each step very carefully. You can see, mechanically, how the
person gets from one step to another by rotating a particular face of the
cube. And, it is obvious that the state of the cube after the last step is
a "solution" to the cube. Still, if one has struggled for hours
unsuccessfully attempting to solve tne cube, it seems like magic when the
expert produces a realigned cube. It is only when the expert reveals her
technique, categorizing moves in a variety of ways, that one comes to have
some insight into how she solved the cube.
7. Essentialy Meaning Dependent Capacities:
The Extent of the Problem
The target capacities of homunctional explanations in cognitive
science will almost always be meaning dependent. It is impossible to
regard a system as doing the sort of things that cognitive scientists want
to explain--seeing, hearing, reading, reasoning, problem-solving,
24. Rubik's cube, which was popular in the early 1980's, is a plastic cube
consisting of 27 smaller cubes. Each of the smaller cubes (except for
the center cube) have a different color on each face, the same six
colors being used for each cube. Any face of the larger cube, which
itself consists of nine smaller faces, can be rotated. Tnese rotations
allow one to change the outer appearance of the larger cube. Starting
with a cube in which the colors on the faces have been "scrambled," the
object is to get each face of the larger cube to be uniform in color.
So, for example, the cube is solved if one face is all red, one all
green, one all blue, one all yellow, one all white, and the sixth face
all orange.
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remembering, etc.--without associating an interpretation with some of the
system's states. Meaning dependent capacities are, then, quite typical.
Meaning dependent capacities will be essentially meaning dependent if they
cannot be replaced by syntactic alternatives without substantially
weakening the explanation in which they occur. In sections 2 and sections
3 through 5, I discuss two different ways in which syntrcticizing meaning
dependent capacities can weaken the surrounding explanation: (1) the
resulting explanation will sometimes be less general than the original
explanation; and, (2) sometimes the only syntactic alternative available
will require sucr an enormously lengtny characterization that it burdens
the resulting explaiation witn too much irrelevant detail. So far we have
focused on a single example to illustrate each passibility. In this
section I want to consider some other examples, and address tne question of
how often we can expect to encounter each of tnese kinds of cases. I will
argue that cases of the first sort will be ubiquitous in cognitive scierce,
and cases of the second zort, wnile less common, will not be unusual.
7.1
The example in section 2 concerned an nomunctional account of our
ability to add pairs of numbers. Tne capacity at issue was the capacity to
compute the sum of tnree digits. Tne proposed syntactic recharacterization
was: the capacity to produce the expression '1' when given two tokens of
the expression '0' and one token of the expression '1'; to produce the
expression '2' when given two tokens of the expression '1' and one token of
the expression '0'; etc. I objected that the resulting explanation would
then fail to apply to systems that calculate in bases other than base-10,
The example worked because the capasities in the rartial homunctional
explanation of adding pairs of numbers do not determine, explicitly or
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implicitly, precisely the set of syntactic formulae to be used by systems
tnat the explanation applies to.
Homunctional explanations will often have this feature. Theories of
cognitive processing can often be given in a fair amount of detail without
specifying the exact form of the structures being manipulated. Tnis claim
can be thought of as an extension of the tenet which spawned
functionalism--that a precise account of how a system processes information
can be given without specifying the physical nature of the system. I'll
further illustrate the claim with two examples.
Consider a theory of parsing. The theory assumes a particular theory
of grammar, the latest version of Government-Binding theory let's suppose.
The theory makes assumptions about the kind of structures that are computed
during the course of parsing. Tnere will be structures constituting tne
sequence of words to be parsed, structures constituting words which have
been encountered but not assigned syntactic roles, structures constituting
syntactic trees, structures constituting partial syntactic trees, etc. The
theory will also include a number of specific principles which specify how
these structures are built up in the course of parsing. For example, one
such principle might have to do witi determiners. Perhaps, whenever a
determiner is encountered during processing of a sentence, a structure
constituting a noun phrase having (at least) a determiner and a head noun25
is created: the determiner is filled in of course, but the slot for the
head nouz is left empty. And, perhaps the slot is .a be tilled by the very
next noun that is encountered. Tnis is ensure~d by allowing empty slots in
25. The reader does not need to know what a head noun is in order to follow
the discussion.
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our syntactic structures to be "starred," and having a general principle
which says tnat when a word of a certain category is encountered and an
empty slot for that category is starred, the slot must be filled by that
word.
Now, in an homunctional explanation of the ability to parse sentences
based on our hypothetical theory, we might include the capacity to respond
to a determiner by setting up a noun phrase whose constituents are (at
least) the determiner, and a starred empty slot for the head noun. If the
theory were presented in tne fullest possible detail, and the precise form
for all of the structures computed in the course of parsing were given then
we may well be able to characterize this capacity syntactically. But, the
theory could be given witnout specifying the precise form of the structures
it posits. In particular, at tne level of detail used to describe the
principle above, it is an open question what the precise form of a noun
phrase is. Tne noun phrase might have the form:
(NOUNPHRASE1 (("The"),(HEADNOUN*))).
But, it could also have the form:
(Si; S1 IS NOUNPHRASE; S1 CONTAINS "the"; S1 CONTAINS HEADNOUN*).
The two forms are clearly very different. Systems using the two forms
would have to engage in very different sorts of computations. But, the
theory, and hence, the homunctional explanation, can remain silent about
whion of these forms the structure is to take. And, this is so in spite of
the fact that the theory may present a rather detailed account of parsing.
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Consider another example. Marr's theory of vision involves tne
construction of a series of representations of tn contents of tne visual
field. The earliest such representation is called the "raw primal sketch."
It is derived from the array of light intensity values encoded at the back
of the retina, with tnis derivation being mediated by the computation of
zero-crossings.
A zero-crossing is a point in the visual field where the change in
light intensity values is at a local peak. These often correspond to
important points in the visual field such as a point on the boundary of an
object. The zero-crossings are computed over a number of "channels."
Intuitively, eacn channel blurs tne image to a certain degree. Tne greater
the blurring, tne more zero-crossings are eliminated, and the greater the
chance that the remaining ones are significant. Points that are associated
with zero-crossings in all the channels are especially significant and
become part of tne raw primal sketch.
Now, simplifying somewnat, let's say that the raw primal sketen
includes just those points that do appear as zero-crossings in eacn
channel. These points are organized into various kinds of clusters,
depending on tne rough shape that they form. Among the kinds of clusters
are edges, blobs and bars. Representations of the clusters are explicitly
constructed and include information about the cluster's position, length,
orientation, etc. These representations are the telements of the raw primal
sketch.
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use of one kind of coordinates will not apply to machines or organisms
using the other. But, an homunctional explanation based on Marr's theory,
at tne level of detail I nave described it, need not specify which
coordinate system is to be used.26
The parsing and vision examples illustrate well that detailed
homunctional accounts of cognitive abilities can be given without
consideration of the precise form tnat the structures being processed are
to take. In such cases, syntacticizations of the posited capacities will
typically result in explanations tnat are not sufficiently general. And,
for this reason, such capacities will be meaning dependent and the
explanations will constitute counterexamples to the tnesis of the
dispensability of meaning in cognitive science.
7.2
If tne arguments above are correct, then the following situation will
be common in cognitive science. A single partial homunctional explanation
applies to a variety of (possible) systems or organisms, each of wnich has
the target capacity. As far as the explanation goes, the systems and
organisms all work in the same kay, but at a more detailed level tne
systems and organisms work differently. The dispensabilist will not be
able to give the general explanation which applies to all of the systems,
but will, it has been assumed so far, be able to provide an homunctional
explanation for any particular system. The example discussed in sections 3
through 5 suggests that that assumption may not always be correct. There,
26. In fact, Harr did specify tne use of cartesian coordinates, and he may
have had important reasons for doing so (Cf. Marr, 1982, p. 73.). But,
the important point is that, stated at a certain level of abstraction,
the theory can be neutral on this i'sue.
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I considered tne explanation of Solver's ability to solve puzzles. The
capacity at issue was the capacity PICKOP. In that discussion, I did not
rely on considerations of generality at all. The claim was not that a
syntacticization of PICKOP would result in an explanation that was too
narrow, but that, even as applied to Solver alone, the explanation
resulting from a syntacticization slould not be as effective as the original
explanation.
In a moment I want to describe the crucial elements that made tnis
example work, and suggest some other examples wnere the same elements are
present. But, first a discussion of tne general problem of providing
syntactic recnaracterizations of capacities will be helpful. Tne
discussion will be ratner abstract, but not completely unfamiliar, since it
is just a general version of mucn of the discussion in section 5.
Suppose tnat we are considering a capacity C that occurs in an
homunctional account of a particular system S's having a certain cognitive
ability. Typically, we can tnink of a component (of a system) that has tne
capacity as a black box which takes expressions as its input and generates
expressions in response. To keep things simple, we can restrict our
attention to deterministic black boxes. Tierefore, the black box will be a
function, f, mapping a certain domain of expressions onto a certain range
of expressions. The original characterization of the capacity tells us the
relation, R, that the output of tne black box--f(e)--must bear to the
input--e--if the component actually has the capacity. And, tne capacities
of interest are ones that characterize this relation by making implicit or
explicit reference to the semantic values of e and f(e) respectively. A
syntactic recharacterization of the capacity will describe tne relation R
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that f(e) must bear to e without referring to any semantic properties of
tne two expressions.
Two general methods for characterizing R syntactically are o7
particular interest. First, assuming that the domain of inputs and the
range of outputs are both finite, we can just list all the acceptable
input/output pairs. A second metnod is available if R is a function--i.e.,
if there is only one acceptable output for any given input. The method
hinges on the fact that the system S must have a component that nas
capacity C. This component must use some algoritnm for taking an
expression e and generattng an expression that bears R to e. By describing
this algoritnm in complete detail, we can cnaracterize a function f* sucn
that o will bear R to i (assuming that R itself is a function) just in case
o:f*(i).
Tne problem with tne first metnod, of course, is that a list of all
the acceptable input/output pairs may be so long that the explanation
becomes literally incomprehensible. Tne second method has two hazards.
First, if, according to the original capacity, there is more than one
acceptable output for a given input, tnen the syntactically characterized
capacity will be "narrower" than the original capacity. Since I won't be
concerned witn this hazard in the present discussion, I won't bother
discussing the problems it creates. The second hazard and the one we will
be concerned with here has to do witn the fact that there may be some slack
between the capacity C and what is actually achieved by fP. That is, it
may be that for some input i, f*(j) does not really bear R to i. For some
such i the original input to the system that generates i is an input on
which the system fails, i.e. an input for which the system fails to
manifest the ability A, even thougn, in general, it does hvve the ability.
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Frequently, it is important that such inputs be treated as exceptions to be
explained, as in the case of visual illusions. If f* is used to define a
new relation R', then f*(i) automatically bears R' to i. Hence, S will be
considered successful on all inputs. Failures are then covered up and not
explained.
All of the above, rather abstract, discussion should have sounded
somewhat familiar. For it parallels the argument given in section 5
concerning the capacity PICKOP and the explanation of Solver's ability to
solve puzzles. The inputs in the case of PICKOP, it will be recalled, are
knowledge states (I am assuming again that tne puzzle being solved and tne
problem space being used to solve it are fixed) and the outputs are
operators. A given output is acceptable if it designates an operator tnat
is appropriate if the current status of the puzzle is represented by the
input. The relation RJ between two expressions thus defined must he
characterized syntactically if the capacity PICKOP is to be syntactically
recharacterized. In section 5 I argued that any sucn recharacterization
would substantially weaken the explanation of Solver's ability to solve
puzzles. The argument hinged on three points: (1) A list of acceptable
input/output pairs would be so long as to render the resulting explanation
literally incomprehensible; and, (2) It may be assumed that there are
inputs for which Solver--PICKOP in particular--fails to select an
appropriate operator. These failures need eventually to be explained,
whereas using the complete algoritnm used by PICKOP to syntactically
characterize a slight variant of Ra would treat the failures as successes.
Hence, using this method of syntactically characterizing RW weakens our
explanation of Solver's ability to solve puzzles. (3) No other plausible
methods for syntacttcally characterizing fl* seemed to be available.
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In order, then, to find other examples of meaning dependent capacities
without appealing to considerations of generality, we need only find
examples where the three elements above are present. Tne most difficult
requirement to satisfy is tnat there be no plausible methods, otner than
the two methods above, for syntactically characterizing the relevant
relation, since the number of metnods that could be proposed is limitless.
Still, I think there are plenty of other cases where all three elements
above are present.
Imagine, for example, an account of tne ability to read. Sucn an
account will involve issues of determining co-reference. In particular, an
homunctional explanation of tne ability to read will probably include tne
capacity to determine wnether two expressions are co-referential. Pernaps
the capacity will appear more than once in tne explanation, each occurrence
dealing witn different kinds of sentences, or different kinds of pairs of
expressions, or contexts that differ in otner ways. And, details of tne
context might be built into tne characterization of the capacity. Still,
the capacity to determine whetner two expressions are coreferential will
appear in some guise.
Tne input for such a capacity will include representations, probably
incomplete, of the sentence or sentences in which the two expressions
occur; representations of some of the preceding sentences; some sort of
representation synthesizing the most important information conveyed thus
far in the passage; etc. The output will take one of two values, one
indicating that the expressions are co-referential and the other indicating
that they are not. Obviously, a listing of all acceptable input/output
pairs would be too long. Even if tne input contained nothing more than an
unparsed 50-word section of the passage, the number of possible inputs
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wou.d be much greater than 1050. Also, it is clear that whatever algoritnm
is used by the system or organism in question will fail on certain inputs,
and that it will be important to explain these failures. It is not at all
uncommon to read a piece of text and take two expressions to be co-
referential when, in fact, they are not intended to be and a more careful
reading of the passage makes this evident. A good account of the human
ability to read will not treat such failures as successes.
Finally, consider the question of whether any other plausible method
of syntactically characterizing the relation between inputs and acceptable
outputs is available. Assume, in considering the question, that the
capacity in question encompasses sentences sucn as (Si), where pragmatic
considerations must be brought to bear:
(S1) By the time the fatner found the boy, he was in despair.
In this example, whether 'tne boy' and 'he' are co-referential depends on
whether the information in previous sentences suggest that the boy, but not
the father, might be in despair, Whether it does is determined by tne
information in the input, which would include information about previous
sentences. But, it determines it in a very subtle way. Outside of
constructing a sophisticated algoritnm for making such judgments, there
clearly won't be any way of sorting cases of co-reference from cases of
distinct reference on the basis of the syntactic features of the input.27
The key to this example is that the corsiderations that determine
whether a particular input/output pair is acceptable are rather open-ended.
27. By syntactic features I mean, of course, tne syntactic features of tne
input itself, not the syntactic features of the sentences that tne
input is about.
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Consider, for example, the myriad of ways of suggesting that "tne boy"
might be in despair. This open-endedness has tne consequence that (a) any
particular algoritnm for determining co-reference is likely to fail on some
cases; and (b) except for using a sophisticated algoritnm for determining
co-reference, or simply listing all the acceptable input/output pairs,
there won't be any plausible way to characterize acceptable input/output
pairs on the basis of tneir syntactic properties.
We can find otner examples of capacities that satisfy the three
criteria above by duplicating this feature of open-endedness. That is, we
want capacities that determine input/output relations the satisfaction of
which is determined by an open-ended set of factors. Such examples snould
not be too difficult to generate. To briefly sketch another example,
suppose tnat the target capacity is the capacity to formulate complex plans
in some particular domain. Suppose tnat one of tne posited subcapacities
is the capacity to identify cases wnen two goals or subgoals conflict.
Wnether two goals or subgoals conflict may depend in a complex way on
knowledge about the problem domain that is not explicitly encoded in the
representations of the goals. Again, the factors that could determine that
two goals conflict will be quite open-ended and any particular algorithm
for identifying conflicts is likely to fail on some cases.
These examples and the analysis above make it clear that the
explanation of Solver's ability to solve puzzles is not unique in its
particular impact on tne issue of dispensabilism. The important feature of
the explanation was that it contained a meaning dependent capacity which
the dispensabilist could not syntacticize without substantially weakening
the explanation, even as it applies to Solver alone. We now see that other
homunctional explanations will have this feature as well.
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8. Conclusion
My aim throughout this essay nas been to defend the concern of the
Representational Theory of Mind with the meaning of mental representations.
Suan concern has come under attack by Sticn, who has suggested that
questions about the meaning of cognitive symbols can and should be
discarded. My strategy has been to challenge tne assumption that issues
involving meaning can be ignored without paying a significant price. I
have attempted to demonstrate tnat witnin a widely accepted framework for
explanations in cognitive science claims about tne meaning of mental
representations have a central role to play.
Tne explanatory framework I nave assumed is tnat of homuncular
functionalism. Witnin tnis framework, tne abilities of systems and
organisms are explained by analyzing tnem into hierarchies of interacting
subcapacities. Wnen tne ability to be explained is cognitive, the
subcapacities often involve the manipulation of cognitive structures. And,
we have seen that the characterization of tne subcapacities frequently
involves the association of interpretations or meanings witn these
structures. Recharacterizing tne capacities so that they do not associate
meanings with the structures being manipulated is frequently not plausible.
In some cases, any such recharacterization would be excessively lengthy and
difficult to comprehend. More frequently, the explanations resulting from
such recharacterizations will be too narrow, applying to particular systems
or small ranges of systems in cases where the original explanation applied
very broadly.
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To a large extent, the fact that syntactic recharacterizations of
meaning dependent capacities are not always plausible, is a consequence of
the structure of homunctional explanations. A complete homunctional
explanation of a cognitive ability ends witn subcapacities the possession
of which can be accounted for directly by the physical constitution of the
system in question. But, even when such an explanation is cut off part way
down the hierarchy of subcapacities, the result is -An explanation. And, I
as discussed in the previous section, such explanations, even fairly
detailed explanations, may not make any commitment, implicit or explicit,
to the precise syntactic form of tne structures it posits. It is not
surprising, then, tnat characterizing the subcapacities in a way tnat
depends only on syntactic properties of these structures is often not
plausible.
If the existence of essentially meaning dependent cajpacities in
homunctional explanations in cognitive science follows from the structure
of homunctional explanations in general, then it is fair to say that
homunationalism and the thesis of the dispensability of meaning in
cognitive science are incompatible. And, if nomunctionalism is the central
mode of explanation in cognitive science, then the price to be paid for
eliminating appeals to meaning in cognitive science is very stiff indeed.
A successful theory of meaning for mental representation may not be just
around the corner, but perhaps some pstience is in order.
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The Syntactic Theory of Mind and the Collateral Information Problem
The Representaticnal Theory of Mind (RTM), championed most notably by
Jerry Fodor, has been offered as an account of propositional attitude
states--believing that p, desiring that q, etc. According to RTM, for Fred
to believe, e.g., that it's raining, is for Fred to stand in a certain
relation to a token of a symbol (or sequence of symbols) in his head, the
content of which is tnat it's raining. Tnese symbols in Fred's head are
part of a larger structure of symbols that constitute a language of sorts--
a language of thougnt. And, the rquence of symbols can be thougnt of, on
this view, as a sentence in a language of tnought, or, as I snall call it,
a mental sentence. Advocates of RTM have argued that propositional
attitude states play a crucial role in cognitive science and, tnerefore,
consider RTM to be a crucial element in the foundations of cognitive
science,
One of the majur challeges facing RTM is to prov.'.de a theory of
content for mental sentences. Such a theory would answer the question, In
virtue of what does a given sen;ence in someone's language of thought have
the content that it does? Ideally, equipped with such a theiry, aJ given
the relevant non-semantic facts about Fred's psychology (whatever those
might be), we could determine the content of any one of the sentences in
Fred's language of thought.1 The possibility of such a theory has come
1. Altrwugh ATM only requirs that sentences be assigned content, it is
nften assumed that mental sentences derive their content from the
contents of comp..nent symbols "togetner witn some sort of composition
rules). I will make this assumption, and will, therefore, talk about
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under attack in recent years. One line of attack concerns what I shall
call tne "collateral information" problem (the CI problem for short). This
name for tne issue stems in part from Hilary Putnam's characterization of
the problem as one of "developing a criterion which distinguishes changes
in the content of mental signs from changes in collateral information."
(Putnam 1983, pp. 146-47.)
Very briefly--I'll go into a bit more detail in section 1--the CI
problem stems from the following sorts of considerations. Suppose tnat
Fred, but not Barney, believes tnat Stanley has no hair on his head. Tnis
difference in belief surely does not suggest tnat the mental signs of Fred
and Barney associated witn tne word "nair" nave a different content.
Surely, Fred's having this belief is merely a difference in collateral
information with respect to tne concept of hair. But, suppose that Fred
believes that cats don't have nair on tneir bodies. Or, suppose that Fred
believes tnat humans nave no hair on tneir heads or bodies. Such beliefs
suggest something more than a difference in collateral information. There
is a strong inclination to think that they indicate a difference in the
content of the two signs. It appears that a theory of content will have to
give us a criterion for distinguishing beliefs wnich count as collateral
information with respect to a particular concept from those beliefs that
indicate a difference in content. But, there are reasons to think that
such a criterion might not be possible. It seems, for example, that such a
criterion would amount to something like an analytic/synthetic distinction,
a distinction which is widely held to be untenable,
the content of a symbol or mental sign where the symbol is associated
not with an English sentence, but an English word. In a similar vein, I
will talk about the content of a concept.
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Stephen Sticn, in From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case
Against Belief (nereafter, Tne Case Against Belief) has used these sorcs of
considerations to argue against tne possibility of an acceptable theory of
content for mental sentences. His prescription is to abandon semantic
notions in cognitive science altogetner. On his view, cognitive science
would recognize analogs to propositional attitude states. And, tnese
states would be analyzed as relations to mental sentence tokens. But, tne
mental sentence tokens, and, hence, the propositional attitude analogs,
would only be assigned syntactic properties; mental sentences would remain
uninterpreted. Stien thus proposes to replace tne Representatia.al Tneory
of Mind witn toe Syntactic Theory of Mind (STM).
It is tempting to tnink tnat tne collateral information problem is a
problem of meaning and tnat sticking to syntactic properties of mental
sentence tokens would avoid tne problem altogetner. Consider, for example,
tne analogous issues for real languages. It is not uncommon to suppose
tnat if I acquire a series of bizarre beliefs about hair, tnat tne meaning
of the word in my idiolect might change. But, wno has ever'proposed tnat
tne acquisition of bizarre beliefs mignt change the syntactic properties of
that term in my idiolect?
I shall argue, however, that the CI problem is not just a problem of
meaning. I will argue that it is a problem for STM as much as it is a
problem for RTM. And, I will argue tnat the powerful principle whion Sticn
incorporates into 3711 in order to avoid the collateral information problem
is untenable,
The outline of tne rest of tphe essay will be as follows. In section
1, I will quickly review tne collateral information problem and ways of
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nandling it. In section 2, I will turn to tne version of tne CI problem
put fortn by Sticn and the difficulties he believes it creates for RTM.
Section 3 will consider STM and tne way that it is supposed to avoid tne
difficulties discussed in section 2. In particular, I will isolate a
principle which is solely responsible for STM's avoiding the collateral
information problem. Section 4 presents a detailed argument for tne
conclusion that adherence to the principle isolated in section 3 creates
insuperable difficulties for STM. STM must, therefore, abandon tnis
principle and face the collateral information problem. Finally, I defend
this conclusion against a plausible line of attack in section 5.
1. The Collateral Information Problem
Tne most well-known formulation af tne C:llateral Information problem
is given by Putnam in "Computational Psychology and Interpretation Theory"
(Putnam, 1983). Putnam argues there tnat versions of RTM that advocate
some version of conceptual role semantics2 won't be able to develop a
precise nation of sameness of content. 3
In tne essay Putnam presents a thougnt experiment involving two
cnildren living in tne fictional country of Ruritania. At the beginning of
tne story, Oscar and Elmer are, we are told, "as alike as you please."
2. Conceptual, or functional, roba semantics is the doctrine that the
meaning of mental symbols is given by their conceptual, or functional,
role. Field, 1977 presents the most worked out version of this view.
See also Harman, 1982 and Block, 1986.
3. Putnam actually poses the CI problem as a problem for versions of RTM
that advocate "a verificationist semantics." But, on my reading of
Putnam, this is just another name for conceptual role semantics. See
Putnam, 1983, pp. 143-144 in this regard. Putnam's arguments apply to
any version of WITM in whose theory of content inferential role Is a
crucial determinant of meaning.
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Let's assume tnat they are molecule-for-molecule identical. Furtnermore,
tne only difference in tneir environments is that in tne soutn of
Ruritania, where Oscar lives, pots and pans are normally made of aluminum,
whereas in tne north of Ruritania, where Elmer lives, pots and pans are
normally made of silver. In botn dialects, the term 'grug' refers to tne
stuff pots and pans are mdde of. That is, in the north, 'grug' means
silver and in tne soutn, 'grug' means aluminum.
Oscar and Elmer are old enough wnen tne story begins (age ten, let's
say) so that both have acquired a concept that they express witn tne word
'grug.' Oscar and Elmer appear to have nearly identical beliefs about
'grug' (not surprisingly, given tnat tney are molecule-for-molecule twins).
In particular, Oscar and Elmer will say precisely the same things about
'grug.' Of course, tne terms do nave distinct reference in tne two
idiolects. And, tne indexical terms tney use, such as 'nere,' 'my matner,'
etc. will also nave distinct reference. But, if we accek t some version of
individualism, the doctrine that tne nature of a person's purely
psycnological states supervenes on tne states of the person's brain, tnen
we must say tnat Oscar and Elmer's purely psychological states are at tnis
point identical. For, by assumption, they are in identical brain-states
(assuming tnat one's brain states are supervenient on tre state of tne
molecules in one's brain). In particular, we must say that the mental
representations associated for them with the word 'grug' have the same
narrow content.0 Let's introduce some notation and call the mental
4. The term 'narrow content' refers to tnat aspect or determinant of
content that supervenes on the states of a person's brain. That aspect
or determinant of content that does not supervene on the states of a
person's brain and, tnerefore, takes into account facts about one's
linguistic community and the objects in tne world with which one
interacts, is called wide content. The importance of tne distinction
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representations of the two ten-year-olds GO, 10 and GE,10 respectively.
Individualism guarantees, tnen, that the narrow contents of GO, 10 and GE,10
are identical.
Oscar and Elmer now proceed to learn the difference between the stuff
called 'grug' in tneir part of the country and the stuff called 'grug' in
the other part of tne country. Oscar, for example, learns that tne stuff
he calls 'grug' is mucn lignter than the stuff tney call 'grug' in the
north of Ruritania. He learns that the two substances are different
enemical elements. And, he learns that in the United States, the stuff
tney call 'grug' in the nortn of Ruritania is much more expensive tnan tne
stuff he calls 'grug.'
As adults, Oscar's concept of grug and Elmer's concept of grug are as
different as my concept af aluminum is from my concept of silver. There
appears, then, to be as muen reason to believe tnat the contents of G0,25
and GE,25 are distinct as there is reason to believe that the contents of
my concepts of aluminum and silver are distinct.
But, Putnam asks, if the contents of G0,10 and GE,10 are identical,
and tne contents of GO,25 and GE,25 are distinct, at wnat point did tne
contents of Go and GE first diverge? By hypothesis, all that happened is
tnat Oscar and Elmer learned lots of facts about grug. Furtnermore, the
facts they learned were very pedestrian, the sort of facts that we acquire
all the time. For tnis reason, it is difficult to come up with a plausible
answer to Putnam's question. Suppose, for example, we say that the
between narrow and wide content is very widely agreed upon among
advocates of RTM who accept individualism. (But, see Durge, 1986 for an
attack on individualism.)
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contents of the two concepts first diverge wnen one of tne two cnildren
learns the atomic number of (tneir) grug. Then, it would seem, whenever an
American cnild learns the atomic number of silver, the cnild's concept of
silver comes to have a new content. And, if contents are supposed to be
very stable at all, this does not seem plausible.
There is nothing crucially unique about Putnam's particular example
(though it is particularly effective). Tne important point is that one can
easily construct cases in whicn the steady accumulation of what appears to
be collateral information apparently results in a mental representation
coming to have a new content. It then becomes uncomfortable to have to say
just wnen the cnange in content occurred.
There are, naturally, some ways out of tne CI problem. I'll discuss
two in particular. Tne first possibility is to embrace a graded notion of
content according to wnicn tne acquisition of collateral information always
cnanges contents, though only zligntly. Another way to escape tne CI
problem is to insist tnat the acquisition of collateral information is
accompanied by other important changes in psychological state and shift the
burden of accounting for transformations of content to these other cnanges.
Ned Block alludes to the first approach in "Advertisement for a
Semantics for Psycnology." He suggests that the "crude dionotomy of
same/different meaning" may have to be replaced by "a multidimensional
gradient of similarity of meaning..." (Block, 1986, p. 629.) Tne chief
problem with this approacn to tne CI problem is that a graded notion of
content is very counterintuitive. On this view of content, every time I
see a cat, and thus come to believe that there is now a cat in front of me,
the content of my concept of cat changes ever so slightly. Most people, I
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believe, nave the strong intuition tnat the meaning of the concept does not
change at all in such a circumstance, not even a little bit. Of course, if
tne theoretical reasons for adopting a graded notion of meaning are
powerful enough, it would be reasonable to ignore tnese intuitions.
Fodor rejects tne idea of a graded notion of content5 and pursues tne
second approach mentioned above. In Psychosemantics: The Problem of
Meaning in the Philosopny of Mind (Fodor, 1987), Fodor advocates the view
tnat the narrow content of a symbol is a function that maps contexts into
extensions. Put in terms of Putnam's famous twin-eartn thought
experiments, Fodor's view is that the content of tne mental symbol snared
by my doppelganger and me (the one associated with the word 'water') is a
function. Applied to my context nere on eartn, the function picks out H20.
Applied to my doppelganger's context on twin-earth, the function picks out
XYZ. Tne 'unction in question is determined by tne counterfactual
connections that nold in tne relevant context between the mental symbol at
issue and objects in tne world. Fodor's proposal provides a nice response
to Putnam's cnallenge. The reason Go and GE came to diverge in content is
that, "wnereas at first tokenings of 'grug' would have been elicited from
eitner child by eitner aluminum or silver, at the end only silver controls
'grug' for Elmer and only aluminum controls 'grug' for Oscar," (Fodor,
1987, p. 94). The relevant question, then, is when aluminum, e.g., ceases
to be in the relevant counterfactual relationship witn GE. And, Fodor
5. See Fodor, 1987, pp. 57-58.
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points out, Putnam has not given any reason for thinking that there will be
a particular problem in isolating sucn a point.6'7
The reasons for being wary of Fodor's way out of the CI problem
concern the theory of content it rests on. The theory raises a number of
difficulties, one of which I'll discuss in a brief way. The problem I have
in mind concerns the existence of the relevant causal relations in the case
of theoretical concepts. To see the difficulty, suppose that the relation
in question nolds between a mental symbol and a kind of object in the world
just in case the presence of object of tne relevant kind in someone's
environment is guaranteed to cause a token of the symbol in the person's
head. For observable entities one mignt hope to specify general
environmental conditions under which such a relation will nold. But, to
take an example that Fodor discuss.s, it is obvious that this can't be done
for theoretical entities sucn as protons.8  Fodor struggles migntily to
modify tne causal relation so tnat it could fold between protons and tne
relevant symbol. But, in doing so, he raises as many new questions
regarding the proposal as he answers-9
6. Of course, this is not a criticism of Putnam's argument since acceptance
of a conceptual role, or verificationist, semantics for mental
representations is a premise of Putnam's argument.
7. Fodor's response to Putnam does seem to leave open the possibility that
mental symbols acquire new contents more often than we might think. For
it now seems as though it may not be uncommon for the acquisition of
apparently collateral information to change the truth of the
counterfactuals that determine the content of a particular symbol.
B. For a nice discussion of tnese problems applied to an earlier version of
Fodo.-'s theory of content, see Block, pp. 657-660.
9. See Fodor, 1987, pp. 112-127.
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I do n-t mean to suggest tnat tne responses to tne CI problem
suggested by Block and Fodor will not prove to be successful. Tne point is
simply that tne CI problem does seem to require tne advocate of RTM to
embrace controversial proposals. If it were true that the CI problem is so
linked to issues of meaning that it does not arise for STM, then it might
be reasonable for someone who is otherwise sympathetic to RTM but
unsatisfied with tne responses to the CI problem just discussed, to abandon
RTM in favor of STM. It is a question of some interest then whether the
collateral information problem arises for STM. That is the question I
snall be pursuing in tne rest of tnis essay. My claim will be that the CI
problem does arise for STM and, tnerefore, tnat one should be wary of
opting for STM as a means of escaping it.
2. The Story of Mrs. T and its Alleged Implications for RTM
In this section, I want to discuss Stich's version of tne collateral
information problem, and tne difficulties he believes it creates for RTM.
This will set tne stage for section 3 in whicn I will describe how Stich
thinks tnat STM can avoid sucn difficulties.
Stich's version of tne CI problem is presented in a series of
examples, one of which is introduced in the following passage:
Let me ,.. describe in a somewhat idealized way the history of
.Mrs. T, a real person who was employed by my family when I was
a cnild. As a young woman, around the turn of the century,
Mrs. T had an active interest in politics and was well informed
on the topic. She was deeply shocked by the assassination of
President William McKinley in 1901. In her sixties, when I
first knew her, she would often recount the history of the
assassination and spell out her analysis of tne effects it had
had on the politics of the day. As Mrs. T advanced into her
seventies, those around her began to notice that, though her
reasoning seemed as sharp as ever, her memory was fading. At
first she had trouble remembering recent events: who had been
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elected in tne Senate race sne had been following; where she
nad left ner knitting. As time went on, more and more of ner
memory was lost.... Some wnile before ner deatn, something
like tne following dialogue took place:
S: Mrs. T, tell me, what happened to McKinley?
Mrs. T: On, McKinley was assassinated.
S: Where is he now?
Mrs. T: I don't know.
S: I mean, is he alive or dead?
Mrs. T: Who?
S: McKinley.
Mrs. T: You knnw, I just don't remember.
S: What is an assassination?
Mrs. T: I don't know.
S: Does an Lssassinated person die?
Mrs. T: I used to know all tnat, but I just don't remember now.
S: But you do remember what happened to McKinley?
Mrs. T: Oh, yes. He was assassinated.
(Sticn, 1983, p. 55.)
In discussing tnis example, Sticn first notes tnat it seems clearly wrong
to say that Mrs. T, at tne time of tne conversation, believed tnat McKinley
was assassinated. To believe tnat someone was assassinated, one must nave,
it seems, at Jeast a rudimentary understanding of assassination, and this
Mrs. T lacks. But, Stien argues, if sne doesn't '*elieve that McKinley was
assassinated, it wouli appear that there isn't anytning that she believes.
For no sentence p does it seem right to characterize the state tnat leads
Mrs. T to say, "McKinley was assassinated," as the belief that p.10
Furthermore, Stich argues, even if we were intimately familiar witn tne
progress of Mrs. T's loss of memory, it is doubtful that we would be able
10. It is important to note that it is the folk psychological notion of
belief that is at issue in Stich's discussion of Mrs. 7. If Rit' is
willing to embrace a theory of content that doesn't always square with
the judgments of folk psychology, then it has more room to maneuver
here. Although Stich seems to insist that RTM accept tne unrefined
folk notion of belief, I don't see wny it should be bound to do so. .
don't see, for example, why in principle ATM couldn't adomt a graded
notion of content even if sucn a notion would conflict witn the folk
notion of belief.
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to say exactly wnen Mrs. T stopoed having tne belief that McKinley was
assassinated. Sticn adds some details to tne story, and asks if a certain
point is the point at wnicn Mrs. T stopped naving the belief that McKinley
was assassinated. "Tne answer," he writes "surely, is tnat there is no
answer. We nave entered the penumbra of vagueness where, apart from a
special conversational context, there is just no saying whether tne content
sentence is applicable." (Sticn, 1983, p. 142.)
It is the issue of tne vagueness of wnen she ceased believing tnat
McKinley was assassinated tnat makes the example of Mrs. T a version of the
CI problem. The story of Mrs. T is, in a sense, just tne story of Elmer
and Oscar in reverse. Wnereas Elmer and Oscar's concepts of grug underwent
a cnange in content as tney acquired information about grug a little bit at
a time, Mrs. T's concept of assassination undergoes a change in content (in
particular, a loss of content) as sne loses information about assassination
a little bit at a time. The intuition in botn cases is that it would be
impossible to justify any particular cnoice for tne point in time when tne
change in content took place.
Tnere is an important difference in tne two cases in that tne beliefs
acquired by Elmer and Oscar all seem to be collateral to the concept of
grug. In Mrs. T's case, on tne other hand, some of tne beliefs tnat 3nc
loses--the belief tnat people who are assassinated die, for example--seem
to be essential to the concept of assassination. Sticn's example, then,
relies more heavily on the claim tnat it will be impossible to determine
precisely which beliefs are essential in this way and whicn are not. In
other words, Stich's example must rely on something like tne traditional
arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction. Putnam's case is
somewhat independent of such arguments: since all of the beliefs at issue
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would seem to fall On one side of sucn a distinction, the ability to make
such a distinction wouldn't necessarily nelp. Again, however, in both
examples a change in tne content of a concept is caused by a gradual
accumulation or loss of beliefs related to the concept. And, it is argued,
it is impossible to justify any particular cnoice for the point in time
wnen tne cnange in content took place.
Stien argues that tne example of Mrs. T creates two difficulties for
RTM. Botn difficulties stem from tne fact that the generalizations of an
RTM-based tneory typically relate mental state types in virtue of tneir
content. Since an RTM-based theory won't be able to assign a content to
Mrs. T's ccgnitive state, no generalizations of sucn a tneory will apply to
tnis state. 11  But, Sticn notes, tne state in question may still enter into
wnat appear to be law-governed interactions witn otner of ner mental
states. For example, Sticn suggests,
... it may turn out tnat, even as she is on the brink of deatn,
if we tell Mrs. T, "If McKinley was assassinated, then ne is
buried in Onio," she would reply "Well, then, he is buried in
Ohio." It would be tempting to conclude from this, and a
pattern of similar responses, tnat wnile her long-term memory
was largely destroyed, ner inferential abilities remain
intact--the generalizations governing inference wnicn applied
before her illneSs continue to apply. (Stich, p. 142.)
So, Sticn concludes, some of the generalizations governing inference ougnt
to continue to Mrs. T's cognitive state. But, the generalizations of an
11. Stich unjustifiably ignores the possibility of ATM-based theories
containing generalizations which apply to cognitive states in virtue of
something other than their content. ATM is free to characterize
cognitive states in any number of ways--having a particular syntactic
form, being generated by a particular cognitive system, etc.--other
than in terms of its content. Each such way of characterizing
cognitive states brings witn it tne possibility of new generalizations.
All ATM is committed to is trat propositional attitude states, and,.
nence, characterizations in terms of content, play a central role in
the explanation of behavior.
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RTM-based theory, which, according to Stich, must apply to cognitive states
in virtue of their content, cannot.
Tne second problem that the example of Mrs. T is alleged to create for
RTM has to do with the vagueness and sensitivity to conversational context
of the question of when Mrs. T ceased believing that McKinley was
assassinated. The generalizations of an RTM-based theory only apply to
Mrs. T's cognitive state so long as it can be assigned a content. Since it
is a vague and context-sensitive matter when her psychological state ceased
having a content, it is a vague and context-sensitive matter precisely when
the generalizations of an RTM-based theory applied to the state. The
application of the generalizations of a scientifically respectable theory,
Stien claims, should not be a vague or context-sensitive matter.
In sum, Stich argues that the example of Mrs. T (and other similar
examples) show (a) that the generalizations of RTM-based theories do not
apply as widely as they should and (b) that the question of the extent of
their application is plagued with vagueness.
3. STh and Avoiding the Collateral Information Problem
In this section, I will present the Syntactic Theory of Mind that
Stich advances in The Case Against Belief, paying particular attention to
the manner in which it is supposed to avoid the difficulties discussed in
section 2. It will be seen that one principle in particular plays a
crucial role in allowing STM to escape these difficulties. In section 4 1
will argue that although this principle overcomes the collateral
information problem, it creates other, insuperable difficulties for STM.
Stich gives the following thumbnail description of STM:
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The basic idea of STM is that the cognitive states whose
interaction is (in part) responsible for behavior can be
systematically mapped to abstract syntactic objects in such a
way that causal interactions among cognitive states, as well as
causal links with stimuli and behavioral events, can be
described in teruis of the syntactic properties and relations of
the abstract objects to which the cognitive states are mapped.
More briefly, the idea is that causal relations among cognitive
states mirror formal relations among syntactic objects.
(Sticn, p. 149.)
So, before beginning to construct generalizations witn which to explain tne
behavior of her subjects, someone building an STM-based theory must specify
a formal language containing the relevant syntactic objects and delineate
principles according to which cognitive states can be assigned to these
syntactic objects. Sticn does not say much about tne formal language in
whicn the syntactic objects of STM-style tneories ought to be built. But,
in all of his examples he assumes tnat the formal language will be of tne
sort standardly used to express first-order quantification theory.
Adopting the terminology used in talking about formal languages, Stien
refers to the syntactic objects of STM-based theories as wffs.
In answer to tne question of how cognitive states (specified in some
neutral manner-neurologically, for example) are assigned to wffs, Stich
writes:
If we wisn to view tokens of the states postulated by an STM-.
style theory as sentence tokens, then we must say something
more about the individuation or typing of these sentence
tokens. Since the motivation for viewing hypothetical
neurological state tokens as sentence tokens is to describe
causal relations by adverting to syntactic ones, we must ask
just which syntactic relations must be mirrored for the
neurological state tokens to count as sentence tokens. There
are, I think, three rather different answers that might be
given. One idea is to insist that if a neurological state
token is to count as a token of a sentence it must satisfy all
the generalizations specified by the theory.... A second idea
..is to specify a set of essential generalizations which a
neurological state must satisfy if its tokens are to count as
tokens of a given sentence type. Further generalizations may
be added and modified as necessary without altering the account
of typing. But this approach, too, has its shortcomings. It
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is nard to see what motivation there can be for distinguishing
a special set of generalizations as the essential ones, hard to
see how the divide between essential and non-essential
generalizations could be anything but arbitrary. A tnird idea
is to evade tne issue by insisting only that to count as a
taken of a sentence type, a neurological state must satisfy
some substantial number of the cluster of generalizations
included in a theory, without specifying any particular
generalizations that must be satisfied, nor exactly how many
miust be satisfied. (Stich, p. 152.)
Stich does not choose among the three methods for determining when a given
neurological state is to be mapped to a given syntactic object, though he
seems to tilt toward the third possibility. For our purposes, however, the
importance of tnis passage lies in the common assumption underlying each of
the three possibilities: neurological states are to be individuated
cognitively according to their causal role. More specifically, since it is
assumed that an STM-based theory will be able to state generalizations
whicn collectively specify tne causal role of every cognitive state, for a
neurological state to be of a particuler cognitive type is for it to
satisfy the generalizations tnat apply, according to the theory, to
cognitive states of tnat type.12 Tnis view is clearly at work in the
quoted passage; the only question is whether the neurological state has to
12. Stich is well aware that the process of determining which
generalizations of the theory apply to which states is a holistic
process. For example, suppose that an STM-based theory has a
generalization that says that if a subject is in a cognitive state
mapped to the syntactic object AB and is in a cognitive state mapped
to the syntactic object A, then the subject will not be in a cognitive
state mapped to the syntactic object B. Whether a given neurological
state token, N let's say, is to be mapped to the syntactic object A*B
may depend partially on whether this generalization applies to N. But,
of course the decision as to whether it does depends on what syntactic
objects other neurological states--the ones to which N is related in
the appropriate way--are mapped to. And, this in turn will depend
partially on whether the generalization in question applies to them,
which will depend in turn on what syntactic object N is mapped to. The
8TM-style theorist trying to map various neurological states to
syntactic objects will evidently have to coordinate these decisions in
the holistic manner familiar from the case of radical translation.
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satisfy all the relevant generalizations. Regardless of how that question
is answered, the commitment to typing by causal role evidently dictates
that all that matters in determining whether a given neurological state is
of a given cognitive type is what generalizations it satisfies. Hence, we
have the following principle:
(G) The only facts relevant to determining what type a
mental sentence (specified as a token of a neurological
state type) is a token of, are facts about which
generalizations of the theory the neurological state
satisfies.
It should be added that typing cognitive states, according to STM, involves
not only assigning them to syntactic objects but assigning them to certain
broad classifications. The idea is that to capture the distinction
between, for example, (using folk terminology) the belief that John is ill
and the fear that Jonn is ill, an STM-based theory should classify the
former as a B-state and the latter as an F-state, but map them to the same
syntactic object. Which of these classifications applies to a given
cognitive state will again be determined by causal role.
We can now recast Stich's brief description of STM as follows:
generalizations detailing the causal interactions among cognitive states,
of which there are various kinds, are to be stated in terms of relations
between the syntactic objects they are mapped to; the syntactic objects are
wffs in a formal language akin to ones in which first order logic with
quantification is usually expressed; and, which wff a cognitive state
(neurologically specified) is mapped to, as well as which kind of cognitive
state it is, is determined by which of the generalizations it satisfies.
In a moment we will supplement this description with an additional
principle. But, it is important to note that as it stands there is reason
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to believe tnat STM will be vulnerable to the collateral information
problem. Consider, for example, the cognitive state which might lead Mrs.
T to say, "The President of the United States has just been assassinated."
More specifically, consider C1, the cognitive state that would have led
Mrs. T at age 40 to say, "The President of the United States has just been
assassinated," and C2, tne cognitive state that might lead the senile Mrs.
T to say, "Tne President of tne United States has just been assassinated."
For tne young Mrs. T, coming to be in C1 would have had many consequences.
In non-STM terms, she would have come to expect the Vice-President to
assume the presidency. Sne would have expected the next day's newspaper to
be dominated by a discussion of the event and its impact. She would have
expected many people to be shocked and saddened (and might have been
shocked and saddened herself). For the elderly Mrs. T, coming to be in C2
would, presumably, nave none of these consequences.
Each of the predictions above about what the young Mrs. T would have
come to believe and expect is generated by applying folk psychology to what
we know about Mrs. T. In other words, folk theory contains lots of
generalizations about what reasonably knowledgeable, socialized people
living in the United States will think if they learn that the President of
the country has just been assassinated. And, we might expect an STM-tneory
to have analogous generalizations (especially if, as Stich advertises, it
captures all the generalizations RTM can capture). All such
generalizations apply to Cl--that's how I was able to predict what Mrs. T'
would have come to think had she been in Cl. But, of course, none of them
apply to C2. Hence, Cl satisfies a very different set of generalizations
than C2. So, since STM-based theories type cognitive states on the basis
of the generalizations of the theory that they satisfy, it seems that C1 is
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of a different type tnan C2. And, of course, this change is a consequence
of Mrs. T losing lots of B-states. We can now raise the question, Just
when did the (non-actual) state C1 come to be of a different type? Having
to answer such questions would, of course, create a collateral information
problem for an STM-based theory.
It turns out that STM is able to avoid this difficult question. But,
in order to do so, it requires an additional principle. It is a principle
Stich first mentions in a general discussion of individuation of belief-
like states by causal role. Stich writes:
The causal patterns of interest to narrow causal accounts of
typing are not merely those that have obtained among actual
states, but also those that would obtain among nonactual thougn
possible states. The essential point is that, for a narrow
causal theorist, the type identity of a mental state is
determined by its potential causal interactions with other
mental states, with stimuli, and with behavior. Its type
identity does not depend on the other mental states the subject
happens to be in at the moment in question. (Stich, p. 54.)
In his discussion of STM, Stich makes it clear that STM-based theories
must adhere to this principle, tnat the type identity of a cognitive state
does not depend on the other cognitive states the subject happens to be in
at the moment in question:
For a syntactic theory, however, ideological similarity poses
no problem, since the characterization of a B-state does not
depend on the other B-states that the subject happens to have.
A B-state will count as a token of a wff if its potential
causal links fit the pattern detailed in the theorist's
generalizations, regardless of the further B-states the subject
happens to have. (Stich, p. 158.)
Putting this principle--that what wff a B-state is a token of is
independent of what other B-states a subject also happens to be in--
together with the fact that what wff a B-state is a token of depends on
what generalizations apply to the B-state (token), we get a principle about
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generalizations of STM-based tneories. Specifically, whether a
generalization applies to a given B-state token must itself be independent
of which other B-states the subject happens to be in. If not, what other
B-states a subject happens to be in could affect which generalizations
apply to a given B-state token and then affect in turn the type identity of
that B-state token, which, of course, the principle in question does not
permit. Hence, STM is committed to the following:
(I) If a generalization of an STM-based theory applies
to a B-state token of a given subject, then it
applies independently of which other B-states the
subject happens to be in (or not to be in).
Principle (I), and the principle from which it was derived, are used
by Stich to argue tnat STM avoids the two problems witn RTM cited earlier.
Let's see how this works in Mrs. T's case. The idea is this: for an STM-
based theory, Mrs. T's B-states will be individuated not by assigning them
content sentences but by mapping them to wffs. What wff a given B-state is
mapped to will be independent (by the principle from which (I) was derived)
of what other B-states she happens to be in. So, no matter how much of her
memory she loses--in other words, no matter how many B-staes she ceases to
be in--the remaining B-states will still be mapped to the same wffs. If
the B-state which leads Mrs. T to say that Mckinley was assassinated was
mapped to the wff 'Am' before she began to lose her memory, it will be
mapped to the same wff at the time of the conversation quoted at the
beginning of section 2; the identity of her B-state does not change as her
memory fades.
The vagueness and context sensitivity innerent in an ATM-based
theory's judging whether Mrs. T believes that McKinley was assassinated at
a given point in time apparently has no analog for an STM-based theory.
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Furthermore, by (I), the generalizations which applied to Mrs. T's B-states
before apply to the ones that remain. So, tne syntactic version of tne
generalization that if someone believes that p, and comes to believe that
if p, then q, then the person will come to believe that q, still applies to
Mrs. T. Hence, the STM-based theory can explain why, when we say to the
senile Mrs. T, "If McKinley was assassinated, then he is Duried in Ohio,"
sne responds, "Well then, he is buried in Ohio." Thus, an STM-based theory
avoids the difficulty that confronted RTM-based theories here: RTM
theories could not apply the folk version of the generalization because
there wasn't anything that Mrs. T could be said to believe.
Tne idea benind principle (I) is that the type identity of a cognitive
state should be determined not by its actual causal connections witn otner
mental states, stimuli and behavior, but rather by its potential causal
connections. Clearly, this insistence on the importance of potential as
opposed to actual causal connections avoids the collateral information
problem. I shall argue in section 4, however, that identifying cognitive
states by their potential rather than actual causal connections has
disastrous consequences. Roughly put, the idea will be that any two
beliefs of the same logical form will have the same potential causal
connections even if they have very different actual causal connections. I
will then conclude tnat STM must give up principle (I) and face the
collateral information problem.
#. DIstinguishIng B-States vith the Same Logical Form
In this section I will argue that there is no way an STM-based theory
can distinguish between the B-state that leads Mrs. 7 to say, "McKinley was
assassinated" and the B-state that might lead her to say, "McKinley was
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elected." I'll begin by snowing tnat an STM-based theory ought to be able
to distinguish these two states, that simply accepting that these two
states are one and the same is not a live option for such a theory. This
will set the stage for tne argument that the two states will be
indistinguishable for an STM-based theory.
4.1 Two Conversations with Mrs. T
Recall Sticn's supposition that "even as she is on the brink of death,
if we tell Mrs. T 'If McKinley was assassinated, then he is buried in
Onio,' she would reply 'Well tnen, he is buried in Ohio."' A
generalization of the following sort is supposed by Stich to explain wny
this is so:
(1) For all subjects S, and all wffs A and B, if S has a
B-state mapped to A --> B and if S comes to have a
B-state mapped to A, tnen S will come to have a
B-state mapped to B. (Stich, p. 155)
Along witn a few modest assumptions, tnis generalization will, in fact,
engender an adequate explanation of Mrs. T's behavior.
Here are the required assumptions. First, we must assume that some
particular B-state leads Mrs. T to say, "McKinley was assassinated." Let's
call that B-state B1.1 3 Let W1 be the wff that B1 is mapped to. Next, we
have to assume that there is a particular B-state that leads Mrs. T to say,
"Well then, he is burled in Ohio." Let's call that B-state B2 and tne wff
13. I'll use expressions such as '51' to refer to neurologically
characterized states of Mrs. T. In virtue of their causal connections
to other of Mrs. T's neurological states, to stimuli, and to her
behavior, these neurological states also count as tokens of B-states in
our 5TM-based psychological theory, and, hence, get mapped to wffs in
the formal language in which the generalizations of our theory are
cast. I'll use expressions such as 'Wi' to refer to such wffs.
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it is mapped to W2. We must now assume tnat telling Mrs. T, "If McKinley
was assassinated, tnen he is buried in Ohio," leads to a particular B-
state. Let's call it B3. We will have to assume that B3 gets mapped to
the wff W1 -- >W2
B-state Wff
stimulus/behavior B-state
Verbal stimulus/behavior : is connected to I is mapped to
"McKinley was assassinated" Bi W1
"Well then, B2 W2
he is buried in Ohio"
"If McKinley was assassinated, B3 W1 -- > W2
then ne is buried in Ohio"
Given these assumptions, we can explain that prior to our
conversation, Mrs. T was in B-state B1; that as a result of our saying to
her "If McKinley was assassinated, tnen he is buried in Ohio," she came to
be in B-state B3; that she thereby came to satisfy the antecedent of
generalization (1); that as predicted by that generalization, she came to
be in a B-state mapped to tne wff W2, i.e. B2; and, that she said "Well
then, he is buried in Onio," as a result of being in B-state B2.
Imagine now, however, that we had had a different conversation witn
Mrs. T. Imagine that instead of saying to Mrs. T, "If McKinley was
assassinated, then he is buried in Ohio," we tell her, "If McKinley was
elected, then he is buried in Ohio." And, suppose, as is perfectly
consistent with what has been said so far about Mrs. T, that this elicits
no response. Suppose, in other words, that in whatever sense Mrs. T
14. Of course, when I write "the wff W1 .-- > W2Z," I mean the wff formed by
concatenating the wiT W1 with the symbol '-->' and concatenating the
result with the wff W2.
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remembers that McKinley was assassinated, she does not remember that
McKinley was elected.
If we are to continue to maintain that generalization (1) explains
Mrs. T's saying, "Well then, he is buried in Ohio," in the case of the
first conversation, we will have to claim that generalization (1) does not
apply in the case of the second conversation. In particular, we will have
to insist that saying, "If McKinley was elected, then he is buried in
Ohio," does not lead Mrs. T to have a B-state that gets mapped to the wff
W1 -- > W2. For if it did, generalization (1) would apply just as it did
before, and would predict that she will come to be in B-state B2 and say as
before, "Well tnen, he is buried in Ohio." And, of course, she doesn't.
If saying to Mrs. 7, "If McKinley was elected, then he is buried in
Ohio," doesn't lead Mrs. T to nave B-state B3--the one mapped to the wff W1
--> W2--then what B-state does it lead her to have? It's certainly
conceivable that it doesn't lead her to have any B-state at all. But, it
would be odd if the utterance, "If McKinley was assassinated, then he is
buried in Ohio,"--the second half of which is, we may presume, completely
unfamiliar to Mrs, T.--causes a B-state in her, but the utterance in which
"assassinated" is replaced with "elected" does not. In any case, we may
certainly suppose that the latter state does lead to some B-state in Mrs.
T. Let's call that B-state B4. What wff will B4 be mapped to? Tne
association between uttering, "If McKinley was assassinated, then he is
buried in Ohio," and the wff W1 --> W2 leads to an obvious suggestion: B4
should be mapped to the wff WO --> W2, where WO is the wff that B-state BO
is mapped to, and BO is the B-state Mrs. T comes to have if she is simply
told, "McKinley was elected." Let's suppose that this is so. We have so





he is buried in Ohio"
"If McKinley was assassinated,
then he is buried in Onio"
"If McKinley was elected,"




is connected to : is mapped to
B1 W1
B2 W2
B3 w 1n--e> W2
B4 WO2W2
I WO
As I noted before, if we are to explain, using generalization (1), why
Mrs. T responds as she does in the two conversations, we will nave to
insist that wnen we tell her, "If McKinley was elected, then he is buried
in Ohio," she does not come to have a B-state mapped to the wff W1 -- > W2.
If she did, we would expect her to come to have B-state B2 and to respond,
"Well tnen, he is buried in Ohio." And, she doesn't. Given the
suppositions we have made, summarized in the table above, this means that
we must insist that the wffs W1 and WO be distinct. Since, according to
STM, assigning a wff to a B-state is just another way of saying what type
the B-state falls under, this means that B-states B1 and BO must be
assigned to distinct types.
The upshot of our attempt to explain Mrs. T's responses in the two
conversations is that in order to explain why she says, "Well then, he is
buried in Ohio," in the one conversation and merely shrugs her shoulders in
the other, an STM-based theory must be able to distinguish the B-state
which leads Mrs. T to say from time to time, "McKinley was assassinated,"
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(Bi) from the B-state she comes to have if we tell her, "McKinley was
elected," (BO) by assigning them to distinct types (and thereby associating
them wita distinct wffs). I snall argue in the rest of this section that
given principles (G) and (I) discussed in section 3, this will not be
possible.
As I indicated in section 3, STM-based theories individuate B-states
according to their causal role. And, according to STM, the causal role of
a B-state is captured by the generalizations of the theory that it
satisfies. This commits STM-based theories to the following principle,
also discussed in section 3:
(G) The only facts relevant to determining what type a
mental sentence (specified as a token of a neurological
state type) is a token of, are facts about which
generalizations of the theory the neurological state
satisfies.
From (G) it follows that, if an STM-based theory is to assign B-states
B1 and BO to distinct types, there must be at least one generalization of
the theory which is satisfied by one of the B-states but not the other.
Stich countenances three sorts of generalizations in STM-based theories:
generalizations specifying connections between a cognitive state and other
cognitive states; generalizations specifying connections between cognitive
states and stimuli; and, generalizations specifying connections between
cognitive stases and behavior. Among generalizations specifying
connections between cognitive states and other cognitive states, I will
distinguish between those which fold of all cognitive states of a given
form--all B-states mapped to wffs of the form A -- > B, where A and B may be
any wffs, for example--and those tnat do not. This leaves four classes of
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generalizations. I will treat each class in turn and argue that no
generalization of tnat class could apply to B1 or BO but not the other.
Before I turn to the four classes of generalizations, I want to make a
simplifying assumption. The assumption is that the wffs B1 and BO are
mapped to--Wi and WO--are what I'll call simple wffs. By a simple wff I
mean a wff consisting of a predicate later followed by an individual
constant (Recall that we are assuming that the formal language in which the
wffs of the theory are to be constructed is of the sort standards used to
express first-order quantification theory). Eventually I will drop this
simplifying assumption. For the moment, however, let W1 be the wff 'Am'
and let WO be tne wff 'Ew,' understanding that 'A' and 'E' may turn out to
be the same predicate letter and 'im' and 'w' may turn out to be the same
individual constant. I turn now to the four classes of generalizations,
which might justify assigning BO and B1 to distinct types.
4.2'Generalizations Based on Schematic Connections
Between B1 (or BO) and other Cognitive States
I use the phrase "schematic connections" to refer to those connections
which follow from generalization schemas in which no specific predicate
letters or individual constants appear and into which any wff can be
substituted to produce a valid generalization. In other words, a schematic
connection between cognitive states is one based solely on the way the
respective wffs are built up out of connectives and quantifiers. Included
in this class of generalizations would be instances of schemas that
express: (a) rules of deductive logic, such as, from A and A -- > B, infer
A, or, from A and B, infer A & B; (b) the practical syllogism--if you
believe that A -- > B and you desire that B, then you will probably desire
that A; (c) the phenomenon of "belief perseverance"--if you come to believe
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that A and thereby come to believe that B, and then, later come to believe
not-A, you will still be more likely to believe that B than you were
before15; and, many others.
The following, an instance of generalization schema (1), discussed
earlier in this section, is an example of a generalization based on a
schematic connection:
(2) For all subjects S, if S is in a B-state mapped to
the wff 'Am' and S comes to have a B-state mapped
to the wff 'Am -- > Bm,' then S will come to have a
B-state mapped to the wff 'Bm.'
It might be thought that this generalization will distinguish between B1
and BO, since it seems to apply to B1 but not to BO. But, notice that a
very similar generalization does apply to BO, namely:
(2*) For all subjects S, if S is in a B-state mapped to
tne wff 'Ew' and S comes to have a B-state mapped
to the wff 'Ew -- > Bm,' then S will come to have a
B-state mapped to the wff 'Bm.'
If the existence of (2) is to be made to distinguish between BO and B1,
then we will have to be willing to claim that (2) and (2*) are not merely
the same generalization in different guises. But, without begging the
question at hand--whether 'Am' and 'Ew' are really the same wff--that claim
cannot be justified.
The same problem will arise for any generalization which expresses, as
I have called it, a schematic connection between the cognitive states it
applies to. For, given any such generalization which applies to, e.g., BO,
the generalization schema from which it was generated can be applied to
15. Stich cites this phenomenon, and uses it to construct a generalization
schema that might be part of an 8TH-based theory. See Ross, 1977 on
the subject of belief perseverance.
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produce a parallel generalization which cannot be distinguished from the
first one without begging the question at hand. So, generalizations based
on schematic connections between BO or B1 and other cognitive states will
not distinguish the two states.
4.3 Generalizations Based on Non-Schematic Connections
Between B1 (or BO) and other Cognitive States
There are certainly plenty of generalizations based on schematic
connections between B1 (or BO) and other cognitive states. But, as we have
seen, none of them will be able to distinguish between B1 and BO. What
about generalizations based on other connections between cognitive states?
What we need is a connection between B1 (or BO) and some other cognitive
state where the connection is not based solely upon the way the wffs the
states are mapped to are built up out of connectives and quantifiers. Here
is an example of such a generalization:
(3) For all subjects S, if, for some individual constant
't,' S has or comes to have a B-state mapped to the
wff 'At' (corresponding to the belief that the
individual named by 't' was assassinated), then S
has or will come to have a B-state mapped to the wff
'Dt' (corresponding to the belief that the individual
named by It' is dead).
The idea behind this generalization is that if someone believes or comes to
believe that a particular person was assassinated, then they believe or
will come to believe that the person is dead. And, indeed the two beliefs
are normally associated in this way. An 8TH-based theory, however, is not
likely to find room for such a generalization. To see why not, we must
recall the second principle discussed in section 3:
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(I) If a generalization of an STM-based theory applies
to a B-state token of a given subject, then it
applies independently of what other B-states the
subject happens to be in (or not to be in).
Consider now the young Mrs. T (young enough that her memory is intact, but
old enough that McKinley has already been assassinated). If (3) is part of
some STM-based theory, then it ought to apply to the young Mrs. T. After
all, she is, we may presume, normal in every way. And, in fact, the young
Mrs. T presumably has a B-state mapped to the wff 'Am' (B1), and also has a
B-state mapped to the wff 'Dm'; the generalization apparently applies to
B-state B1 of the young Mrs. T. However, it does not apply to this B-state
independently of what other B-states she happens to be in. We know this
because, by hypothesis, she goes on to lose many of her other B-states, and
solely in virtue of the loss of these B-states, the generalization comes no
longer to apply to B-state B1 of Mrs. T. The elderly Mrs. T has a B-state,
B1, corresponding to the belief that McKinley was assassinated, but none
corresponding to the belief that McKinley is dead. By principle (I), then,
generalization (3) doesn't really hold of the young Mrs. T. And, since the
young Mrs. T is perfectly normal, there is no reason to think that it holds
of anybody.
Principle (I) places a substantial constraint on any generalization
based on connections between two cognitive states. The connection must be
strong enough that it will continue to hold regardless of what other
cognitive states a subject happens to be in or happens not to be in. Since
the young Mrs. T' is perfectly normal, and since the elderly Mrs. T differs
from her younger self only in having undergone a loss of memory, the
connection must be strong enough to survive in the elderly Mrs. 7. And, of
course, the whole point of Mrs. T is that the connections between cognitive
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states that normally nold, don't hold in Mrs. T. In particular, given any
alleged connection between B1 (or B0) and some other B-state, if the
connection is not of the form of a logical inference, and, hence, a
schematic connection, it will be easy to suppose that the connection does
not survive Mrs. T's senility. Hence, any such connection between B1 (or
BO) and another cognitive state will not be strong enough to form the basis
of a generalization of an STM-based theory. Evidently then, the category
of generalizations based on non-schematic connections between cognitive
states will be of no use in distinguishing B1 from BO.
4.4 Generalizations Based on Connections
Between B1 (or BO) and Stimuli
It is quite natural to expect that connections with stimuli will allow
us, finally, to distinguish between B1 and B0. After all, we identified B-
state BO, as well as B-states B3 and B4, according to the verbal stimuli
which cause Mrs. T to be in these states. B1 is, by definition, connected
with Mrs. T's hearing the utterance, "McKinley was assassinated."
Presumably, there is no such connection between BO and Mrs. T's hearing the
utterance, "McKinley was assassinated." In a moment, I want to consider
the question of whether we can formulate a generalization of our STM-style
theory based on the connection between B1 and the utterance, "McKinley was
assassinated," that will apply to B1 and not to BO, and thereby distinguish
the two states. But, first I want to argue that if any connection between
81 (or 80) and stimuli will yield such a generalization, it will be a
connection involving a linguistic stimulus.
The connections of interest between cognitive states and stimuli
obviously run in one direction only; stimuli produce cognitive states, and
not, in general, the other way around. So, what we need is some kind of
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stimulus which will generally produce in people cognitive states of the
same type as BO (or B1). Put in folk psychological terms, we need to think
of a stimulus such that, if a person is exposed to it, and the person does
not already believe that McKinley was elected, the stimulus will produce
that belief in them. We must keep in mind, however, that the connection
has to be strong enough that the resulting generalization will satisfy
principle (I). In particular, the connection will have to be strong enough
that it survives even in Mrs. T. Now, what sort of non-linguistic stimulus
can we expose someone to in order to get them to believe that McKinley was
elected. Perhaps we could show them a picture of a campaign celebration in
which McKinley is giving an acceptance speech. If this does allow the
person to infer tnat McKinley was elected, it is only in virtue of that
person's knowing a substantial number of facts about election campaigns, as
well as having the ability to recognize McKinley (which is, of course,
unlikely). But, of course, Mrs. T doesn't have any of the relevant facts
about elections and about McKinley at her disposal. There isn't the
remotest possibility that we can produce B-state BO in Mrs. T just by
showing her a picture of McKinley giving a campaign speech (unless, of
course, it triggers a recovery of some of her lost memory). And, no other
non-linguistic stimulus is any more likely to do the trick. Exposure to
non-linguistic stimuli will generally produce in people the belief that
McKinley was elected by way of complicated inferences, some of the premises
of which Mrs. T is not in possession of.
Evidently, the only kind of stimuli whose connections with the B-state
00 might be direct enough to survive in Mrs. T are linguistic stimuli. The
connections involving linguistic stimuli that seem most likely to allow us
to distinguish between BO and 01 are the ones between 01 and tokens of the
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English sentence, "McKinley was assassinated" and between BO and tokens of
the sentence, "McKinley was elected." I want now to consider the question
of whether such connections will finally provide a generalization that
distinguishes between the two B-states in question. Because these
connections represent the most plausible source for such a generalization,
I will proceed very carefully here, ultimately considering three different
ways that a distinguishing generalization might be framed. Once, however,
we have set eacn of these possibilities aside the argument that an STM-
based theory has no basis for assigning B1 and BO to different types will
be nearly complete.
Let's begin by attempting to construct a generalization based on the
connection between tokens of the sentence, "McKinley was assassinated," and
B-state B1. Here is such a generalization:
(4) For all subjects S, and all names 'N,' if S is a
speaker of English with normal hearing abilities
and a token of the sentence, "N was assassinated,"
is uttered in S's vicinity, then S will come to
have a B-state mapped to the wff 'An,' where 'n'
is some individual constant.
As it stands, this generalization is false. Generally, exposure to
utterances of p do not lead people to believe that p unless the utterer is
thought to be a reliable source of the relevant sort of information, and
the utterance of p is taken as an attempt to express the speaker's belief
that p. And, as Paul Grice has shown, it is quite a complicated matter to
say when utterances of p will (or ought) to be taken as attempts to express
the speaker's belief that p.
Grice argued more particularly that we, as communicators, share an
adherence to certiin conversational maxims, and that the appearance of
violating these maxims can be used by a speaker so that a particular
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utterance conveys to her conversational partner any of a number of tne
speaker's beliefs. In STM jargon the:Gricean claim is this: suppose, as
is suggested by generalizations such as (4), that there is a correspondence
between English sentences and B-states, so that for each sentence of
English, there is a B-state corresponding to it that utterances of the
sentence "standards" lead to. Then, the claim is that by seeming to break
a conversational maxim, a speaker could use an utterance of p to lead her
conversational partner to have any of a number of B-states other than the
one that corresponds to p. In the case at hand, S may have a B-state
corresponding to the belief tnat the person uttering, "McKinley was
assassinated," would be breaking a conversational maxim unless she meant
something other than that McKinley was assassinated. S would then come to
have a B-state other than the one mapped to 'Am.' In sum, for the
utterance actually to lead to a B-state mapped to the wff 'Am,' it must -be
the case (now not speaking in STM jargon) (a) that S believes the speaker
to be a generally reliable communicator; and (b) that S does not believe
that the speaker would be breaking a conversational maxim, if she were
attempting to express her belief that McKinley was assassinated. This is
to say, of course, that (4) violates (I); the generalization only holds
when S has further B-states and does not have others.
It might be thought that this problem can be avoided by building the
necessary conditions into the antecedent of the generalization. Thus, we
might get something like this:
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(5) For all subjects S, and all names 'N,' if S is a
speaker of English with normal hearing abilities,
and a token of the English sentence, "N was
assassinated," is uttered in S's vicinity and S
has a B-state mapped to the wff R (corresponding
to the belief that the speaker is a reliable
communicator), and S does not have a B-state
mapped to the wff B (corresponding to the belief
that the speaker would be breaking a conversational
maxim if she were to attempt to express the belief
that N was assassinated with the utterance, "N was
assassinated"), then S will come to have a B-state
mapped to the wff 'An,' where n is some individual
constant.
But, this generalization too is inadequate. Even if S does not now have a
B-state mapped to the wff B, that is, does not now believe that the speaker
would be breaking a conversational maxim if she were to attempt to express
the belief that N was assassinated, she may come to have this B-state after
having heard the utterance. What is needed to make the generalization
adequate is a set of B-states such tnat if the subject has these B-states,
the subject will not come to have a B-state mapped to the wff B. But, such
a set is surely not in the offing. There are just too many ways that S
might come to believe that the speaker's meaning what she uttered would
break a conversational maxim. This being the case, there doesn't appear to
be any way of constructing a generalization in our STM-based theory based
on the connection between utterances of, "McKinley was assassinated," and
the B-state B1. And, since this connection offered the best hope for a
generalization based on a connection between stimuli and B1 (or BO), we may
conclude that such a generalization will not be available.
It is important to note that the arguments used above to reject (14)
and (5) as plausible STM generalizations need not rely at all on the
details of Grice's theory of communication. I used the Gricean theory in
two ways. First, I used it to make the point that hearing utterances of p
only lead a person to believe that p under certain very particular
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conditions. This point, which Grice stressed, should be uncontroversial.
Given this point, it is clear that (4) is in conflict with principle (I).
We must modify (4) to build more stringent conditions into the antecedent
of the conditional. I then used the Gricean story about conversational
maxims as a way of considering what would have to be built into this
antecedent. If some other story about the conditions under which
utterances of p lead people to form the belief that p is correct, then some
other attempt to modify the antecedent to the conditional in (4) would be
appropriate. But, it still seems doubtful that we could build enough into
the antecedent to the conditional to guarantee that an utterance of p will
lead the subject to form the belief that p. Regardless of what the correct
story about the path from hearing utterances to forming beliefs (or belief-
like states) is, there are, on any plausible view of communication, too
many ways that the path can be blocked.
Though it is true that the arguments rejecting (4) and (5) do not rely
on details of.Grice's theory, there is one technical point that it does
rely on. Let's call those cases where a speaker's utterance of p does not
ultimately result in the listener's forming and maintaining the belief that
p, non-standard cases. The assumption I have made is that in the non-
standard cases the listener never forms, even on a tentative basis, the
belief that p. One could accept the Gricean point, but maintain that in
non-standard oases the listener first forms the tentative belief that p,
then discovers that the belief is not warranted and therefore rejects it.
Let us call this proposal the direct translation proposal, since it
supposes that the listener directly translates the utterance that p into a
tentative belief that p and only then asks questions about whether the
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speaker is really reliable, whether she could have really meant that p,
etc.
An advocate of STM who wanted to distinguish between B-states B1 and
BO could use the direct translation proposal to resuscitate generalization
(4). For if the proposal is correct, then it is true that whenever a
speaker of English hears an utterance of the sentence p. she will come to
be in the associated B-state, even if she ceases to be in that B-state only
moments later. Generalization (4) would apply to B-state B1 but not BO and
thus form the basis for assigning the B-states to distinct types.
The only problem with the direct translation proposal is that it
constitutes a rather bold empirical supposition. If one accepts Fodor's
distinction between input modules and central processes (Fodor, 1983), then
the empirical question being addressed is the question of the form of the
output of the language module. On Fodor's picture central processes bring
to bear everything the subject knows in attempt to determine what the
subject ought to believe on the basis of what the input module has
reported. Hence, unless the output of the language module is the tentative
belief that p, there is no reason to believe that such a belief will ever
be formed.
Fodor himself argues that the output of the language module is a
representation of an utterance's syntactic and logical form (and no
more).16 Such a representation would not be adequate to characterize what
the speaker said, and hence, not adequate as a representation underlying
the belief-like state ultimately formed if the speaker is held to be
'6. See Fodor, 1983, p. 90.
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reliable, etc. A representation of the syntactic and logical form of a
sentence does not indicate, for example, what all of the referring
expressions in the sentence refer to, as a representation of what the
speaker said would.
Of course, Fodor may be wrong about what the output of the language
module is. But, the important point is that the claim that when one hears
an utterance of p, one forms the tentative belief that p before
considerations about the speaker's reliability and intentions have a chance
to block it, is a very speculative empirical claim. It is doubtful tnat
the advocate of STM would want to rely on such a proposal to save STM from
having to face the collateral information problem.
The attempt, then, to produce a generalization of an STM-based theory
based on the connection between B-state B1 and utterances of the sentence,
"McKinley was assassinated," has failed. In general, there is no reason to
believe that an STM-based theory will contain generalizations based on
connections between B1 or BO and stimuli which will allow us to distinguish
the two B-states.
4.5 Generalizations Based on Connections
Between B1 (or BO) and Behavior
As in case 3, my aim here is to argue that our STM-based theory will
not contain any of the relevant sort of generalizations. That is, I will
argue that the theory contains no generalizations based on connections
between 51 (or BO) and behavior. Because the argument will be quite
similar to the one given for case 3, I'll be much sketchier with this one.
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Once again, tne idea is that the connection between B1 (or BO) and any
particular behavior is not strong enough to satisfy the constraints of
principle (I). As before, the most plausible example of a strong
connection between B1 and some piece of behavior involves the utterance,
"McKinley was assassinated." In particular, the most plausible example of
a strong connection is the tendency of B-state B1 to cause a subject, under
certain circumstances, to utter, "McKinley was assassinated." To see that
this is the most plausible case, try to imagine what sort of behavior the
B-state is more likely to produce.
If we are to construct a generalization based on this connection
between having the B-state B1 and saying, "McKinley was assassinated," we
must begin by determining the circumstances under which having the B-state
will produce this behavior. Roughly, it will do so whenever (a) the
subject wants someone to know that they believe that McKinley was
assassinated; and (b) the subject believes that saying, "McKinley was
assassinated," will lead that person to think that the subject believes
that McKinley was assassinated. So far things look pretty good for the
generalization we are trying to build. It looks like we will only need to
build two B-states into the antecedent of the conditional, and the
generalization will hold.
The problem is that a very similar generalization will hold for BO as
well. That is, having the B-state 50 will lead the subject to say,
"McKinley was assassinated," if (a) the subject wants someone to know that
they believe that McKinley was elected; and (b) the subject believes that
saying, "McKinley was assassinated," will lead that person to think that
the subject believes that McKinley was elected. The question then becomes
whether these two generalizations are in fact distinct. In particular, is
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the D-state corresponding to the subject's desire that some person know
that they believe that McKinley was elected, distinct from the D-state
corresponding to the subject's desire that some person know that they
believe that McKinley was assassinated; and, is the B-state corresponding
to the subject's belief that saying, "McKinley was assassinated," will lead
the person in question to think that the subject believes that McKinley was
assassinated, distinct from the B-state corresponding to the subject's
belief that saying, "McKinley was assassinated," will lead the person in
question to think that the subject believes that McKinley was elected? If
the two D-states are identical, and the two B-states are identical, then
the two generalizations will be identical. In that case, the same
generalization will apply equally well to B1 and BO, and cannot be used to
distinguish them. And, of course, we have no reason to assume that either
the pair of D-states or the pair of B-states are distinct. Tne only
apparent difference between the two D-states and the two B-states involves,
speaking folk-psychologically, the difference between the concepts of
election and assassination. And, the question we have been struggling with
is whether, for an STM-based theory, that difference is enough to make two
cognitive states distinct. We still have no reason to think that it is.
Hence, the contemplated generalization connecting B1 with utterances of,
"McKinley was assassinated," will not distinguish B1 from BO.
4.6 Conolualob and Review
I've now discussed the four kinds of generalizations which might
distinguish B1 and BO. And, we have not found a single generalization
which can do the job. We may, therefore, conclude that no generalizations
of an STM-based theory will distinguish Bi and BO, and that for an STM-
based theory these belief-like states of Mrs. T must be regarded as one and
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the same cognitive state. But, now consider the consequences of this
outcome.
At the beginning of this section, I described two conversations we
might have with Mrs. T. In the first, we say to Mrs. T, "If McKinley was
assassinated, then he is buried in Ohio," and she replies, "Well then, he
is buried in Ohio." This is Stich's example. In the second conversation,
we say to Mrs. T, "If McKinley was elected, then he is buried in Ohio," and
she simply shrugs her shoulders. In attempting to explain why Mrs. T
responds differently in the two conversations, we posited two distinct B-
states, B1 and BO, the former being associated with the sentence, "McKinley
was assassinated," the latter being associated with the sentence, "McKinley
was elected." We then explained the difference in Mrs. T's responses in
the two conversations by supposing that she is in B1 but not in BO.
Because she is not in BO, the generalization which accounts for her
response in the first conversation does not apply in the second
conversation, and there is no reason to expect her to say, "Well then, he
is buried in Ohio." But, this attempt to explain the difference in Mrs.
T's responses depends crucially on the fact that she is in B-state BO and
not B1. If these two B-states turn out to be the same B-state, this
attempt collapses. So, one of the consequences of having to regard B1 and
BO as the same cognitive state is that an STM-based theory will not be able
to explain the outcomes of our two conversations with Mrs. 7 (although in
section 5 I'll discuss a way that STM can be modified to avoid this
problem).
But, the consequences of the inability of an STM-based theory to
distinguish between B-states B1 and BO go far beyond Mrs. 7. Since
principle (I) guarantees that the cognitive states that survive in Mrs. T
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have not chcnged in their type identity, the predecessors of B1 and BO in
the younger Mrs. T will also be of the same cognitive type. Since the
younger Mrs. T was, as far as we know, completely normal, we may assume
that the B-states corresponding to your belief that McKinley was
assassinated and your belief that McKinley was elected are of the same type
as well. And, since very little in the argument of this section depended
on the particular concepts associated with B1 and 80, the same could be
said of countless other pairs of beliefs. The argument will go through
unless the beliefs in question involve concepts that are so strongly tied
to behavior and stimuli that the intervention of other, even bizarre,
beliefs cannot break the link. Such concepts might include color or other
sensory concepts, but not much more. So, your belief that lambs are gentle
and my belief that lions are ferocious will be indistinguishable. Your
belief that volcanoes are full of lava and my belief that coffeepots are
full of coffee will be indistinguishable; etc. In the next section, I will
argue that this situation is intolerable for a tneory of cognition. But,
first I want to review where things now stand in my attempt to saddle STM
witn the collateral information problem and also describe the somewhat
technical argument of this section in less formal terms. Then, in the next
section, I will modify the conclusion of this argument slightly but
maintain that STM is still left in an untenable position unless it gives up
principle (I) thereby opening itself up to the CI problem.
In section 1 1 discussed the collateral information problem as it was
raised by Putnam. The main point of the section was to demonstrate that
Putnam's arguments creates a difficult problem for RTM that does not have
an uncontroversial solution. Section 2 described Stich's version of the CI
problem, the example of Mrs. T, and how he sees it creating problems for
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RTM. In section 3 I described STM in some detail. I showed that STM would
be vulnerable to the CI problem if it were not for principle (I), which
holds that the generalizations of an STM-based theory must apply to a
particular cognitive state independently of the other cognitive states a
subject happens to be in (or not to be in). I then argued in section 4
that principle (I) has the consequence that STM-based theories will not be
able to distinguish belief-like states as finely as it must. Roughly put,
it will not be able to distinguish beliefs with the same logical form.
Principle (I) captures tne idea that in typing cognitive states it is
not the actual causal links between that cognitive states and other
cognitive states, stimuli, and behavior that matter. Rather, what counts
is the state's potential links. The driving force behind the argument in
section 4 is the idea that potential links come too cheaply. The belief
that McKinley was elected has the same potential causal links as the belief
that McKinley was assassinated. The belief that McKinley was elected has
the potential to produce the belief that McKinley is dead. And, it is
likely to do so if the subject also happens to believe that people who have
been elected are dead. The belief that McKinley was elected has the
potential to be caused by the hearing of an utterance of, "McKinley was
assassinated." And it is likely to be so caused if the subject happens to
believe that people normally express the thought that McKinley was elected
by uttering, "McKinley was assassinated"; that the utterer is a reliable
source of information, etc. The belief that McKinley was elected has the
potential to cause the subject to utter, "McKinley was assassinated." And
it is likely to do so if the subject happens to desire that people know of
her belief, and happens to believe that uttering, "McKinley was
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assassinated," will lead people to think that she believes that McKinley
was elected.
Tne causal links between the belief that McKinley was assassinated (or
any other belief) and most of the cognitive states and stimuli and behavior
to which it is linked depend-on the presence of certain other cognitive
states. Once these dependencies are spelled out, it becomes clear that if
other, similar cognitive states were present instead--for example, the
belief that being elected entails dying, instead of the belief that being
assassinated entails dying--beliefs other than the original one would have
the same causal links that the original belief actually has. In other
words, it becomes clear that other beliefs have the same potential causal
links as the original belief. And, since potential causal links are all
tnat count toward type identity of a belief-like state, STM is unable to
distinguish the two original belief from the others. And, since these new
beliefs may be rather dissimilar to the original, STM ends up with a far
too coarse-grained individuation of cognitive states.
5. B-states with the Some Logical Form are of the Same Type
In this section I want to make a distinction that was not made in the
previous section. The distinetion will be between the claim that an STH-
based theory can't distinguish two cognitive states and the claim that an
8TH-based theory must regard two cognitive states a" being of the same
type.17 I will ultimately conclude that an 8TH-based theory can
17. It is important to remember that questions like, What makes you think
you've got two states if you can't distinguish them? are not
appropriate here. For we've assumed following Stich that the two
states of interest are originally specified neurophysiologically. The
question is whether the two (neurophysiologically specified) states can
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distinguish between B-states such as BO and B1, but must still regard them
as being of the same type. This result, I will argue, is still
unacceptable, and, therefore, principle (I) must still be rejected. To
motivate these refinements, I now want to discuss an argument that claims
that B-states B1 and BO can be distinguished after all.
Suppose, the argument begins, that there is a universal human response
to being "informed" of a proposition of the form, 'If p, then p."18 Call
this response the t-response (Among English speakers, tne t-response might
consist of uttering the words, "Of course; do you take me for an idiot!")
Then, our theory will contain the following generalization 19:
(T) Given any subject S and any wff A, if the subject
comes to be in a B-state mapped to tne wff A -- > A,
then S will produce the t-response.
Now, let's introduce some new B-states of Mrs. T. B5 is the B-state
Mrs. T comes to be in if we tell her, "If McKinley was assassinated, then
McKinley was elected." B6 is the B-state that Mrs. T comes to be in if we
tell ner, "If McKinley was assassinated, then McKinley was assassinated."
Now, the generalization just mentioned will apply to B-state B6 but not to
B-state B5. Tnat is, if we tell Mrs. T, "If McKinley was assassinated,
then McKinley was assassinated," she produces the t-response. But, if we
be distinguished at the cognitive level. This question makes perfect
sense.
18. The argument was suggested to me by James Higginbotham.
19. For the sake of simplicity, I am assuming the picture of communication
that I rejected in the previous section. That is, I am assuming that
telling someone, "If p, then p" leads them to explicitly formulate the
normally implicit belief that if p, then p. The argument being
presented here could be formulated without this assumption, but not
without adding needless complexity.
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tell her, "If McKinley was assassinated, then McKinley was elected," she
does not. Hence, B6 is to be assigned to a wff of tne form A -- > A, but B5
is not.
Now, generalization (1) discussed in section 4.1 should apply to B-
states B6, B1 and BO respectively. This means that B-state B6 will have to
be mapped to the wff W1 --> WO. A listing of all the B-states we have now
posited and their assignments is given below. I assume there that B-state




he is buried in Ohio"
"If McKinley was assassinated,
then he is buried in Ohio"
"If McKinley was elected,"
then he is buried in Ohio"
"McKinley was elected"
"If McKinley was assassinated,
then McKinley was elected"
"If McKinley was assassinated,
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Putting the fact that B5 is assigned to the wff W1 -- > WO together with the
fact that, in virtue of not satisfying generalization (T), B5 is not to be
mapped to a wff of the form A -- > A, we can conclude that wffs W1 and WO
must be distinct. Since distinct wffs correspond to distinct cognitive
state types, we may conclude that B1 and B0 must be assigned different
- 130 -
types by our STM-based theory. But, isn't this precisely the conclusion
which I argued could not be reached in section 4?
An analogy will help us untangle the situation. In "The Meaning of
'Meaning'," Putnam confesses that he cannot tell the difference between
beech trees and elm trees. Consequently, he argues, his crncept of a beech
tree is "exactly the same as" his concept of an elm tree.20 Putnam
evidently believes that the connection between the concepts and the
associated phonological and morphological forms is not sufficient to create
a difference between the two concepts. If Putnam is right about this, then
the way things stand with his concepts of elm trees and beech trees
(assuming that his knowledge of beeches and elms has not expanded) is
precisely the same as the way things stand with B-states B1 and BO. Putnam
surely does not mean to suggest that he has just one concept of the
relevant sort. If he did, then he would surely believe that beech trees
are elm trees, which, presumably, he does not. The point is not that the
two concepts are identical; that he does not believe that beeches are elms
proves that. Rather, the point is that although the concepts are distinct,
they have precisely the same content (on the assumption that the connection
with distinct phonological and morphological forms is not significant in
this regard).
Similarly, generalization (T) reveals that BO and B1 are distinct B-
states. If they weren't, then telling Mrs. T, "If McKinley was
assassinated, then McKinley was elected" would provoke the t-response.
However, there is still no basis for assigning the two B-states distinct
20. Putnam, 1975, p. 143.
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wffs or for regarding them as being of distinct types for they still
satisfy exactly the same pattern of generalizations.
Why, one might ask, can't an STM-based theory resolve this situation
by arbitrarily assigning the two B-states to distinct wffs if the B-states
are known to be distinct? One can even continue to honor the idea tbat
different wffs correspond to distinct cognitive state types by simply
attaching indices to wffs. So, for example, we could acknowledge that B1
and BO are distinct B-states but of the same type by associating both of
them with the wff 'Am,' but attaching different indices. Thus, B1 might be
associated with the indexed wff 'Am1' and BO with the indexed wff 'Am0 .'
In general, we could associate with every distinct pattern of
generalizations a single cognitive state type and a single wff, but an
indefinite number of indexed wffs. It would be understood that when
generalizations of the theory quantify over wffs, they quantify over
indexed wffs. Hence, a generalization might refer to all (indexed) wffs of
the form Ai.
There is, as far as I can see, nothing wrong with this proposal. It
maintains STM's commitment to individuating cognitive states according to
the generalizations they satisfy. At the same time, it allows the
explanation of why Mrs. T reacts differently in the two conversations
described in section 3 to go through. For all that was required there was
that B-states Bi and BO be assigned distinct wffs. For these purposes a
distinction captured by arbitrarily assigned indices will be sufficient.
The proposal does not, however, change the fact that B-states B1 and
BO must still be regarded as cognitive states of the same type. The point
becomes clear when we consider intersubjective comparisons. Since indices
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are attached arbitrarily to tne wffs that distinct B-states are mapped to,
the pattern of attachments will be different in different individuals.
Suppose, for example, that Mrs. T has a twin. The B-state that leads Mrs.
T to say, "McKinley was assassinated" might be assigned to the very same
wff with the very same index as the B-state that leads Mrs. T's twin to
say, "McKinley was elected." If these are the only B-states the two women
have, then our STM-based theory would not be able to regard the two women
as having different B-states.
And, what goes for Mrs. T and her twin goes for me and you as well.
An STM-based theory still won't be able to distinguish between my belief
that McKinley was elected and your belief that McKinley was assassinated,
or between your belief that lambs are gentle and my belief that lions are
ferocius; etc. Evidently, as far as intersubjective comparisons are
concerned, the individuation of cognitive states of an STM-based theory
will still be too coarse-grained.
That Stich needs to be able to quantify over more finely-grained
cognitive states is evident in his discussion of an argument against STM
proposed by Patricia Churchland. In setting up the argument, Stich writes:
One of the ways in which a content-based theory may specify
connections between stimuli and behavior is by linking specific
stimulus types to specific beliefs; thus:
(11) For all subjects S, when an elephant comes into
view, S will typically come to believe that an
elephant is in front of him.
This sort of generalization can be mimicked easily enough by a
syntactic theory:
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(12) For all subjects S, when an elephant comes into
view, S will typically come to have a sequence
of symbols, E, in his B-store.
(Stich, 1983, p. 178.)
Stich goes on to discuss the possibility that RTM-based theories could
produce more general forms of such a generalization. The important point
for us, however, is that generalization (12) relies on the ability of an
STM-based theory to regard the state I am in when an elephant is in front
of me and the state someone else is in when there is an elephant in front
of them as being cognitive states of the same type. There is nothing wrong
with this, but the state in question will be the same as the one I would be
in if a tiger rather than an elephant were in front of me. Hence, an STM-
based theory will get into trouble when it attempts to mimic the following
generalization: for all subjects S, when an elephant comes into view, but
not a tiger, S will typically come to believe that an elephant is in front
of him, but not come to believe that a tiger is in front of him.
To summarize: the argument in section 4 turns out to have been
slightly overstated. 'Generalizations such as (T) above may be capable of
identifying B-states that satisfy the same pattern of generalizations but
must nevertheless be assigned dfstinct wffs. STM can be modified to allow
for such distinctions by using some sort of indexes: B-states that satisfy
the same pattern of generalizations must still be considered to be of the
same type, but can be distinguished by attaching distinct indexes to the
wffs they are mapped to. This move allows us to explain why Mrs. T
responded differently in the two conversations discussed in section 3.
However, since B-states of the same logical form are still regarded as
being of the same type, the individuation of B-states will still be too
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coarse-grained. This problem manifests itself particularly in contexts
where B-states are being compared across individuals.
We see, then, that principle (I) leaves STM with a notion of cognitive
state that is unacceptably coarse-grained. But, we saw earlier, in section
2, that without principle (I), STM will have to face the collateral
information problem. Perhaps STM can find some other solution to the
collateral information problem. But, until this has been shown, it would
be ill-advised for anyone to abandon RTM in hopes of an easy way out of it.
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Eliminative Connectionism and Cognition as Pattern Association
1. Connectionism
Cognitive science has seen an explosion of interest in connectionist,
or parallel distributed processing (PDP)1 , models in recent years. A
connectionist model consists of a very large set (a network) of individual
processing units (nodes). Each node is connected to many, if not all, of
the other nodes. Each node is associated with a level of activation, which
changes over time. Often the activation level is allowed to take on any
value between an upper and a lower limit. In other models the activation
levels must assume discrete values. In some cases the nodes are restricted
to an activation level of 1 or 0; i.e., they are either "on" or "off."
Each node receives input from the nodes it is connected to. The
connections are weighted, and the input one node receives from another is
typically the product of the activation level of the second node and the
weight of the connection. The activation level of each node is
1. The word "distributed" in the phrase "parallel distributed processing"
refers to a feature which many connectionist models do not have. In
particular, "distributed representation" refers to the fact that in some
models concepts (or whatever one wants to call the items being encoded
in the network) do not correspond to individual nodes in a network or
even to a small set of nodes. Instead, they correspond to patterns of
activity over a very large number of nodes. The same large set of nodes
may be used for a number of concepts. Which concept is active at any
given time depends on the pattern of activity in the set of nodes at
that time. Since only some connectionist models use distributed
representation, it would seem that "parallel distributed processing" is
not synonymous with "connectionism," and shouldn't be used in that way.
However, Rumelhart, McClelland and the PDP Research.Group have written a
two-volume work entitled Parallel Distributed Processing, which is
something of a connectionist bible and contains many models which don't
have distributed representation. I follow them in using the two phrases
interchangeably.
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periodically (continuously in some models) updated as a function of the
input it is receiving from the nodes it is connected to. This function,
usually called the activation rule, may be probabilistic. Updating of
activation levels usually occurs in all nodes simultaneously.
A "run" of a PDP network typically begins with the activation levels
of some nodes being set manually. This setting of activation levels
constitutes the stimulus for which the network must generate a response.
The clock then begins to run, and activation levels for all nodes are then
determined on the basis of activation levels at previous times, connection
weights and the activation rule. Typically, activation levels of the
various nodes stabilize after some number of cycles. This stable set of
activation levels constitutes the network's response to the stimulus.
Methods for interpreting activation levels, either individually or
collectively, allow the network to be seen as a model of some cognitive
process. Sometimes means are provided for adjusting the connection weights
in a given network on the basis of "experience." Learning, or cognitive
development, is modeled in this way.
In sum, connectionist networks are large sets of simple processing
units, which are densely interconnected, and operate in parallel.
Connectionists have often advertised such networks as alternatives to
models in cognitive science that are based on standard, serial computer
architectures.2 Three differences between connectionist architectures and
2. Feldman and Ballard, for example, write,
The fundamental premise of connectionism is that individual
neurons do not transmit large amounts of symbolic
information. Instead they compute by being appropriately
connected to large numbers of similar units. This is in
sharp contrast to the conventional computer model of
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conventional computer architectures (Von Neumann architectures) are usually
cited. First, there is the issue of parallelism vs. seriality. In
conventional architectures, processing occurs one step at a time. In PDP
networks, processing occurs in all nodes at the same time. Hence, the
networks are said to be "massively parallel." The second architectural
difference is that there is no centralized control in connectionist
architectures. A Von Neumann machine has a central processing unit, or
executive, which is the locus of control in the machine.3 The third
difference is that the notion of a symbol being operated on is not
fundamentally involved in connectionist architectures. The operations of
reading and writing symbols are primitive operations in Von Neumann
architectures. Because they take notions of storing, retrieving, and
transforming symbols for granted, models based on conventional computer
architectures are sometimes characterized as symbol-processing models. In
sum, then, connectionist models nave often been advertised as alternatives
to symbol-processing models.
The function of the node in a PDP network is obviously supposed to be
reminiscent of the role of a neuron in the brain. It is not hard to
imagine how connectionist notions might apply to collections of neurons.
Nodes could be individual neurons; activation levels could be time-averaged
intelligence prevalent in computer science and cognitive
psychology. (Feldman and Ballard, 1982, p. 208.)
3. Connectionists tend to depict the contrast between connectionist and
non-connectionist computer architectures in stark terms. In fact,
however, there are many architectures which could hardly be called
connectionist, but which incorporate either elements of parallelism or
decentralized control. Parallel (but non-connectionist) architectures
in particular, such as that presented in Hillis, 1985, have been much
publicized of late. For an example of a non-connectionist architecture
with decentralized control, see Agha, 1986.
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firing rates; connection strength could correspond to the strength of
synaptic connections; etc.4  Although there is some disagreement among
connectionists about the extent to which their networks should be
understood as directly modeling what occurs in the brain, almost all
connectionists cite something like "biological plausibility" as an
advantage of connectionist models.5 The idea that PDP networks are to be
thought of as networks of neurons invites an advocate of old-fashioned
symbol-processing models to claim that she and the connectionist are simply
looking at cognitive processing at different levels of abstraction. Of
course, she says, if you are looking at what the individual neurons are
doing, then conventional computer architectures might not be appropriate.
But, that doesn't mean that they aren't appropriate at a higher level of
abstraction. Similarly, if you look at conventional computers at a low
enough level, processing does not consist of tne execution of complex rules
or the manipulation of complex symbolic representations: at a low enough
level it consists solely of transistors switching currents in response to
the switches of other transistors.6
4. On the other hand, there are many different ways of making this sort of
talk precise, and its not at all clear what the most appropriate way
would be.
5. See, for example, J. A. Anderson, 1983, pp. 799-803; Feldman and
Ballard, 1982, p. 206; and Rumelhart, 1984, pp. 60-61. McClelland,
Rumelhart and Hinton are more restrained, but still cite oiological
plausibility as part of the appeal of PDP models (McClelland, Rumelhart
and Hinton, 1986, pp. 10-11). Smolensky, it should be noted, appears to
be somewhat wary of resting much weight on the appeal to biological
plausibility (Smolensky, 1987, pp. 7-8).
6. In regard to the issue of levels of abstraction, see the exchange
between Broadbent (Broadbent, 1985) and Rumelhart and McClelland
(Rumelhart and HcClelland, 1985).
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This obvious response to the connectionist challenge has led to much
discussion in the literature on the question of the extent to which
connectionist and symbol-processing models are pitched at different levels,
and if they are, the extent to which connectionism should still be viewed
as an alternative to work in the symbol-processing tradition. These
questions about the proper relation between connectionist and symbol-
processing models constitute the topic of this paper. In particular, I
will be concerned with a view, which, borrowing the terminology of Steven
Pinker and Alan Prince (Pinker and Prince, 1988), I will call eliminative
connectionism.
Eliminative connectionism says that connectionist models and symbol-
processing models are pitched at different levels of analysis, but that the
level of analysis associated with the former is more fundamental. Symbol-
processing models are, on this view, only "approximate" or metaphorical
descriptions of an underlying connectionist reality. Symbol-processing
models do not accurately characterize actual cognitive processes at any
level of abstractioa.
I will be focusing especially on a paper by Paul Smolensky, entitled
"On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism" (Smolensky, 1987). I will claim
that the advocacy of eliminative connectionism on the part of Smolensky and
others is a consequence of taking a particular kind rf connectionist model,
pattern association, as a paradigm for cognition in general. In other
words, eliminative connectionism rests on a view of cognition as pattern
association. I will argue, based on considerations drawn from within the
connectionist framework, that the view of cognition as pattern association
is untenable. And, I will argue that once the view of cognition as pattern
association is abandoned, tnere is no reason to accept the eliminativist
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connectionist s view of the proper relation between connectionist and
symbol-processing models. I will conclude that it would be wise for the
connectionist to take a more open-minded view about the proper relation
between connectionist and symbol-processing models than that suggested by
eliminative connectionists.
2. Eliminative Connectionism.
2.1 Views on the Relation Between Conneotionist and
Symbol-Processing Models
In a recent article, Steven Pinker and Alan Prince discuss the different
stances that can be taken on the question of the relation between
connectionist and symbol-processing models. They describe three possible
views on the matter. The views are not supposed to cover all the
possibilities. Rather, they represent three points on a continuum of
views. A useful way of thinking about the continuum is to consider the
relative importance within each view of symbol-processing accounts of
cognition. In the first view, which we may think of as defining the
rightmost point in the continuum, symbol-processing accounts loom large.
According to this view, which Pinker and Prince label implementational
connectionism, connectionist models describe the elementary information
processes out of which the algorithms described in symbol-processing
accounts are built. Research into connectionist models might produce new
suggestions about the primitive information processes of the brain, but
this would function mainly to select from among the already available
symbol-processing accounts of cognition.
The view in the center of the spectrum is called revisionist-symbol-
processing connectionism. On this view groups of connectionist networks
will again implement the primitive procedures out of which symbol-
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processing algorithms are constructed. Symbol-processing accounts will
thus retain much of their importance. But, the view allots greater
importance than implementational connectionism does to connectionist
models. For on this view, the sort of primitive information processes used
by the correct symbol-processing algorithms will largely be discovered by
research into connectionist models.
For example, connectionists have had success in developing networks
that perform pattern completion (much more on this later). If such a
network contains information about baseball teams, one might be able to
retrieve all the information stored about a particular team by feeding the
network the names of a few players. The revisionist-symbol-processing
connectionist might conclude that a memory fetch involving the retrieval of
an item from memory by producing an incomplete description of the item,
should be regarded as a primitive process in symbol-processing models of
cognition.
According to revisionist-symbol-processing connectionism, the
primitive processes available to symbol-processing algorithms are largely
unknown, and, therefore, the shape of the correct symbol-processing
accounts will undergo substantial change based on the results of research
into connectionist models. Hence, although symbol-processing accounts play
a crucial, if not the crucial, role in the ultimate account of cognition,
the direction of cognitive science will largely be driven by connectionist
research.
The view on the far left of Pinker and Prince's continuum is
eliminative connectionism, the position at issue in this paper. According
to this view, many of the symbolic structures that get processed in symbol-
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processing models will typically not correspond to any discrete components
of connectionist models. Similarly, the individual processing steps of
symbol-processing algorithms will not correspond to discrete events in the
operation of connectionist models. Groups of connectionist networks do not
implement symbol-processing algorithms at all on this view. Symbol-
processing models may approximately capture the relation between the input
to these models and their behavior. In so far as they do, symbol-
processing descriptions of connectionist models will have heuristic value
in generating behavioral predictions, and provide an "approximate"
description of the behavior of the model. But, the symbol-processing
description of cognitive processes will not be literally true at any level
of analysis. Symbol-processing models of cognition are clearly of
secondary importance on this view; connectionist models are where all the
"action" is.
The position I have just described encompasses many ideas. But, the
heart of the view concerns: (1) the claim that connectionist networks do
not implement symbol-processing algorithms (in the sense that, for example,
some assembly-level code implements an algorithm specified in a programming
language); and, (2) the claim that symbol-processing descriptions of
cognition are not, therefore, true characterizations of actual cognitive
mechanisms at any level of abstraction. The upshot is, of course that
connectionist models are more fundamental and more important than their
symbol-processing counterparts.
The claim of non-implementation can be explicated in terms of the
impossibility of mapping elements of a symbol-processing algorithm onto the
events in the underlying connectionist network. For example, the
eliminative connectionist might claim that individual steps of symbol-
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processing algorithm intended to model a cognitive process will not map in
any neat or simple way onto events or sets of events in the operation
(either during the processing of the mature networks, or in their training
history) of the connectionist networks that correctly describe the
cognitive process. However, to repeat, the heart of the eliminative
connectionist view is simply that ultimately connectionist networks will
not turn out to implement symbol-processing algorithms, and, therefore, no
symbol-processing algorithms will accurately describe actual cognitive
processing.
2.2 Eliminative Connectionists
A number of authors appear to espouse eliminative connectionism.
Consider, for example, the view of connectionism presented by Daniel
Dennett in "The Logical Geography of Computational Approaches (A View From
the East Pole)." Dennett describes PDP systems in the article, emphasizing
that the values computed by the nodes in a PDP network do not by themselves
nave any "external-world semantic role" and asks, "How then do we ever get
anything happening in this system that is properly about Chicago?" Dennett
answers that on the connectionist view in question, there is a higher level
of description at which one can attribute external-world significance to
the activity of the networks, But, the relationship between the elements
posited at this level is not computational, but "statistical, emergent,
holistic." Hence, he concludes:
in this vision the low, computational level is importantly
unlike a machine language in that there is no supposition of a
direct translation or implementation relation between the high-
level phenomena that do have an external-world semantics and
the phenomena at the low level. If there were, then the usual
methodological precept of computer science would be in order:
ignore the hardware since the idiosyncrasies of its particular
style of implementation add nothing to the phenomenon
(Dennett, 1986, pp. 69-70.)
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Of course, in symbol-processing models of cognition, at least some of
the symbols that are manipulated are supposed to receive external-world
interpretations. Hence, symbol-processing models are supposed to be what
Dennett calls higher level descriptions. But, at that level, the
interactions and relationships between elements is not computational
accurding to Dennett's understanding of connectionism. Since symbol-
processing models ascribe computational relations to elements at this
level, these models do not accurately characterize cognitive processes on
Dennett's picture.
Douglas Hofstadter paints a similar picture in "AI: Subcognition as
Computation." He uses a metaphor to illustrate doubts about conventional
approaches to AI. The brain is compared to a colony of ants, witn ants
playing the role of neurons, and teams of ants corresponding to concepts or
thoughts. Hofstadter then questions whether there exist formal,
computational rules at the level of the teams tnat describe the behavior of
the colony. The idea, of course, is tnat the only level at which the brain
is truly computational is at the level of the neurons, and that at any
higher, more abstract level, the brain is no longer computational.
Hofstadter concludes:
The premise of AI is that thoughts themselves are computational
entities at their own level. At least, this is the premise of
the information-processing school of AI, and I have very
serious doubts about it. (Hofstadter, 1983, p. 278.)
Hofstadter is not talking here specifically about an underlying
connectionist structure. But, elsewhere in the paper, he makes favorable
indirect references to connectionist research. And, it is no secret that
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Hofstadter is sympathetic to the connectionist program. To the extent
that Hofstadter can be thought of as a connectionist, he is clearly an
eliminative connectionist.
The widely noticed "bible" of connectionism is, Parallel Distributed
Processing, a two-volume work by David Rumelhart, James McClelland and the
PDP Research Group. The main locus of the metatheoretical, or ideological,
elements of the book is Chapter 4 of Volume I, an essay by Rumelhart and
McClelland entitled, "PDP Models and General Issues in Cognitive Science."
Here Rumelhart and McClelland opt also for the eliminative connectionist
view. Setting up part of the discussion, they write:
It might be argued that a model such as, say, schema theory or
the ACT* model of Jonn Anderson (1983) is a statement in a
"higher level" language analogous, let us say, to the Pascal or
LISP programming languages and that our distributed model is a
statement in a "lower level" theory that is, let us say,
analogous to the assembly code into which higher level programs
can be compiled.
But, they respond
Pascal code will, in general, compile into only a small
fraction of the possible assembly code programs that could be
written. Since there is every reason to suppose that most
programming that might be taking place in the brain is taking
place at a "lower level" rather than a "higher level," it seems
unlikely that some particular higher level description will be
identical to some particular lower level description. We may
be able to capture the actual code approximately in a higher
level language-and it may often be useful to do so--but this
does not mean that the higher level language is an adequate
characterization. (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986a, pp.
124-125.)
7. When Dennett presented a version of his paper (Dennett , 1986) at the
Sloan Conference at MIT in 1984, he had Hofstadter give a brief
presentation on connectionist research as an adjunct to the paper.
Furthermore, Dennett credits Hofstadter with being a major source of the
ideas in his paper, ideas which are rather sympathetic with the
connection ist program.
- 146 -
Later, Rumelhart and McClelland introduce the idea that higher level
symbol-processing models are "approximately" correct descriptions of an
underlying connectionist structure.
We view macrotheories as approximations to the underlying
microstructure which the distributed model presented in our
paper attempts to capture. As approximations they are often
useful, but in some situations it will turn out that an
examination of the microstructure may bring much deeper
insight. (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986a, p. 125.)
Terming the macrotheories approximations actually suggests that the
theories might provide an important, true description of the structure of
cognition, just as Newtonian mecnanics provides an important, true
(provided that the laws are not claimed to hold precisely) description of
physical reality. But, Rumelhart and McClelland go on to write:
Tnus, although we imagine that rule-based models of language
acquisition--the logogen model, schema theory. prototype
theory, and other macrolevel theories--may all be more or less
valid approximate macrostructural descriptions, we believe that
the actual algorithms involved cannot be represented precisely
in any of those macrotheories. (Rumelhart and McClelland,
1986, p. 126.)
The phrase "the actual algorithms involved" betrays, I believe, the fact
that when the macrotheories are characterized by Rumelhart and McClelland
as "valid approximate macrostructural descriptions," the validity lies in
their heuristic value and not in their corresponding to actual mental
processes.
My main target in this paper will not be Dennett, Hofstadter or
Rumelhart and McClelland. My arguments will apply directly to Rumelhart
and McClelland, but their main target is Paul Smolensky's essay, "On the
Proper Treatment of Connectionism." To understand Smolensky's statement of
eliminative connectionism, we must begin by reviewing some of his
terminology. The first piece of terminology we need to look at, "the
intuitive processor," is introduced in the following passage:
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What kinds of programs are responsible for behavior that is not
conscious rule application? I will refer to the virtual
machine that runs these programs as the intuitive processor.
It is (presumably) responsible for all of animal behavior, and
a huge portion of human behavior: perception, practiced motor
behavior, -fluent linguistic behavior, intuition in problem
solving and game playing ... (Smolensky, 1987, p. 3)
Clearly Smolensky believes that the operation of the intuitive processor
constitutes the bulk of cognition. On anybody's view, only a very minor
part of cognitive processing is the conscious application of rules.
Smolensky discusses the nature of the activity of the intuitive
processor. He considers and rejects the hypothesis (labeled (3b)) tnat
"the programs running on the intuitive processor are composed of elements--
symbols--referring to essentially the same concepts as are used to
consciously conceptualize the task domain," and comments on it as follows:
This hypothesis has provided the foundation for the symbolic
paradigm for cognitive modeling. Cognitive models of both
conscious rule application and intuitive processing have been
programs constructed of entities which are symbols both in the
syntactic sense of being operated on by "symbol manipulation"
and in the semantic sense of (3b). Because these symbols have
the conceptual semantics of (3b), I will call the level of
analysis at which these programs provide cognitive models the
conceptual level (Smolensky, 1987, p. 4.
For Smolensky, one of the characteristic features of traditional
symbol-processing models is that its level of analysis is the conceptual
level. If connectionist models could be regarded as implementations of
symbol-processing models, then such models could be characterized at the
conceptual level. The intuitive processor, it turns out, is properly
described as a connectionist network. Smolenaky directly confronts the
question of the extent to which the intuitive processor can be
characterized at the conceptual level in the following passage:
The entities in the intuitive processor with the semantics of
conscious concepts of the task domain are complex patterns of
activity over many units.... The interactions between
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individual units are simple, but these units do not have
conceptual semantics: they are subconceptual. The
interactions between the entities with conceptual semantics--
interactions between complex patterns of activity--are not at
all simple. Interactions at the level of activity patterns are
not directly described by the formal definition of a
subsymbolic model; they must be computed by the analyst.
Typically, these interactions can be computed only
approximately. There will generally be no precisely valid,
computable formal principles at the conceptual level; such
principles exist only at the level of the units--the
subconceptual level. (Smolensky, 1987, p. 6.)
Symbol-processing accounts of cognition are generally presented at the
conceptual level. But, "no precisely valid, computable formal principles"
apply to the intuitive processor at the conceptual level. Hence, no
symbol-processing account will provide a completely accurate description of
the activities of the intuitive processor. As with Rumelhart and
McClelland, it is possible to interpret Smolensky here as leaving an
important role for conceptual level accounts, since they might be
approximately, if not precisely, valid. But, I think that the tone of the
passages above makes it clear that when Smolensky says that there are no
precisely valid, computational principles that apply to tne intuitive
processor at the conceptual level, ne means that there are no such
principles that have anything beyond heuristic value.8
8. This interpretation is reinforced later in the paper when Smolensky
illustrates the relation between conceptual level theories and
subconceptual accounts with examples. He writes of a certain set of
conceptual level representations, for example, "They are informal,
approximate descriptions--one might even say they are merely
metaphorical descriptions--of an inference process too subtle to admit
such high-level descriptions with great precision." (Smolensky, 1987,
p. 23.) Smolensky seems to me to believe that conceptual level
descriptions will, in general, be "merely metaphorical."
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3. Pattern Association
My aim in this paper is to show that the eliminative connectionist
views of both Rumelhart and McClelland (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986a)
and Smolensky are based on a very specific and overly simple view of the
form of connectionist models of cognition. In particular, their view seems
to be based on the assumption that connectionist models of cognition will
be networks called pattern associators. More specifically, they seem to
assume that connectionist models will consist either of simple pattern
associators or of the kind of pattern associators Smolensky has studied
under the rubric "harmony theory." In the present section I will describe
these kinds of networks and explain why undue attention to them might lead
one to espouse eliminative connectionism. In section 4 I will demonstrate
the extent to which McClelland and Rumelhart and Smolensky rely on these
sorts of networks in developing their ideological positions, charging them
with subscribing to a view of cognition as pattern association. A careful
look at the connectionist research program itself, section 5 will argue,
suggests that the view of cognition as pattern association is overly
simple. And, finally, I will show that a more realistic picture of
connectionist models of cognition is not nearly so conducive to eliminative
connectionism,
3.1 Pattern Associators and AutomAssociators
Connectionist networks are often designed to be pattern associators.
When a pattern associator is proposed as a model for a cognitive task, the
task is conceived as that of generating the right response to a stimulus.
The stimulus, or input, might be a verb and the response, or output, the
past tense form of the verb. Or, the input might be a person and the
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output their occupation. Etc. One subset of the nodes in a pattern
association network are designated as input nodes. Another subset is
designated as output nodes. There may be further, "hidden" nodes, but
there needn't be. Each element in the set of possible stimuli is
associated with a distinct pattern of activity among the input nodes.
Similarly, each possible response is associated with a distinct pattern of
activity among the output nodes. If the connection weights are set
properly, then, when a stimulus is encoded "manually," the network will
generate the appropriate response. In other words, if the pattern of
activity associated with a particular stimulus is imposed on the network
externally, and the network is then allowed to run and stabilize, the
pattern of activity that emerges among the output nodes will be the one
associated with the correct response to the stimulus.9
Usually, the point is not simply to show that a network can be
designed that associates the appropriate response to a given stimulus.
Rather, the point is to show that the network can learn this association.
This is done by providing the network with a "learning rule," and supplying
it witn "experience." Each unit of experience consists in the following
sequence of events. A particular stimulus is encoded manually in the
normal fashion. The network is allowed to run, thereby generating a
particular pattern of activity among its output nodes. A special teaching
input is then supplied to each node, ±ndicating what the correct response
to the given stimulus was for that node. Finally, connection weights are
9. When the activation rule for the network is stochastic, sometimes
"running" the network involves changing the activation function over
time in accordance with a measure called "temperature." The basic idea
is that the activation values of the nodes should be highly random at
first (when the temperature is high), and become less so as time goes on
(during which time the temperature drops and the network "freezes.")
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updated in accordance with a learning rule based on differences between the
network's response and the correct response as encoded in the teaching
input. A great variety of learning rules have been proposed, but in effect
they all say: if input node A was on, and output node B was off but was
supposed to be on (i.e. the corresponding teaching node was on), then
increase the weight of the connection between node A and node B; if input
node A was on, and output node B was on but was supposed to be off, then
decrease the weight of the connection between node A and node B.
Connectionists have been quite successful in designing networks that learn
to associate particular stimuli with particular responses in this manner.
A special case of pattern association that is of particular interest
here is the case where the set of input nodes and the set of output nodes
are identical. In this case, the pattern associator is called an auto-
associator. If the individual nodes correspond to meaningful features,
then auto-association can be interpreted as providing the network with a
partial description of a situation or object and asking the network to
complete the description. In other cases auto-association is best
understood as feeding the network a noisy input and asking the network to
eliminate the noise.
3.2 The Room--Schemata Example
One particular example of auto-association, or pattern completion,
plays a central role in Smolensky's paper and in a paper cited at an
important juncture in Rumeihart and McClelland, 1986a. In the rest of this
section, I'll discuss the example and its lessons in some detail.
The network in question consists of forty nodes. Each node
corresponds to a "feature" of a room. The features are things such as,
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coffee-pot, window, large, [hasJ books, etc. The activation level of eacn
node ranges between 0 and 1. As always, the activation level of node x at
time t+1 is a function of the activation level of node xj at time t, the
activation levels of other nodes at time t, and the weights of the
connections between those nodes and xj. The activation levels of nodes are
updated one at a time.
The weights connecting the nodes were derived in the following way. 10
First, eighty sample feature-sets were constructed. This was done by
asking someone to imagine a living room, e.g., and then running through
each of the forty features, having the person say for each one whether or
not it applied to the room they were imagining. (The person was asked to
imagine a living room in one-fifth of the cases. Similarly with kitchens,
bathrooms, offices, and bedrooms.) Given these eighty feature-sets, the
weight between any two nodes (features) was set as a function of the
following four joint probabilities: the probability tnat both the first
and second feature are included in a given feature-set, the probability
that the first feature, but not the second, is included in a given feature-
set, etc.
A "run" of the network consists of "telling the network that a given
room has certain features", i.e. manually setting the activation level of a
handful (usually two or three) of nodes at 1, and then letting the
activation levels of all the nodes change in accordance witn the specified
10. Rumelhart et al. could have set the weights by equipping the network
with a learning rule and providing it with experience. Presumably,
they refrained from doing so out of expediency, perhaps because of the
computing expenses that would have been involved (The computational
effort required to simulate the training of a connectionist network on
a serial computer is apparently quite substantial).
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rules for updating activation levels. The run ends when a stable set of
activation levels has been reached. Because of certain aspects of the
design of the network, the network will always end up with a certain set of
nodes having an activation level of 1, and the rest having an activation
level of 0. Hence, we can always interpret the network as telling us what
other features are likely to be in the room in question. We can thus view
the network as performing a pattern completion task. It is given a partial
list of the features of a given room, and must then complete the list. As
it turns out, in most cases, the output of the network will be nearly
identical to one of just five lists of features. These lists of featurns
correspond to i prototypical kitchen, a prototypical bedroom, a
prototypical living room, a prototypical bathroom, and a prototypical
office.
Among connectionists, there is a popular way of conceiving of what the
network does which helps to explain why it is so likely to end up
describing a prototypical kitchen, or a prototypical bedroom, etc.
Consider first a very simple network containing just two nodes whose
activation levels range between 0 and 1. We can create a function, G
(goodness-of-fit), which associates with every pair of activation levels
for the two nodes, a measure of-how consistent. the activation levels are
with the connection weights. So, for example, if the two nodes are
mutually inhibitory, G will be greatest for the pairs (1,0) and (0,1). We
can modify:G to take into account the nodes' initial activation levels.
So, if we begin with the first node having an activation level of .5 and
the second node having an activation level of .2, and modify G accordingly,
G ought to be greatest for (1,0) since this is most consistent with both
the connection weights and input activation levels. We can graph G (either
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the original version or the modified version) as a surface lying over the
square in the xy-plane whose corners are (0,0), (0,1), (1,0) and (1,1).
Connectionists call these surfaces landscapes. Given our function G,
together with a method for modifying it for a particular set of input
activation levels, we can think of the network as having a goodness-of-fit
landscape (the one determined by the original function) which then gets
distorted depending on the input activation levels given to the network.
It turns out that there is a function G of the sort described such
that the behavior of the room-schemata network and other networks of its
kind is accurately characterized as climbing a path of steepest ascent
toward a peak (or local maximum) in some distortion of its goodness-of-fit
landscape. The particular distortion of the landscape it climbs is
determined by the input to the network.
The room-schemata network contains 40 nodes. So, for this network, G
would have to be plotted in 41-space. The graph would "lie over" a 40-
cube. Because the activation rule for the network tends to drive nodes
into activation levels of 1 or 0, the peaks in the goodness-of-fit
landscape all occur at corners of the 40-cube. It turns out that the room-
schemata network has five dominant peaks in its goodness-of-fit landscape.
The vectors of activation levels tnat these peaks lie over correspond, of
course, to the five lists of features that the network tends to produce.
In other words, the dominant peaks in the goodness-of-fit landscape
correspond to the prototypical kitchen, bedroom, living-room, bathroom, and
office discussed above. Because these peaks are so dominant, whenever the
input to the network consists in turning on just a handful of features, one
or more of the five peaks will dominate the relevant distortion of the
goodness-of-fit landscape, and the path of steepest ascent will lead to one
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of tnem. Tnis explains wny the network is so likely to settle into a state
associated witn one of tne five prototypical rooms.
Obviously, it is impossible to visualize the goodness-of-fit landscape
in 41-space, but Rumelhart et al. present several three-dimensional cross-
sections of the landscape and some of its distortions. Some of these are
reproduced below in Figure 1. Figure 1A is a three-dimensional cross-
section of the original landscape. Figure 1B is the landscape associated
with an input in which the "oven" node alone is turned on. And, figure 1C














3.3 Lessons of the Room-Schemata Example.
Rumelhart et al. (Rumelhart et al., 1986), and Smolensky (Smolensky,
1987) both make much of the example just described. Their point is
basically this. The network behaves as if it had encoded in it sumehow
five schemata describing a typical kitchen, a typical bathroom, etc. There
is an inclination to think of it as having schemata, complete with
subschemata, variables with default values, etc.11 Thinking of the network
in this way allows us to generate good predictions of the networks
behavior. But, in fact, the network has no schemata encoded in it all.
The information associated witn the schemata is all encoded in the network
in the weignts of the connections. The only thing in the network
corresponding to these schemata are patterns of activity that turn out to
be highly stable.
Smolensky writes,
Looking closely at the harmony landscape we can see that the
terrain around the "bathroom" peak has many of the properties
of a bathroom schema; variables and constants, default values,
schemata imbedded inside of schemata, ... The system behaves as
though it nad schemata for bathrooms, offices, etc., even
though they are not "really there" at the fundamental level:
these schemata are strictly properties of a higher-level
description. They are informal, approximate descriptions--one
might even say they are merely metaphorical descriptions--of an
inference process too subtle to admit such high-level
descriptions with great precision. Even though these schemata
may not be the sort of object on which to base a formal model,
nonetheless they are useful descriptions that help us
understand a very complex inference system. (Smolensky, 1987,
p. 23)
11. The notion of a schema referred to here is the one introduced in
cognitive psychology by Rumeihart (Rumelhart, 1975). For present
purposes, Rumelhart's schemata are equivalent to Minsky's frames
(MInsky, 1975). Schank and Abelson's scripts (Schank and Abelson,
1977) are also similar, but not applicable to the case at hand.
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In discussing the differences between conventional approaches to
schemata and the present network, Rumelhart et al. stress the flexibility
of the network. In a conventional schema-processing algorithm, for
example, they note that a decision has. to be made about "which aspects of a
given schema are constant and which are variable" and "which aspects of
the 3ituation are part of the schema and which are not." (Rumelhart et
al., 1986, p. 37) In the network, such decisions needn't be made. A
feature's being part of a schema consists only in its being strongly linked
to many other of the features in some group. The question of how strong
these links must be for the feature to be part of the schema is irrelevant
to the functioning of the network.
Rumelhart et al. consider the flexibility of the PDP approach to
schemata an advantage of the approach. They also use it to illustrate
their view of tne relation between symbol-processing and PDP models. In a
way, the network operates as if it had a schema in the conventional sense.
However, the differences show up if the network is given unusual inputs.
For example, given the input, bed, sofa, and ceiling, the network seems to
"blend" tne bedroom schema with the living-room schema. (Rumelhart et al.,
1986, p. 34) This illustrates the general point that "we can often run up
against phenomena in which our high-level descriptions will not do, we must
describe the system in terms of the underlying processes to understand its
behavior." (Rumelbart et al., 1986, p. 56)
The flexibility that Rumelhart et al. stress follows largely from the
use of a simple pattern associator. Not only does the network not make a
decision about when a feature will be part rif a schema and when it will
not, it isn't even possible for such a decision to be reflected tn the
network. Because the network only contains nodes for individual features,
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only connections between a feature and individual features can be encoded.
Similarly, it would not be possible for the invoking of a schema itself to
be a distinct event within the network. Other aspects of a conventional
symbol-processing model of schema-application are also unlikely to be
reflected in a simple pattern associator. For example, because a pattern
associator encodes almost all of the statistical associations available
(due to the learning rule), the sources of input to any given feature will
be numerous. When the activation level of a particular feature will begin
to climb will, for this reason, vary a great deal from one pattern
completion to another. A simple pattern associator is, therefore, unlikely
to reflect any particular algorithm for filling the slots in a schema or
frame sequentially.
As a general rule, then, it would seem unlikely that a simple pattern
associator could be regarded as implementing a symbol-processing algorithm.
Since all the nodes are dedicated either to input features or to output
features, no nodes are available to represent higher-level structures.
And, since the learning rule for adjusting weights encourages all observed
statistical associations to be reflected in the connection weights, the
manner in which an output pattern emerges in a pattern associator will not
likely reflect a particular algorithm. If we assume that the connectionist
models that are to account for human cognitive abilities are simple pattern
associatora, eliminative connectionism is certainly an attractive view. I
now want to show that the same can be said of a slightly more complicated




The netwnrks Smolensky studied in harmony theory12 are auto-
associators with one layer of hidden units and a differential activation
equation. As with many auto-associators, the task confronting a harmonium
network 13 is pattern completion. A stimulus pattern of activity is encoded
in the input/output layer of nodes. The pattern can be interpreted as a
list of features, or, as Smolensky prefers, "microfeatures", which provides
a partial description of an object or situation. The goal of the network
is to complete the description by filling out the pattern of activity in
the input/output layer of nodes.
Smolensky calls the nodes in the hidden layer "knowledge atoms." A
given knowledge atom has a positive connection to some of the
microfeatures, a negative connection to others, and no connection to the
rest. Harmonium networks are unusual in that there are no intra-layer
connections, only connections between nodes in the hidden layer--knowledge
atoms-wand nodes in the input/output layer--microfeatures. The connections
between a given knowledge atom and the microfeatures define three subsets
of the input/output layer--the microfeatures that are positively connected
to the knowledge atom, those that are negatively connected, and those that
are unconnected. Potentially, there is a different knowledge atom for
every possible three-way partition of the set of microfeatures.
The potential number of knowledge atoms is enormous for input layers
of even modest size--3N where N is the number of microfeatures. Not all of
12. Harmony theory is presented in Smolensky, 1986.
13. The term is Smolensky's.
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the potential knowledge atoms will be used. But, for theoretical reasons,
it is likely that a substantial portion of them will be. S!.olensky is
particularly interested in using probability theory to study the
capabilities of harmonium networks. The theorems Smolensky proves in
Smolensky, 1986 concern how the network should and will complete a
particular pattern given its exposure to a variety of patterns in "the
environment." It is assumed that a pattern in the environment consists of
the presence of certain microfeatures and the explicit absence of others.
It is further assumed that the network contains a distinct knowledge atom
for every such pattern "observed" by the network. (Smolensky, 1986, pp.
226-229)
It is possible for a number of patterns to be observed on a single
occasion. Suppose, for example, the environment presents a pattern that
includes six features, with four others explicitly excluded and two
features neither included nor excluded. The pattern would contain as
subpatterns six different patterns that include five features, exclude
four, and neither include nor exclude three others. Any or.all of these
subpatterns could be observed depending on how observation is supposed to
work for the network in question. 14
All of these technical details are suggestive of a very large number
of knowledge atoms, and this is clearly what Smolensky has in mind.
Consider, for example, the following passage discussing how a harmonium
network would handle letter-perception:
14. The possibility of observing subpatterns is clearly suggested when
Smolenaky considers having some of the knowledge atoms in a word-
recognition network be digraph units, e.g. W in position 1 together
with A in position 2. (Smolensky, 1986, p. 204) The possibility also
seems to be in the general spirit of the discussion on pp. 201-208.
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In harmony theory, tne idea is that there would be a set of
representation nodes [nodes in tne input/output layer]
dedicated to the representation of the presence of letters
independent of their shapes, sizes, orientations, and so forth.
There would also be a set of representations for graphical
features, and for each letter there would be a multitude of
knowledge atoms, each relating a particular configuration of
graphical features with the representation of that letter
[Smolensky's emphasis]. (Smolensky, 1986, pp. 217-218)
Tne fact that harmonium networks contain very large numbers of
knowledge atoms is important. Higher-level structures in a harmonium
network do not correspond either to individual nodes in the input/output
layer or to individual knowledge atoms. Rather, they correspond to large
groups of knowledge atoms. It is possible that a given higher-level
structure will be best represented by one particular knowledge atom.
Suppose, for example, that we were to construct a harmonium network for the
room-schemata example. Thcz'e is a potential knowledge atom corresponding
to the prototypical bEdroom. The knowledge atom would have positive
connections to all those features that are contained in the prototypical
bathroom. There mignt be some features to which it had no connections, and
it would have positive connections to the rest. Perhaps this prototypical
knowledge atom would be included in our harmonium network. But, it needn't
be. As long as many knowledge atoms which have considerable overlap with
the prototypical knowledge atom are present in the network and are assigned
sufficient strength, the prototypical knowledge atom itself need not be
present. And, even if it is present, its role is not really
distinguishable from that of many similar knowledge atoms.
Learning in the harmonium network will consist of particular knowledge
atoms acquiring greater strength as they are observed in the environment
more and more frequently. Since a pairing of even two features constitutes
a knowledge atom, once again all statistical associations between features
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may be learned and then exert an influence on the emergence of an output
pattern during pattern completion. As with simple pattern associators,
then, we would not expect a harmonium network to implement a sequential
symbol-processing algoritnm.
3.5 Suumary
Harmonium networks differ from simple pattern associators in that a
layer of knowledge atoms is added. Each knowledge atom is associated with
a set of input features that it includes and a set that it excludes.
Harmonium networks are like simple pattern associators in that the activity
in the network is very diffuse. There are a very large number of knowledge
atoms, many of whion differ from others by a very small degree. The
learning procedure for harmonium networks, like the learning procedure for
simple pattern associators, results in all statistical associations being
learned reflected in connection weights; in this case, all statistical
associations between a given feature and a set of features are reflected in
the weights of connections between an input feature node and a knowledge
atom. When an output pattern emerges in a harmonium network during pattern
completion, just as in a simple pattern associator, a great many nodes will
be involved. Activity is spread over a great number of similar knowledge
atoms.
In sum, representation, learning and subsequent processing are diffuse
in harmonium networks, just as in simple pattern associators. I now want
to coin a term that will cover both simple pattern associators and
Smolenaky's harmonium network. To emphasize the diffuseness of
representation and processing, I will say that both are unstructured
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pattern associators.15 I won't try to delineate such a class of pattern
associators with any precision. What is important is: (a) to have some
term that covers both simple pattern associators and the pattern
associators studied in harmony theory; and (b) to have a rough idea of what
they have in common, so that when the time comes we'll have no trouble
recognizing that certain models are importantly different from t.ese.
What we have seen in this section is that unstructured pattern
associators are not likely candidates to be implementations of symbol-
processing algorithms. Therefore, if it is assumed that connectionist
models of cognitive processing typically consist of a single unstructured
pattern associator, or even multiple unstructured pattern associators
operating independently of one another, eliminative connectionism is
extremely plausible. In other words, someone who thinks of cognition as
unstructured pattern association ought to be an eliminative connectiunist.
In the rest of the paper I will argue that, in fact, Smolensky, and to a
lesser extent McClelland and Rumelhart, do hold to a view of cognition as
unstructured pattern association (I will sometimes refer to this view
simply as the view of "cognition as pattern association"). I will argue
further that this view is overly simple, and that a more realistic view of
how connectionist models might account for cognitive abilities, is not
nearly so conducive to eliminative connectionism.
15. Recall that harmonium networks are pattern associators with a single
hidden layer (the layer of knowledge atoms).
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4. Pattern Association and Eliminative Connectionism
4.1 Pattern Association and Smolenaky's
Eliminative Connectionism
We saw in section 2 that Smolensky is an eliminative connectionist.
Symbol-processing accounts cannot, he insists, precisely describe the
activity of the intuitive processor. But, why does he believe this? I
want now to suggest the following answer. Smolensky conceives of the
intuitive processor as a single pattern associator of the sort studied in
harmony theory (Smolensky, 1986). And, such networks, as we saw in section
3, are, like simple pattern associators, particularly conducive to
eliminative connectionism. In other words, Smolensky advocates eliminative
connectionism because he is implicitly wedded to the view of cognition as
unstructured pattern association.
To see how Smolensky's eliminative connectionisn is rooted in a view
of cognition as pattern association, let's begin by looking at the details
of the intuitive processor, Its important to realize that just because the
intuitive processor is thought to have a connectionist architecture does
not mean that the intuitive processor is a single connectionist network.
It could very well be a number of connectionist networks linked together.
This might raise the question of why it should then be thought of as a
single processor. But, there might be any number of reasons for this.
Perhops, for example, there is a single network in which the ultimate
output of the processing of all the other networks is represented. This
would be a reason for thinking of the networks as forming a larger whole.
Nevertheless, although the intuitive processor could be thought of as a set
pf irnterlinked connectionist networks, it is pretty clear that Smolensky
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thinks of it as a single network. 16  Immediately after stating that the
intuitive processor has a connectionist architecture, he writes,
The kind of connectionist model I will consider can be
described -as a network of very simple processors, units, each
possessing a numerical activation value that is dynamically
determined by the values of the other processors in the
network. The activation equation governing this interaction
has numerical parameters which determine the direction and
magnitude of the influence of one activation value on another;
these parameters are called connection strengths or weights.
The activation equation is a differential equation .... A
network is sometimes programmed by the modeler, but often a
network programs itself to perform a task by changing its
weights in response to examples of input/output pairs for the
task. The learning rule is the differential equation governing
the weignt changes. (Smolensky, 1987, p. 5.)
All of these assumptions generate "the connectionist dynamical system
hypothesis":
Tne state of the intuitive processor at any moment is precisely
defined by a vector of numerical values (one for each unit).
The dynamics of the intuitive processor is governed by a
differential equation. The numerical parameters in this
equation constitute the processor's program or knowledge.
These parameters may change according to a learning equation.
(Smolensky, 1987, p. 5)
If the intuitive processor were a set of networks, it would make more sense
to say that the state of the processor at any moment is defined by a set of
vectors, one for each network. It would also be more natural to regard
each network as having its own activation equation. 17 Similarly witn the
learning equation. That Smolensky thinks of the state of the processor as
16. It should be emphasized that the criticisms I will go on to level
against the view of cognition as pattern association apply both to (a)
views that envision single pattern associators as models of cognitive
processes; and (b) views that envision multiple pattern associators
operating independently as models of cognitive processes. Smolensky's
view, however, seems to be of the former variety.
17. I only say more natural because, if we assume that the connections
between the networks are of the standard connectionist sort, and if the
general principles governing activation were the same in each network,
then it would be possible to regard the set of networks as a single
network with a single activation equation.
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being defined by a single vector, and his assumption without argument or
comment that the rules governing update of activation and modification of
connection strengths should be expressed in a single activation equation
and a single learning equation, make it evident that Smolensky thinks of
the intuitive processor as a single connectionist network.
The passages above also serve to make another point. Smolensky
assumes that the activation equation will be a differential equation. 18
This assumption is borrowed from his work on harmony theory, in which he
studied connectionist networks governed by a differential activation
equation. Those networks also happened to be auto-associators with a
single layer of hidden units. Smolensky is evidently thinking of the
intuitive processor as a single network of the kind he studied in narmony
theory.
There is yet another manner in which the intuitive processor could
easily have been complicated. The ultimate output of the intuitive
processor could be the outcome of several processing cycles. By a
processirg cycle, I mean the period of time which begins when a network
receives an input and ends when the pattern of activity of the network has
stabilized. In many systems the activation equation changes over the
course of such a processing cycle in accordance with a measurement called
"temperature." In the beginning of the cycle the temperature of the system
18. The significance of a differential activation equation is that a
differential equation is continuous. So, in the Smolensky's networks,
activation levels are updated continuously, not just at discrete units
of time. This feature sets up a parallel between the activity of such
networks and the activity of thermodynamic systems, a parallel that
Smolensky makes much of in Smolenaky, 1987. For our purposes, the
important parallel is the one between the networks that appear in
harmony theory and the intuitive processor.
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is high. This means that there is a large random component in the
assignment of activation levels. The temperature cools over the course of
the processing cycle. The intuitive processor could work as follows. It
begins with an initial input. The temperature of the system is raised and
then lowered, leading it to settle into a particular pattern )f activity.
This pattern then becomes the input for the next processing cycle, during
which the temperature is again raised and then lowered. Eventually, after
some number of processing cycles, the network settles into a final pattern
of activity, constituting its ultimate output. Smolensky specifically
proposes something like tt e above scenario as an account of conscious rule
application. Among the intermediate patterns of activity are the explicit
rules being followed. (More on this later.) However, Smolensky also
specifically assumes that this is not how the intuitive processor
functions. The contrast is described in the following passage:
Using the stored rules th;e network can perform the task. the
standard learning procedures of connectionist models turn this
experinnce performing the task into a set of weights for going
from inputa to outputs. Eventually, after enough experience,
the task can be performed directly by these weights. The input
activity generates the output activity so quickly that before
the relatively slow interpretation process has a chance to
reinstantiate the first rule and carry it out, the task is
done. (Sriolensky, 1987, p. 12)
In sum, Smolensky assumes that the intuitive processor is a single
connectionist network, with a differential activation equation that
produces a response to an input in i single processing cycle. He all but
explicitly assumes that it is a pattern associator of the kind he studied
in harmony theory.
That Smolensky regaras tne intuitive processor as an unstructured
pattern ossociator can further be seen in the concluding section of the
paper, where re illustrates the relation between connectionist accounts of
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the intuitive processor and symbolic accounts at the conceptual level
(Smolensky, 1987, pp. 21-23). Smolensky discusses two specific examples in
this section. One example is taken from his work on harmony theory, and
is, therefore, a harmonium network. The other example is the room-schemata
example, which is, as we have seen, a simple auto-associator.
4.2 Pattern Association and Rumelhart
and NoClelland's Conneotionism
Both the detailed assumptions that he makes about the intuitive
processor--which, one must keep in mind, is supposed to be responsible for
the vast majority of cognition--and the examples he uses to illustrate the
relation between connectionist and symbol-processing models, show that
Smolensky, in "On tne Proper Treatment of Connectionism," relies on a view
of cognition as unstructured pattern association. Rumelhart and
McClelland, in "PDP Models and General Issues in Cognitive Science," do not
give as elaborate a picture of cognition as Smolensky does. It would be
unfair to charge them with the view of cognition as pattern association.
Still, their view of the relation between connectionist and symbol-
processing models is heavily influenced by the pattern association
paradigm, They write:
The basic perspective of this book [Parallel Distributed
Processing] is that many of the constructs of macrolevel
descriptions such as schemata, prototypes, rules, productions,
etc, can be viewed as emerging out of interactions of the
microstructure of distributed models. These point are most
explicitly considered in Chapters 6, 14, 17 aand 16. (Rumelhart
And McClelland, 1986a, p. 125.)
Chapter 6 is Smolensky'a essay on harmony theory. Chapter 14 in Rumelhart
et al., 1986, the central example of which is the room-schemata model
described above--a simple auto-associator. In chapter 17, McClelland and
Rumelhart present a PDP model of human learning and memory. Each of the
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specific models described in the chapter are simple auto-associators.19
Finally, chapter 18 presents Rumelhart and McClelland's model of the
acquisition of the past tense. The model is essentially a simple pattern
associator. In some simulations the pattern associator is augmented by a
secondary output layer, but this additional layer is not fundamental to the
model.20  It turns out that all of the models that illustrate Rumelhart and
McClelland's (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986a) basic perspective on the
relation between connectionist and symbol-:yocessing models are
unstructured pattern associators. If, as I shall argue, unstructured
pattern associators are too simple to serve as a general paradigm for
cognition, then the foundations of both Smolensky's and Rumelhart and
McClelland's eliminative connectionism will be shaken.
5. Problems with the View of Cognition as Pattern Association
We have seen that in espousing eliminative connectionism, Rumelhart
and McClelland (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986a) to some extent, and
Smolensky to a greater extent, have relied on a view of cognition as
unstructured pattern association. My aim in this section is to cast doubt
19. McClelland and Rumelhart actually contemplate a model of human memory
consisting of a large number of interconnected modules, each one of
which would be a simple auto-associator (McClelland and Rumelhart,
1986, p. 174). They also contemplate the possibility of augmenting the
networks with hidden units (McClelland and Rumelhart, 1986, pp.
209-14). However, the PDP models that are presented in the chapter,
and whose performance is compared with human performance on a variety
of learning tasks, are all individual modules, and, hence, consist of a
single simple auto-associator.
20. Rumelhart and McClelland write, "All learning occurs in the pattern
cssooiator; the decoding network is simply a mechanism for converting a
featural representation 'ihich may be a near miss to any phonological
pattern into a legitimate phonological representation. Our primary
focus here is on the pattern associator." (Rumelhart and McClelland,
1986b, p. 223
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on this view and thereby cast doubt on the eliminative connectionism of
these authors. More particularly, I will claim that a careful look at the
connectionist research program itself, even that branch of it represented
in Parallel Distributed Processing, suggests that unstructured pattern
association may not be adequate as a paradigm for the study of cognition.
I will begin in section 5.1 by describing three ways in which
structure is sometimes added to PDP models. As I present each of tnese
features I will discuss how the structure in these models make it more
likely that they will be implementations of symbol-processing algorithms.
In section 5.2 I discuss the importance of these features and reasons for
thinking that they or other similar features ought to be incorporated into
PDP models that are adequate to account for human cognitive abilities.2 1
It should be emphasized that the discussions in sections 5.1 and 5.2
are supposed to nave a cumulative effect. I will discuss three very
different ways of adding structure to PDP models, arguing in each case that
there is reason to consider complicating PDP models in this way and that
doing so makes them much more likely to end up being implementations of
sequential symbol-processing algorithms. I do not claim for any of the
features that PDP models will absolUt have to have the feature or that
models with that feature will necessarily implement conventional models.
Nor do I even attempt to show that models with any of te particular
21. The ensuing discussion may leave the unknowing reader with a picture of
connectionist research according to which simple pattern association is
the most basic, fundamental model and other models can be derived from
simple pattern association with the addition of the relevant features.
This is not an accurate picture. Many connectionist models, particular
non-distributed models, are neither simple pattern associators nor
variations on that theme. McClelland and Rumelhart's interactive model
of word recognition is a prominent example (MeClelland and Rumelhart,
1981).
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features in question will implement full-blown symbol-processing
algorithms. Rather, I show in each case that models witn these features
are likely to exhibit substantial elements of sequential symbol-processing
algorithms. Although my claims for each feature are, therefore, not
particularly strong, their cumulative effect, particularly when one
considers that the features could be combined, shiuld be to demonstrate
that there are a great many ways in which PDP models could be developed,
and, perhaps need to be developed, so that they will come to implement
symbol-processing models. Hence, it will be seen, one should be extremely
wary of assuming, in our current state of ignorance about what fully
adequate PDP models of cognitive processes might look like, that they will
not in any way implement symbol-processing algorithms.
5.1 Ways of Ading Structure to PDP Models
Smaller Numbers of Special Purpose Hidden Units. The possibility of
using hidden units in pattern associators is important because simple
pattern associators are subject to the limits On certain perceptron-like
devices discovered by Minsky and Papert(Minsky and Papert, 1969).
Perceptron-like devices (pattern associators being such devices) without
hidden units cannot compute certain functions, such as the logical function
of exclusive disjunction. Smolensky, we saw, uses very large numbers of
hidden units arranged in a single layer. Also, in his harmonium networks,
the connections between a given hidden unit, or knowledge atom, and
features in the input/output layer, and, therefore, the significance of the
unit, is fixed in advance. Other models have not insisted on a large
number of hidden units. They have also formulated methods by which
connections involving hidden units can be learned. In such models, the
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hidden units often come to play very particular roles in processing. This
is in contrast to harmonium networks where the role played by any given
knowledge atom is very similar to the role played by many others.
Rumelhart and Zipser, 1986; Rumelhart, Hinton and Williams, 1986; and,
Ackley, Hinton and Sejnowski, 1985 provide examples of such models.22
Although I believe that similar sorts of remarks would apply to other
proposals for small numbers of special-purpose hidden units, I want now to
focus on one in particular. Specifically, I want to argue that the
networks described in Rumelhart and Zipser, 1986 are likely to contain
elements of sequential processing. The networks Rumelhart and Zipser
studied were not pattern associators. Rather, they were networks of the
kind called "regularity detectors." A regularity detector contains an
input layer and some hidden units. As with pattern associators, a single
input is a pattern of activity over the whole input layer. The network
receives a range of inputs during the course of the training period, each
witn a particular frequency. The system is supposed to discover and come
to represent regularities in the input population.23  In Rumelhart and
Zipser's networks, the hidden units are organized into a hierarchy of
layers. Within each layer units are organized into clusters. Units within
22. Minsky and Papert, incidentally, were dubious about perceptrons
because, although their computational limitations could be overcome by
adding hidden units, it wasn't clear that adequate learning rules for
the hidden units would be forthcoming. Hence, because of the existence
of learning rules such as the ones in the references cited above, their
reasons for being dubious about perceptrons have largely been overcome.
See the Epilogue to the expanded edition of Perceptrons (Minsky and
Papert, 1988) for a discussion of this issue.
23. It isn't hard to imagine a regularity detector being merged with a
pattern associator so that regularities in the inputs were used to
assist in producing the appropriate response to a given input.
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a cluster "compete" with each otner in the learning process so that
different units end up responding to distinct features of the inputs.
In the particular example I want to describe in some detail, there are
two layers of hidden units. The first layer contains two clusters, each
containing four units. The second layer contains one cluster of two units.
The input layer contains 72 units. The nodes in the input layer can be
thought of as forming two 6-by-6 square grids. The grid on the left serves
as a "teaching" grid and is eventually dropped, so that the input
eventually occurs only in the grid on the right. The network will receive
a large number of inputs (the input population) in the grid on the right,
and the goal of the network is to come to respond to regularities in the
input population. Since tne final cluster of hidden nodes contains only
two nodes, the network will tend to classify the input population into two
sorts, with one node lighting up when inputs of the first sort are
produced, and the other node lignting up when inputs of the second sort are
produced. In the input population for which the network was tested, all
the inputs were either vertical or horizontal lines in the 6-by-6 grid.
Hence, if the network is successful, one of the top two nodes should come
to respond to vertical lines and the other to horizontal lines.
When the network was tested on this input populatioa, each of the
units in the first layer learned to respond either to half of the vertical
lines or to half of the horizontal lines (in the grid on the right). So,
four of the units in the first layer only respond to vertical lines, and
the other four units only respond to horizontal lines (though no one node
at this layer will respond if and only if a vertical/horizontal line is
present). One of the units in the top layer then learned to respond when
and only when two of the former units became active. The other unit in the
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top layer learned to respond wnen and only when two of tne latter units in
tne first hidden layer became active. Hence, one of tne units in tne top
layer came to respond when and only when the input was a horizontal line,
and the other unit came to respond when and only when tne input was a
vertical line.
Clearly, the network, which is depicted Figure 2, can be thought of as
implementing a particular three-step algorithm for determining whether the
activation of some nodes in a 6-by-6 grid of nodes is either a vertical or
a horizontal line. Each of tne first two steps, which are taken in
parallel, consist of determining whether the input falls into any one of
four categoriesi. The third step uses the results of the first two steps to




..... < InptA Units
Figure 2. Reproduced from Rumelhart and Zipser, 1986.
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The fact that the network can be seen to implement an algorithm is more
important than the sophistication of the achievement. Still it is worth
noting that the achievement is more notable than it might first appear.
The architecture of the network is indifferent to how the input nodes are
arranged. It would have been just as accurate to picture them in a single
row or in a differently arranged 6-by-6 grid, so that the inputs could not
have been thought of as vertical or horizontal lines. The network would
still have worked in the very same way, and thereby learned an algorithm
for classifying tne inputs in an important way.
The network in the example above comes to implement a simple
sequential algorithm for recognizing vertical/horizontal lines because of
general features of Rumelhart and Zipser's proposal. Hidden units are
organized on this proposal into a hierarchy of clusters. The arrangement
of the layers Logetner witn tne associated learning rules have the
consequence that any given cluster of hidden nodes comes to detect
regularities in tne patterns in the layer below it. It is quite natural
that such networks would come to implement sequential algorithms for
classifying the stimulus encoded in the input layers, with the hidden nodes
in the higher layers detecting regularities of greater scope (i.e.,
applying to more of the nodes in the input layer) and greater abstraction.
The greater the number of layers, or the greater the number of clusters
within each layer, the greater is the potential for such a network to
implement a complex algorithm.
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Modular Structure. Connectionist models may be organized into a
number of distinct networks or modules.24  One can imagine, for example, a
model consisting of two pattern associators which have been connected so
that some or all of the output nodes of one pattern associator are
connected to the input nodes of the other. In this manner, the output of
the first pattern associator could become the input to the second.
McClelland and Rumelhart (McClelland and Rumelhart, 1986) propose a model
of human learning and memory which consists of a large number of
interconnected networks or modules. "We assume," they write, "tnat the
units are organized into modules. Eacn module receives inputs from other
modules; the units witnin the module are richly interconnected with each
other; and they send outputs to other modules." (McClelland and Rumelhart,
1986, p. 174.) They suppose that a complete system of memory would contain
"many hundreds or perhaps many thousands" of modules.
The significance of a modular structure is clear. In general, if a
connectionist attempts to model human performance of a given task and
proposes a modular structure, each network will be thought of as being
responsible for a distinct component of the task. Suppose that the
connections are arranged so that processing in any given network does not
bedin until the network which supplies its input has stabilized. And,
suppose that each of the components of the task corresponded to a step in a
symbol-processing algorithm. Then, it is easy to imagine the model
implementing a sequential (or only moderately parallel) symbol-processing
24. The modules under discussion here are not assumed to be modules in
Fodor's (Fodor, 1983) sense. For example, there is no assumption of
informational encapsulation. When I talk about modular structure, I
simply mean a PDP model consisting of a number of distinct,
interconnected networks.
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algorithm. The restriction that the modules supplying the input to a given
module stabilize before the given module begins processing could be
relaxed. We would only have to require that the end result in the given
module is the same as it would be if it received its inputs all at once,
rather than over a period of time. We could relax the assumption still
further if any deviations were incidental enough to regard as effects of
the implementation. Whether the interactions among modules in sucn PDP
models will generally turn out to satisfy any version of these assumptions
is a matter of speculation. But, it is certainly plausible that they will.
Multiple annealings. The final complicating feature of PDP models
that I want to bring up is one discussed at length by Smolensky himself.
He proposes it to account for conscious rule application, that aspect of
cognition that does not involve the intuitive processor. Smolensky
supposes that a particular pattern associator contains units for a large
number of features pertaining to some problem. Patterns of activity over
these features are able to represent both descriptions of the current state
of the problem (state-descriptions) and linguistic descriptions of rules
pertaining to the problem. In conscious rule application the problem is
solved as follows. The statement of the problem provides the initial input
to the pattern associator. The-pattern associato" goes through a single
annealing process. This annealing is not sufficient to generate a pattern
of activity representing a solution to the problem. Instead the pattern
associator generates a rule. In partioular, it generates a rule whose
antecedent is satisfied by the stimulus state-description. Suppose, for
example, that the problem being solved is of the sort found in books of
"brain teasers," where a group of people must be seated around a table
subject to various constraints. Then, the stimulus state-description might
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be that Harry is sitting next to Shirley. And, the rule generated might
say that if Harry is sitting next to Shirley, then neither Bill nor Beth is
sitting next to Harry.
Once a rule has been generated, it becomes the input to the pattern
associator which then goes through another annealing process. The output
this time is a representation of the situation that execution of the rule
would produce. In the example above, the second annealing process
generates a state-description that includes the information that neither
Bill nor Beth is sitting next to Harry. This new situation becomes the
input for another stage of processing, which generates a new rule. The
network thus produces an alternating sequence of state-descriptions and
rules such that each rule applies to the state-description that precedes it
and each state-description is the consequence of applying the preceding
rule to the preceding state-description.
Eventually, after enough rules have been generated and executed, a
solution to the problem will be generated. Smolensky proposes that
conscious rule application is realized in connectionist networks through
multiple annealings of the same network in this way. After enough
experience, he supposes, connection weights will be established wnich will
make it possible to generate the pattern of activity representtng the
solution to the puzzle in a single annealing.
A network of the sort just described (at the point when it still
requires multiple annealings to generate solutions) obviously implements a
sequential algorithm in order to solve the problems it is given. In fact,
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it can be seen to implement a production system.25  During the stages in
which the ultimate output of the network is a rule, the network can be
regarded as identifying a production whose antecedent matches the current
situation. During the stages in which the ultimate output is a description
of the situation resulting from execution of the rule, the network can be
regarded as executing the production. In general, when a PDP model
involves multiple annealings, the model can be seen as implementing a
serial process.
5.2
I have described three different features of PDP models, each of which
makes them more structured than unstructured pattern associators. In each
case we saw that the additional structure may result in the models
implementing sequential algorithms. If tnese features are combined, of
course, the possibilities of implementing standard symbol-processing
algorithms are only increased. The obvious question at this point is, will
adequate PDP models of human cognitive abilities (if suon are fortncoming)
have some or all of tnese features? If there is reason for thinking that
they will, then the versions of eliminative connectionism that we have been
discussing will be in trouble. I want next to argue that indeed there are
reasons to believe that some or all of the above features will be present
in adequate PDP models of human cognitive abilities. But, first I want to
emphasize that the burden of proof here is really on Smolensky and on
Rumelhart and McClelland. Once it is clear that their ideological
positions depend on a very particular sort of PIP model, the burden of
25. See J. R. Anderson, 1983, chapter i for a general discussion of
production systems.
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proof, it seems to me, is on them to give reasons for thinking that
adequate PDP models of human cognitive abilities will be models of that
sort. Still, I shall now give some reasons for thinking that they won't.
Small numbers of special-purpose hidden units. The importance of
having some hidden units is clear. As I noted earlier, without any hidden
units, pattern associators are subject to the limits on perceptrons
discovered by Minsky and Papert. Smolensky's harmonium networks have
hidden units, but present a different problem. Recall that in a harmonium
network, the network comes with a full array of knowledge atoms in place.
And, the connections between knowledge atoms and the input/output layer are
fixed in advance. All tnat is learned is the strength of the knowledge
atom. The obvious question, then, is how do the knowledge atoms, complete
with connection weignts, get put in tne network. An obvious suggestion
would be to have a mechanism for automatically "growing" all the possible
knowledge atoms for a given input/output layer, and perhaps eliminating
ones that are never used. However, as I noted earlier, the number of
possible knowledge atoms is 3N for an input/output layer of size N. The
number of possible knowledge atoms is too large for this suggestion to be
biologically plausible even for an input/output layer with 40
microfeatures: the number of nodes required would exceed the numbvr of
neurons in the brain by several ordere of magnitude. Models with a small
number of hidden units in wihich the strengths of a given units' connections
are learned do not have this problem. Installing a few hidden units which
obey the appropriate learning rule is easy enough. The learning rule takes
care of everything else. In raising this question of how harmonium
networks acquire their knowledge atoms, I do not mean to suggest that it .is
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a fatal problem. Still it does provide one reason for thinking that the
otner models may be preferable.
Modular structure. The fundamental point I want to raise here is a
simple one: PDP models are typically incomplete in many ways (not unlike
most models in cognitive psycnology). Many aspects of the task in question
are 'ssumed to be handled elsewhere, I.e. somewhere otner than the network
being described. Within a PDP framework, "elsewhere" could mean one of two
things, eitner in an expanded version of tne network being described, or in
other networks connected in appropriate ways with the one being described.
The latter option is, I believe, often more natural and leads to the
supposition that the network being desc' .bed is part of a larger modular
structure- I'll now illustrate tnes. points witn an example, Rumelnart and
McClelland's model of the acquisition of the past tense (Rumelhart and
McCLelland, 1986b). Much of tne discussion relies on Pinker and Prince,
1987, in which tne model and some of its snortcomings are dis.ussed at
lengtn.
For tne sake of this discussion, all we need to know about Rumelhart
and McClelland's model is: (1) toat it is a simple pattern associator; (2)
that the input layer encodes pr 'ent tense forms of vert s and the output
layer encodes past tense forms; (3) that the microfeatures in the layers
are purely phonolciical: and (4) that the model learns by being repeated1v
exposed (by some external entity) to present tense forms followed by tne
correct associbted past tense form. Once the modex has gone through a
period of learning it is supposed to be able to produce the correct past
tense form in its output layer when a given present tense form is encoded
in, its .input layer.
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The first tning to notice is that in actual practice the network will
be conjoined witn a mecnanism or mecnanisms whicn need to access tne past
tense form of a given verb in completing some task and use tne network for
this purpose. One mignt think that tnese mechanisms are peripheral to the
actual acquisition of the past tense, that all the learning takes place
inside tne network. But, this isn't so. In some cases, for example, the
output of the network will have to be interpreted in a fairly sophisticated
way. For some people, myself included, tne word "leap" has two more or
less equally acceptable past tense forms, "leapt" and "leaped." My answer
to the question, wnat is tne past tense of "leap"?--"Wcll, it really nas
two past tense forms ..."--can to some extent be accounted for by this PDP
model. Perhaps 1 neve a net fork of tne sort proposed and it produces two
stable patterns in its output layer given "leap" as input. Still, tne fact
tnat I say tnat "leap" nas two past tenses, rather tnan saying tnat I'm not
sure wnat its prat tense is or tnat I don't remember must be accounted for.
Evidently, part of my knowledge about the past tense of "leap" is contained
outside tne network Itself, and resides in tne me.nanisms tnat interpret
it.
Tnere also must be fairly sopnisticated knowledge of tre past tense in
the mecianisms that access the network. Pinker and Prince note, for
example, that when a verb is derived from a noun, the regular rule for past
tense formation is used, citing examples such as26:
(a) He flied out to tne centerfielder. (not flew)
26. Pinker and Prince, 1988, p. 111.
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(b) The invading army ringed the city with troops. (not rang)
It appears that in the production of such sentences the network is
bypassed, and some mechanism that generates the regular form used. The
knowledge that this is to be done must be built into the mechanisms that
would rormally access the network.
The mechanisms that are responsible for "teaching" the network will be
another locus of important activity in the acquisition of the past tense.
Presumably teaching occurs as tne child comprehends sentences and her
language comprehension faculties figure out, using syntactic and semantic
clues, that some of the pnonological forms being processed must be past
tense forms of familiar verbs. Thus, there is a subtle interaction between
tne mechanisms involved in parsing sentences and constructing tneir
meaning, and the past tense network. Tne interaction will presumably go
both ways: an association between a present tense and a past tense form,
even when it is weak, will probably sometimes be one of the clues in
determining that a given form is tne past tense of a certain verb; tne
association will then, of course, be reinforced.
Other likely cases of important interactions between the past tense
network and mechanisms external'to it--other networks if the model is to
fit into a PDP framework--could be cited. There is likely, for example, to
be some interaction between the past tense network and networks responsible
for acquiring related forms such as passives, past participles and verbal
adjectives, all of which are governed by the same rules for regular
verbs.27 In sum, a complete account of the acquisition of the past tense
27. See Pinker and Prince, 1988, p. 102.
- 184 -
will involve much more than a single network. It must involve a large
number of networks interacting in complex ways. And, the locus of tne
explanation of the past tense will involve the other networks crucially.
This claim is not intended as a criticism of Rumelnart and McClelland's
model of the acquisition of the past tense. Rather, it is a reminder that
their model is a deliberate simplification. Careful analysis of other PDP
models would, I believe, lead to similar conclusions. Althcugh a single
network is typically posited to account for cognitive abilities, ultimately
these networks will generally have to be embedded in larger structures in
order to become complete accounts of tne ability in questions. Hence,
there is reason to believe that ultimately many PDP models of cognitive
abilities may nave a modular structure.
Multiple annealings. I want, finally, to discuss multiple annealings.
The tnrust of my remarks nere will be tnat if sometning like pattern
association is fundamental to cognition, then, something like multiple
annealings will likely be used in many PDP models of human cognitive
abilities. Before arguing this point, nowever, I want to recall
Smolensky's proposal for implementing conscious rule application in a PDP
architecture througn multiple annealings. Tne sort of rules Smolensky has
in mind are, of course, rules that are expressed in production systems as
condition-action pairs, or productions. The proposal, very roughly, is
that conscious rule application can be modeled by an auto-associator if (a)
states of the network in which a condition obtains, cause the network to
settle into a pattern of activity in which a rule witn that condition is
represented, and Cb) states of the network representing a given rule cause
tne network to then settle into a pattern of activity representing a new
situation in which tne action sequence of the rule has been executed.
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After presenting tnis proposal, Smolensky suggests that such networks will
eventually be able to perform tasks directly without going tnrough multiple
annealings.
Using the stored rules the network can perform the task. The
standard learning procedures of connectionist models turn this
experience performing tne task into a set of weights for going
from inputs to outputs. Eventually, after enough experience,
the task can be performed directly by these weights. The input
activity generates the output activity so quickly that before
the relatively slow interpretation process has a chance to
reinstantiate the first rule and carry it out, the task is
done. (Smolensky, 1987, p. 12.)
Tne suggestion in tnis passage, which offers an account of tne novice-
expert snift, mignt be used to argue for tne relative importance of PDP
models.28 Early in Smolensky's paper, a dicnotomy is set up between
conscious rule application and tne operations of tne intuitive processor.
Symbol processing models may provide satisfying accounts of conscious rule
application. But, ne wants to argue, tney don't provide satisfying
accounts of otner kinds of cognition, namely tne operation of the intuitive
processor, wnich is best explained in PDP terms. The proposal that
conscious rule application rapidly becomes intuitive suggests tnat
conscious rule application will account for a relatively small percentage
of cognitive activity: it can't be prevalent in any domain for long
without becoming an intuitive process. Connectionist models, then, will
account for far more of cognition tnan will symbol processing models.
There is a major flaw in tnis argument. Let us accept Smolensky's
account of the novice-expert shift. And, let us assume that conscious rule
applicution, with experience, is rapidly transformed into the expert's
28. I am not claiming that Snmolensky makes the following argument, tnougn
it seems to me that he may.
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ability to perceive the answer to a problem directly. Still, much of
cognition will not be accounted for by pattern associators completing a
task in a single annealing. Even for an expert in a given domain, a great
number of cognitive tasks can only be completed over an extended period of
time. Rumelhart et al. explicitly assume tnat their networks take on tne
order of a few hundred milliseconds to settle into a stable pattern of
activity.29  Smolensky does not make this explicit assumption, but ne does
assume, following Rumelhart et al., that the contents of consciousness are
the stable patterns of activity of the intuitive processor.30 Presumably,
when a cognitive task is performed over a number of minutes, tne contents
of consciousness cnange a number of times. We can infer, then, tnat in
such a task tne intuitive processor will acnieve a sequence of stable
states pricr to completion of tne task. And, this, of course, requires
multiple annealings.
Sucn will be the case then witn any task tnat requires extended
deliberation. In the novice-expert snift, of course, what originally
required deliberation no longer does. But, for even the most expert of
experts many tasks will require substantial deliberation. The chess master
may have learned to "perceive" cneckmate without consciously verifying that
eacn of her possible moves leaves tne king vulnerable. But, she still
takes several minutes to choose a single move in a serious game of cness.
Such examples could, of course, be produced for any other expert we might
choose. The physicist recognizes the solution to Physics 101 problems at a
29. See Rumelhart et al., 1986, p. 39.
30. See Smolensky, 1987, p. 12.
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glance, but presumably will have occasion to deliberate at length when
designing expertments to test the very latest theory in particle physics.
Extended deliberation will also be required in many tasks not
associated with any sort of expert. The formulation of complex intentions
and plans often requires extended deliberation, During such time
consciousness is full of mental activity: subgoals are formulated,
consequences of possible actions are evaluated, etc. The point here is not
tnat tasks which require extensive deliberation of experts must be achieved
by way of conscious rule application. I don't intend to be advocating any
particular psychological account of tnese cognitive abilities. Tne point
is simply tnat if Smolensky's intuitive processor or some otner PDP network
is to model extended deliberation, tn2 model will nave to settle into many
different stable patterns of activities before the task is completed. In
otner words, extended deliberation can only be modeled by PDP networks
wnich undergo multiple annealings.
6. Conclusion
Before reviewing and summarizing the arguments presented in this
paper, I want discuss the polemical situation created by papers such as
Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986a and more particularly by Smolensky, 1987.
No one doubts that connectionist models are very different, both in spirit
and detail, from the symbol-processing models, designed to be implemented
in conventional computer architectures, that have dominated cognitive
science. One can recognize these differences, however, and still maintain
that there is an important place for both connectionist and symbol-
processing models. Eliminative connectionists choose not to; instead they
believe that connectionism should be taken as and advocated as an
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alternative approach to the study of cognition wnose ascendance will render
some symbol-processing models obsolete, some superfluous, and otners merely
heuristic.
Neitner McClelland and Rumelhart or Smolensky really offers an
argument for their version of eliminative connectionism. There is a good
reason for tnis. It is clearly possible to construct connectionist models
that do implement symbol-processing models. It would be futile, tnerefore,
to attempt to argue that a connectionist must be an eliminative
connectionist. It is quite natural, then, that in advocating eliminative
connectionism Mclelland and Rumelhart and Smolensky focus on describing
wnat they believe connectionist models should look like and the relation
they envision between tnese models and traditional accounts in tne relevant
cognitive domains. The views, as a wnole, are never really argued for,
altnough parts of tne views are.
Someone reading these essays, be they a connectionist or not,
wondering wnether to take connectionism as, or perhaps whether to pursue it
as, a radical alternative to traditional models in cegnitive science,
cannot critically evaluate arguments given for the view that she snould so
take it; no such broad arguments nave been provided. Of course, tne reader
can critically evaluate the arguments that are provided, but all of these
are in the service of narrower claims. In this situation, it is perfectly
reasonable for the critical reader to inquire into the sources of the
authors' views about what connectionist models should look like and what
their relation to other models ought to be. In particular, it is
reasonable to wonder whether the views reflect a very narrow conception of
a connectionist model and whether the views would make less sense if the
conception were broadened. This is, of course, the tack that I have taken.
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Revealing that these views appear to follow from a very narrow conception
of a connectionist model is important. Many readers, connectionists and
non-connectionists alike, would, I believe, take much more of a skeptical
stance toward Smolensky's and Rumelhart and McClelland's versions of
eliminative connectionism if they believed them to follow largely from an
overly narrow conception of a connectionist model. My a;m has beeti to
encourage the development of such skepticism.
Toward tnat end, I nave highlighted tne fundamental importance of what
I call unstructured pattern association in the views of Smolensky and of
McClelland and Rumelhart, This was the aim of sections 3 and particularly
section 4. Having established the role of unstructured pattern
association, I turned to the question of whetner eliminative connectionism
retains its plausibility given tne possioility of a wider range of
connectionist models. In section 5, tnen, I examined three different ways
of modifying unstructured pattern association. I argued that in each case,
tne possibility that connectionist models implement symbol processing
models is substantially increased. Finally, in section 5.2 I argued that
these modifications of unstructured pattern association are not mere
possibilities. In each case, there are reasons for thinking that
connectionist models adequate to account for f iman cognitive abilities may
include such features. We can conclude not only that unstructured pattern
association plays a crucial role in Swolensky's and McClelland and
Rumelhart's eliminative connectionism, but that the views lose their appeal
if an approprtately broad range of connectionist models are considered. A
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